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The thesis provides a critical, comparative analysis of some important, 
recent theoretical approaches to the study of international relations in 
terms of their distinctive explanations of the process of order 
formation characterising the modern western states-system. Drawing upon 
the critical resources offered by Ashley's typology of different 
knowledge-constitutive interests orienting different forms of 
theoretical inquiry, the thesis distinguishes the contrasting 
conceptions of this modern process of international order formation 
presented in the work of representative thinkers of the Neo-Realist, 
Rationalist and Critical theoretical perspectives, noting the different 
methodological approaches informing these models. At the same time, the 
thesis provides a critical assessment of these different theories in 
terms of their relative adequacy as a means for understanding the 
general nature and significance of this modern process of order 
formation considered, in broadest terms, as the expression of the uneven 
development of power between modern states. A central aim of the thesis 
argument in this context, is to indicate how the elaboration of this 
critical comparative analysis raises the possibility for the development 
of a more sophisticated theoretical model - a synthetic perspective 
which draws upon the valuable insights provided by the Neo-Realist, 
Rationalist and Critical approaches as the basis for the articulation of 
a more adequate understanding of the nature and implications of the 
process of order formation within the modern western international 
system.
INTRODUCTION
Since the time of Thucydides the question of what are the appropriate 
principles which should govern states' actions in their external 
relations and, consequent upon this, what type of order may be said to 
be possible between states has assumed a privileged position in the 
western tradition of thinking about international relations. Moreover, 
from the outset this issue has given rise to quite diverse and often 
conflicting responses in accordance with the more basic understandings 
of the nature of international relations informing the successive 
traditions of theoretical speculation on the subject.1 In Thucydides' 
own Melian Dialogue2, for example, we find articulated two radically 
opposed views of the limits of cooperative relations between states 
reflected in the respective positions of the Athenians and the Melians. 
Thus, the Athenians, in emphasising the necessitous nature of 
international relations as a sphere wherein self interest forms the 
basic motive of political action, offer a minimalist account of the 
possibilities for states' cooperation. Here the standard of justice 
governing the behaviour of states is seen to be dependent upon "the 
equality of power to compel and ... in fact the strong do what they have 
the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept"3. 
Contrasting with this position is the view of the Melians for whom the 
relations between states are seen to be subject to the normative 
standards of a community transcending individual states' interests and 
encompassing the totality of humankind. The proper foundation of
2interstate relations is identified by them with those higher, universal 
principles of justice pertaining "to the general good of mankind ... 
[based on considerations of] fair play and just dealing.
Significantly, contemporary scholars have pointed to a similar 
divergence of attitudes in the writings of those modern thinkers 
addressing themselves to this central question of the normative limits 
to the process of international order formation dictated by the 
qualitative nature of international relations as a sphere of political 
action. In this context Clark has differentiated between the opposing 
attitudes of Kant and Rousseau as representative of a much broader 
cleavage characterising modern thought on this subject manifested in the 
so-called traditions of optimism and despair. s For those thinkers 
included within the tradition of despair epitomised by the work of 
Rousseau, the sphere of international relations is understood as an 
unchanging, anarchical realm characterised by conditions of necessitous 
action which rigidly constrain the type of political relations possible 
between states. In a manner not dissimilar to that presented in the 
arguments of the Athenians the nature of cooperative relations between 
states is here seen to be rigidly delimited by the objective laws 
associated with the operation of an anarchical system of political 
action in which the dictates of states' self interest predominate. Here 
then, we encounter a strictly limited conception of the process of 
international order formation circumscribed by the recurring, 
necessitous constraints arising from a condition of international 
politics in which life is best characterised in Hobbesean terms as 
nasty, brutish and short.e
3Opposed to this general attitude of despair Clark identifies those 
thinkers who, following Kant, may be said to fall broadly within the 
purview of the tradition of optimism. According to Clark these thinkers 
are united, first and foremast, by the mare expansive conception of the 
potential for cooperation between states they offer - a conception based 
upon their shared view of the sphere of international relations as a 
condition facilitative of change and progress. Where the attitude of 
despair involves a denial of the possibility for the qualitative 
transformation of relations between states, the attitude of optimism, 
when applied to international politics, "reflects a faith that 
progressive change is possible."7 More particularly, this progressivist 
perspective entails a view of international relations as subject to the 
influence of ethical principles transcending the interests of particular 
states which potentially bind all humans as rational beings. As such 
these normative principles are seen to constitute the informing basis 
for the ongoing transformation of the anarchical structures of order 
existing between states, offering the foundation for the establishment 
of extended forms of human cooperation beyond the more limited dictates 
of states' self interest. Accordingly, for those subscribing to this 
tradition the attitude of optimism characterisitically engenders a 
concern with the prospective transformation of the relations between 
states and the extension of the nature of international order in 
accordance with these higher, universal norms.
Locating itself within the broader tradition of speculation noted here, 
the present thesis is concerned to examine the way this central 
question of the nature and limits of international order formation has
4been treated of within the works of certain important recent aspects of 
international relations theory. As we shall see, the theoretical 
perspectives examined in this work are characterised by their common 
concern with this issue as it relates to the particular milieu of the 
modern western states-system. Moreover, like the diverse perspectives 
associated with the broader theoretical tradition which precedes them, 
these different theoretical approaches present contrasting views of the 
nature and limits of order formation within the specific context of this 
modern states-system. They manifest their own distinctive attitudes of 
relative optimism or despair in accordance with their views as to 
whether that system is akin to one of amoral anarchy, in which 
cooperation can only be based upon the dictates of self interest or, 
alternatively, a condition susceptible to higher forms of interaction 
facilitating progressively more extensive forms of cooperation. 
Proceeding according to these fundamental assumptions about the 
qualitative nature of international relations as a sphere of political 
action each of these broad perspectives offers its own distinctive 
interpretation of the nature and limits of order formation between 
states within the modern western system of states.
In elucidating the major features of these different theoretical 
perspectives it is the aim of the present work to attempt to provide 
some general answers to the question of how we are to understand the 
process of order formation within the modern western international 
system and to try and reach some tentative conclusions as to the 
qualitative limits of that general process. In isolating this as the 
broad focus of the thesis then, it is not my intention to offer an
5historical analysis of the 'actual' processes of order formation 
occurring within the modern states-system.Q Rather, the approach adopted 
here is primarily theoretical in nature. Taking each of these different 
perspectives in turn, the thesis attempts to establish their 
effectiveness as a means for understanding the nature and implications 
of this modern process of international order formation. More 
particularly, by critically comparing the explanations provided in these 
different theoretical perspectives the attempt will be made to determine 
what they have to offer of value for the development of a general 
theoretical explanation of the nature of, and the limitations upon the 
formation of order within the modern western states-system.
As with other central concepts of political discourse the concept of 
order is a notoriously ambiguous and vigorously contested one.9 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, when applied to the more specific study of 
international politics this notion encompasses a range of different, 
potentially conflicting connotations.10 In using this term in the 
present work in relation to the process of order formation within the 
modern western international system what I want to signify, in very 
broad terms, is the idea of a pattern of activity embracing the 
constituent entities of a system or society which is directed to 
securing certain basic ends or goals. These goals may vary, but they are 
all ultimately connected with a more general end which is here 
identified as the reproduction of those regulative structures 
facilitating relatively stable relations between states within a 
condition of political anarchy. Adopting this very broad definition as 
our guide we can isolate as the main concern of those theories of
6international order formation examined below to explain the basic 
processes whereby such a pattern of activity is brought about and 
maintained between states within the modern western international 
system. Within the paramaters of the broad definition presented here, 
these theoretical perspectives incorporate very different views both of 
the type of order or pattern of activity produced by these processes and 
of the character of the order-producing forces themselves. Moreover, 
these accounts extend in most, though not all, cases to the provision of 
an explanation of the general reproduction of such patterns of activity 
between states. Accordingly, an important function of our comparative 
analysis will be to try to establish what is meant, in practical terms, 
by the different theorists when talking about 'order' and the process of 
order formation between modern states and, further, whether it is 
possible to distil from these different conceptions a single theoretical 
conception possessing a superior explanatory power.
In taking as its concern this process of order formation within the 
'modern' western international system the thesis covers a very broad 
historical scope ranging from the initial emergence of this system in 
the breakdown of feudal society and extending to its contemporary 
historical expression as a system of nation states which is globally 
encompassing. This historical generality of the thesis is dictated by 
the scope of the theories which form its central focus. As we shall see, 
the different theoretical explanations of order formation examined below 
constitute very general models potentially embracing the modern 
international system in totom. Moreover, despite their major 
disparities, we can identify certain other features which they share in
7common concerning the character of the process of order formation within 
this modern western international system. Insofar as these define the 
general problematic of the thesis they require some initial 
consideration before we can proceed to outline the criteria which will 
govern our proposed comparative analysis.
In the first place the theories considered in this thesis all share the 
view that the formation of order in the international sphere occurs in a 
context of political anarchy - a political condition sui generis 
distinguished by the absence of a central government exercising 
sovereign authority over the constituent states. The key notion here 
then, is that of the absence of government. As we shall see, this 
general notion of international relations as 'anarchical' in nature is 
given markedly different content by the theorists examined. However, the 
view of the international system as a condition of political 'anarchy' 
is linked, in turn, with a second common feature of these different 
theoretical perspectives which relates to the nature of the power 
relations between states and their implications for the general process 
of international order formation. This is the idea of the uneven nature 
of the distribution and development of power within this anarchical 
sphere as a central factor shaping the process of order construction 
among states.
More specifically, it will be my concern to show that each of these 
different theories assumes, in more or less explicit terms, a view of 
order formation within this anarchical system as, in most basic terms, a 
product of the uneven distribution of power between its constitutive,
8sovereign members. This theme is given substantive expression in the 
focal idea accepted by them all that the central source of order within 
this otherwise 'governmentless' sphere derives from the actions of the 
'great' or most powerful of states. It is these great powers which are 
responsible for the imposition of regulative structures producing order 
between states. Further, each perspective assumes, again in more or less 
explicit terms, that the transformation of these regulative systems of 
international order is an integral product of the uneven development of 
power within the international system. In elaborating their particular 
explanations of the modern process of international order formation the 
various theoretical perspectives examined below offer significantly 
divergent understandings of the form assumed by the uneven dissemination 
and development of power between states, the character of such power and 
the manner in which it is exercised by preponderant states in the 
construction of regulative systems of order at the international level.
Acknowledging these common assumptions underpinning the various 
theories of international order formation, the following work will 
critically compare the very different conceptions of this process 
presented in these recently developed theoretical perspectives. This 
will be the task of the first three sections of the thesis, each of 
which is devoted to an examination of the major explanations of 
international order formation presented in the works of representative 
theorists of the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical approaches to 
international relations theory. The comparative analysis outlined in 
these sections will provide the basis for the concluding part of the 
thesis which is concerned to develop the outlines of a synthetic
9theoretical perspective. In this context it will be my concern to 
examine the possibility of establishing a single theoretical approach 
which draws together the different theories of order formation 
considered in the first three sections. The guiding assumption here is 
that each of the theories examined illuminates different aspects of what 
is, in essence, a single historical process. Proceeding on this basic 
assumption the comparative analysis presented in the body of the thesis 
forms a prelude to a more holistic approach in the last part which 
examines how the different dimensions of order formation, examined for 
formal purposes in separation in parts one to three, might be 
interrelated within a more unified, historical account of the nature of 
order formation within a modern anarchical states-system characterised 
by the uneven distribution and development of power.
In elaborating this comparative analysis I shall draw on the resources 
provided by the concept of general cognitive or knowledge-constitutive 
interests orienting different forms of theoretical investigation which 
has recently been applied to the study of international relations theory 
by Richard Ashley.11 According to Ashley these general knowledge- 
constitutive interests informing theoretical inquiry operate to shape 
the general type of theory constructed. They engender a particular 
orientation in the theorist's approach to his subject matter which is 
manifested at a number of levels: firstly, in the mode of inquiry 
adopted, secondly in the knowledge claims advanced concerning the nature 
of the object of study drawn from that enquiry and, lastly, in the 
perceived utility or purpose of such knowledge for the more general 
problem of the reproduction of international order. Implicit in this
10
notion of prior knowledge-constitutive interests informing theoretical 
inquiry is Ashley's view that there is no objective, value-free 
standpoint of intellectual inquiry. Rather, every theoretical model 
involves an implicit normative element shaping the understanding of the 
object under study. Furthermore, it is his contention that these 
different cognitive interests and the theories they engender may be 
organised in a hierarchical schema in accordance with their relative 
adequacy as explanations of the nature of order formation within the 
international system which ultimately forms their common object of 
concern.12
In his work Ashley distinguishes three such types of knowledge- 
constitutive or cognitive interest orienting theoretical inquiry, namely 
the technical, the practical and the emancipatory interest. Moreover, 
each of these different types of cognitive interest, in shaping the 
nature of theoretical analysis, leads the theorist to a qualitatively 
distinct understanding of the nature of the international system and the 
forms of co-operation engendering order between states. In so doing, 
each leads to a very different conclusion as to the way such order is to 
be effectively maintained between states. Thus, in the case of those 
theories oriented by the technical interest, the purpose of inquiry is 
to accumulate "information regarding universal [causal] laws and their 
operation that can expand powers of technical control over an 
objectified environment."13 The international system is understood here 
then, as an objective sphere of natural power processes in which order 
is produced through the extension of technical control over the 
operation of such power. Moreover, the purpose of theoretical knowledge
11
is to facilitate this technical-rational end through the elucidation of 
those abjective laws governing the operation of that system.
By contrast, in those theories oriented by a practical interest this 
technical, objectified perspective is replaced by a mode of inquiry 
concerned with acquiring knowledge of the conditions facilitating the 
establishment of a consensus among actors within a framework of socio­
cultural understanding derived from tradition. In terms of this 
practical interest then, the international system is conceived of as a 
form of social community in which order is engendered as a result of the 
development of forms of inter-subjective understanding between the 
members of the community. Moreover, as Ashley notes, the purpose of such 
practically oriented theory, in acquiring knowledge of this socio­
cultural sphere of human action, is not that of enabling an enhanced 
capacity to control one's object environment but, rather, to "undertake 
interpretations that make possible the [successful] orientation of 
action within a common tradition. " 1,4 The primary interest of theories 
informed by this practical interest therefore, is to elucidate the 
inter-subjective, consensually endorsed norms, rights and meanings whose 
observance by the members of the community ensures the reproduction of 
international social order.
Contrasting with both of these interests is a third, reflective, 
emancipatory theory-orienting interest. According to Ashley, this type 
of interest assumes a more general character than the first two, 
potentially embracing the concerns of both within its own parameters. In 
addressing itself to the process of international order formation this
12
emancipatory theory-orienting interest is distinguished by its concern 
with the acquisition of knowledge of international society defined as a 
historically constituted totality of structures and practices. Moreover, 
in terms of this broad historical focus the purpose of such theory in 
deriving knowledge of this historically constituted totality is not 
limited to a concern with the extension of technical control over an 
objectified environment nor with the preservation of conditions of 
consensus between socialised subjects. Rather, its purpose, which is 
seen to ultimately incorporate the concerns of the other two, is that of 
acquiring knowledge of the nature of the humanly constituted practices 
and structures broadly defining the limits of human cooperation within 
this international society and the historical possibilities raised by a 
reflective consciousness of their contingent, historical character for 
the historical extension of human autonomy within the international 
sphere. The principal interest of the approach noted here then, is to 
elucidate the various "unacknowledged constraints, relations of 
domination and conditions of distorted communication and understanding 
that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and 
consciousness."15 Thus, the emancipatory interest engenders an approach 
to international order formation viewed essentially in terms of a 
concern with the transformative possibilities opened up by the former 
for the extension of human autonomy understood as the historical 
elaboration of the human capacity for self determination.
These respective knowledge-constitutive interests informing theoretical 
inquiry give rise then, to qualitatively distinct understandings of the 
substantive nature of the process of international order formation in
13
terms of the nature of the sphere of action in which such order is 
produced, the forces accounting for its production and the limitations 
of such structures of cooperation. Moreover, as was noted above, Ashley 
contends that they, and the theories which they engender, may be ordered 
in a hierarchical schema according to the adequacy of their explanations 
of the nature of this process of order formation within the modern 
international system which is ultimately their common object of inquiry. 
Adopting this critical comparative model in the present work, I shall 
use the schema of qualitatively distinct knowledge-constitutive 
interests as a heuristic guide for classifying the representative 
theorists of the different schools of thought considered in the body of 
the thesis.1S Examining the distinctive theoretical understandings of 
international order formation emerging from these different Neo-Realist, 
Rationalist and Critical perspectives, this comparative analysis 
indicates the broad knowledge-constitutive interest informing each of 
them. At the same time, it indicates how these distinct interests 
receive expression in substantive terms in their contrasting 
explanations of the general process of order formation arising within 
the modern international system.
As we shall see, these differences are reflected in a number of aspects 
of their theoretical constructs. In most general terms, they receive 
expression in their broad paradigmatic understandings of the anarchical 
international sphere forming the context of order formation. Thus, the 
technical interest informing Neo-Realist approaches entails an 
objectivistic understanding of the international system as a quasi­
natural sphere characterized by unregulated power relations between
14
general units of power. Alternatively, the practical interest informing 
Rationalist theory entails a socio-cultural, interpretative 
understanding of international relations conceived as a society of 
states predicated upon culturally constituted social relations between 
sovereign subjects. Within the Critical theory perspective, by contrast, 
this societal paradigm is rearticulated, international society here 
assuming the form of an historically evolving set of structures and 
practices expressing the articulation of the reflective human capacity 
for conscious self determination.
Secondly, and more specifically, these differences are apparent in the 
different accounts of the agents responsible for producing international 
order, namely sovereign states, and in the type of international order 
engendered by them within this international system. Consideration is 
directed here to the differently defined nature of those order-bearing 
structures introduced by the great powers within the condition of 
international anarchy as the regulators of relations between states 
including, for example, the technical forms of control manifested in 
the balance of power and structures of hegemonic domination stressed by 
Neo-Realist theorists; the cultural structures of legitimate order 
highlighted by Rationalist theory; and the hegemonic systems of world 
order emphasised by Critical theory. Consideration is also given here to 
the differing conceptions of the qualitative nature of the pattern of 
orderly interaction engendered at the international level by these order 
constitutive structures expressing the power of preponderant states. 
These range from Neo-Realist accounts of international order understood 
purely as facilitating relations of self preservation or systemic
15
survival (Valtz) or the securing of relations advancing material and 
political self interest (Gilpin), to those Rationalist conceptions of 
international order involving forms of ethical-cultural co-operation 
expressing conceptions of moral-political legitimacy and Critical 
theoretical conceptions of international order as the historical 
expression of the creative powers of a self-determining human species.
Analysing the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical approaches in terms 
of this critical comparative perspective I shall attempt to classify 
these theoretical accounts of international order formation into lower 
and higher conceptions in terms of their relatively more sophisticated 
explanatory capacity. Examining the representatives of each broad 
perspective in turn I will argue that the categories of the successive 
paradigms offer increasingly more sophisticated means for understanding 
the nature of the process of order formation within the modern 
international system. 17 In developing this hierarchy of theoretical 
approaches it will be argued that it is not possible to rigidly 
differentiate between these different theoretical perspectives. Rather,
I intend to show that, far from being mutually exclusive, each of these 
perspectives contains unelaborated assumptions which, when their 
implications are fully articulated, provide points of linkage from one 
perspective to another.
Accordingly, in critically comparing these theoretical perspectives, the 
thesis argument moves in dialectical fashion through the different 
conceptions of international order formation suggesting how their 
particular limitations require the modification and elaboration of their
16
particular explanations of this process in ways illuminated by the 
insights of other perspectives, in this manner progressively building 
towards a synthetic perspective on the process of order formation within 
the modern states system which is more fully articulated in Part Four. 
Rather than offering an eclectic combination of elements drawn from 
fundamentally incompatible paradigms then, my aim will be to indicate 
how the synthetic conception of international order formation presented 
in Part Four actually evolves from, and builds upon the logic of the 
critical analysis presented in the first three sections. The movement of 
the thesis towards our concluding synthesis aims, in this way, to 
facilitate a progressive elaboration of, and qualitative transformation 
in, the nature of our theoretical understanding of the modern 
international system. More particularly, in Part Four we shall be led to 
sketch the broad outlines of a reflective, historical understanding of 
the nature of western international society and the process of order 
formation accompanying its historical development - a theoretical 
perspective which recognizes this process of order formation as the 
complex historical product of conscious creative human activity.
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PART ONE




Our comparative analysis of recent theories of international order 
formation begins with a consideration of two representative theories 
drawn from the 5eo-Realist school of international thought, namely those 
of Kenneth Valtz and Robert Gilpin. As we shall see below, these 
perspectives are informed by a technical interest in the modern process 
of international order formation in the sense defined in the 
introduction to this work. In terms of this common technical interest 
these theories are principally concerned with establishing theoretical 
knowledge of the international system understood as a quasi-natural 
condition of political anarchy. Moreover, in accordance with this 
naturalistic paradigm each of these theories offers an account of the 
constitution of international order as the product of the operation of 
those major structures of technical-rational control which engender a 
degree of stability within what is a basically antagonistic, asocial 
sphere of political action. The primary concern of these theories then, 
is with those technical, regulative structures imposed by the most 
powerful of its members upon this quasi-natural international sphere as 
the basic means whereby the basic condition of political anarchy is 
brought under control and a system of relatively stable relations 
between states is secured.
At the same time, although sharing this broad technical interest in the 
process of international order formation defined in such quasi-natural 
terms, these theories focus on quite different types of structures of
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technical control as the basic agency regulating relations between 
modern states. Thus, in the case of Kenneth Valtz's systems theory 
examined in Chapter One the primary source of international order is 
identified with the constraining effects of the balance of power. 
Attention is directed here to the different forms of power balance 
produced by the great powers within the modern international system in 
response to the anarchical power relations generated by the structural 
condition of political anarchy delimiting inter-state relations. 
Exhibiting a more historically-oriented technical perspective, Gilpin's 
theory focusses, by contrast, on the role of successive structures of 
hegemonic domination as the principal regulator of the quasi-natural 
power relations existing between modern states. In both cases, however, 
their common theory-orienting interest engenders a view of such 
knowledge of the technical structures of international order formation 
as serving a strictly limited purpose; namely that of determining the 
relative effectiveness of the different examples of such technical 
control in reproducing orderly relations between states.
Examining these two theories in this first section of the thesis I shall 
outline their different explanations of the technical process of 
international order formation engendered by the great powers within the 
modern international system. In doing so I shall argue that they raise 
certain important, general themes which are of central significance for 
the broader concerns of this thesis. However, I will also be concerned 
to indicate some basic tensions implicit in their general accounts of 
this process. These tensions, I suggest, ultimately reflect the 
important limitations of their more general, mutually informing,
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naturalistic paradigm of international relations, and the technical 
interest from which the latter is derived, as a theoretical basis for 
understanding the modern process of international order formation. 
Critically analysing rhe major elements of the theories articulated in 
the work of Valtz and Gilpin, I will attempt to show how these 
limitations of the Ueo-Realist technical perspective point the way to a 
more adequate, societal approach to the explanation of the process of 
order formation within modern western international society.
Chapter One
Waltz’s Systems’ Theory of International Order Formation
The writings of Kenneth Waltz have been at the forefront of recent 
efforts to revise and reconstruct the Realist conception of 
international politics forming the dominant theoretical perspective on 
international relations since the second world war, from within. Along 
with other so-called 'Neo-Realists' Waltz has sought to reformulate the 
basic categories of Realist thought in an attempt to overcome certain 
apparent weaknesses of the orthodox perspective with the aim of 
producing a more robust theory capable of resisting the recent 
challenges to the Realist position emerging from other schools of 
thought.1 In this chapter I consider the systems theory of international 
politics resulting from this process of theoretical reformulation which 
Waltz proposes as a superior conceptual model for understanding the 
general nature of international politics and the distinctive account of 
international order formation which he derives from the former.
After an initial consideration of the distinctive methodological 
assumptions underpinning Waltz's technical approach I shall proceed to 
examine his account of the constitutive structure of the international 
political system. Outlining its major defining features I attempt to 
show how this systems approach leads Waltz to a view of international 
politics as, in its most basic form, a 'quasi-natural* political system 
in which the constraints imposed by the underlying structure of
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international politics restrict the units of the system to certain 
essential forms of activity while precluding the possibility of their 
developing other, non-necessitous types of cooperative relations. The 
analysis of the basic structural components of this 'quasi-natural' 
international system will lead us directly to our main concern with 
Waltz's account of the technical process of international order 
formation within the modern international system expressed in the 
operation of the regulative mechanisms of the balance of power. Here I 
examine his description of the different types of power balance imposed 
by the great powers upon the modern anarchical political system and 
Waltz's critical assessment of their relative efficacy in maintaining 
stable relations between states at the international level. Having done 
this we shall consider certain criticisms of Waltz's systems theory 
which raise serious questions concerning its adequacy as a means for 
understanding the processes accounting for order formation within the 
modern states system.
I Descriptive versus Explanatory Theories: The Virtues of a Systems 
Approach to International Politics
Although anticipated in his earlier works, Waltz's system's theory is 
presented in its clearest and most developed form in his most recent 
book, Theory of International Politics.a At the beginning of this work 
Waltz defines as one of his main aims "to construct a theory of 
international politics that remedies the defects of present theories"3. 
Accordingly, in seeking to properly grasp the distinctiveness of his
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system's theory it will be helpful to initially consider the nature of 
those methodological and substantive deficiencies identified by Valtz in 
existing theories and the manner in which his own systems approach seeks 
to transcend their limitations. This brief analysis will provide the 
essential background knowledge required for an understanding of his more 
general conception of the anarchical structure of the international 
system which represents the seminal feature of his thought and the 
defining element in his account of the technical nature of the process 
of international order formation operating within the modern states- 
system.
Central to Waltz's critique of traditional international relations 
theories is his attack upon their 'reductionist' character. What he 
refers to here is the perceived tendency of such theories to limit their 
attention to one partial dimension of international politics and to seek 
the explanation of all international outcomes in terms of the processes 
occuring within this dimension. Thus Valtz observes that "with a 
reductionist approach the whole is understood by knowing the attributes 
and interactions of its parts."4' In particular, it is national decisions 
and forms of action which are of overwhelming importance for the 
theorists adopting this reductionist approach. The focus of their 
attention in seeking to establish general, theoretical explanations of 
international politics is the level of historical process and the 
temporal relations between individual political units. It is this 
tendency to focus exclusively on 'unit level' interaction, to the 
exclusion of what he identifies as the larger, pre-determining dimension 
of the international political structure which Waltz identifies as the
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major shortcoming of such theories and the source of their limitations 
as models for grasping the essential nature of international political 
relations.
Valtz traces the roots of this reductionist theoretical approach 
directly to the general type of methodology used by these theorists, 
namely the descriptive method. The aim of this descriptive method, he 
notes, is to establish predictive laws based on observable correlations 
between individual units or objects. In terms of this approach theories 
are defined as collections or sets of laws pertaining to the behaviour 
of particular types of phenomenon. Moreover, according to this 
inductivist perspective "truth is won and explanation achieved through 
the accumulation of more and more data and the examination of more and 
more cases. " 5 According to Valtz, however, this type of theory is unable 
to provide objective theoretical knowledge of the subject under study. 
Based as it is on a highly contingent approach to the acquisition of 
knowledge derived from the accumulation of examples of ever greater 
empirical correlations, descriptive theory is incapable of providing any 
account of the deeper causes underlying and shaping the contingent, 
observable connections of objects which constitute its primary focus. 
Accordingly, the latter can offer us no explanation of the necessary 
connections explaining these constant correlations. Theoretical 
knowledge of this sort, Valtz maintains, can only be provided by an 
explanatory, or systems, approach which takes account of the deeper 
structure underlying the observable level of unit level interactions. Ve 
shall have more to say about this systems approach shortly. But first 
let us consider more closely the specific limitations arising from the
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application of this descriptive methodological approach to international 
politics.
As the preceding comments suggest, the most serious of these 
shortcomings for Valtz concerns the limited explanatory power deriving 
from the reductionist character of this methodological approach when 
applied to international politics. The preoccupation of those theories 
adopting this approach to the study of international politics with 
observable connections between individual units within the international 
system provides a highly limited, contingent form of knowledge. For such 
theories try to "explain international outcomes through elements and 
combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels. That 
internal forces produce external outcomes is the claim of such theory 
... The international system, if conceived at all, is taken to be merely 
an outcome."0 However, according to Valtz, this descriptive approach is 
ultimately unable to provide general knowledge concerning the nature of 
the international system because the lawlike statements it generates are 
based purely upon the accumulation of observable instances of contingent 
interactions between individual states. Thus he observes that "if the 
actions [of states] are the main concern [of theory] then we are forced 
back to the descriptive level and from simple descriptions no valid 
generalization can logically be drawn. Ve can say what we see but we 
cant know what it means."'7
According to Valtz then, it is not possible to adequately grasp the 
character of the international political system simply by focussing on 
the dimension of unit level interaction. Most importantly, such
23
descriptive analysis is ultimately incapable of explaining the manifest 
continuities and repetitive features characterising the behaviour of 
states in international politics despite constant change in the nature 
of those individual units which constitute the international system. A 
particular example of this problem is identified in the economic 
explanations of nineteenth century European imperialist expansion 
presented in the writings of Hobson and Lenin which, like contemporary 
international political theories, are seen as focussing upon the level 
of units and their temporal interactions in developing their analyses. 
Here Waltz notes that, "Hobson's theory, taken as a general one, is a 
theory about the workings of national economies... From a knowledge of 
how capitalist economies work Hobson believed he could infer the 
external behaviour of capitalist states."® But, while this approach 
might explain, at least in part, the phenomenon of ninteenth century 
European imperialism, Waltz notes that it is unable to account for 
imperialism as a general phenomenon occurring throughout the history of 
the international system.
Similarly, considering the phenomenon of war. Waltz observes how "many 
different sorts of organizations fight wars, whether . . . tribes, 
empires, tor] nations ...[But even] if an indicated condition seems to 
have caused a given war, one must wonder what accounts for the 
repetition of wars even as their causes vary. " 3 The same sort of problem 
is identified in current international political theories with similar 
consequences for their relative explanatory power. According to Waltz 
the different approaches of theorists such as Stanley Hoffman and 
Richard Rosecrance offer only a highly contingent theory of foreign
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policy, not a qualitative theory of international politics. Despite 
their claims to provide a sophisticated explanation of international 
politics Valtz maintains that the common tendency of these theories is 
to invoke the level of states' historical interactions to explain all 
outcomes and continuities. The upshot is the failure on their part to 
account for those repetitive features characterising international 
politics which is inevitably attendant upon this reductionist method.
For Valtz then, this "repeated failure of attempts to explain 
international relations ... through examination of interacting units 
strongly signals the need for a systems approach. " 10 As defined by him 
systems theory is differentiated by its over arching, all-embracing 
explanatory character. Vhat distinguishes it, first and foremost, is its 
concern to provide an account of the general context within which unit- 
level interactions occur. In specific terms, this type of theory aims to 
describe the underlying organizational principles which represent the 
principal source of those recurring features characterizing the 
contingent, historical relations between states. According to Waltz such 
explanatory theories "do not only define terms and specify the functions 
which can be performed Cby the units considered]. They [also] indicate 
... what the structure of a realm of inquiry may be. " 11 In developing 
such general explanations, systems theory proceeds in a formal, 
deductive fashion. To establish the formal structure defining a 
particular system the theorist must abstract the former from the 
attributes and relations of its constituent units. The systemic model 
generated in this formal fashion may then be used as the basis for 
explaining and predicting those outcomes unexplained by the descriptive
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approach noted above. 1 2 Waltz’s own systems theory, predicated upon this 
type of methodological approach takes, as its central aim, to provide 
theoretical knowledge of the underlying features defining the structure 
of the international political system. Its specific concern is to 
delineate the underlying structural dimension of international politics 
which constrains everyday unit-level interactions among states, thereby 
engendering certain forms of 'necessary' action within the sphere of 
international politics. It is to Waltz's account of the elements of this 
systemic structure of international politics that I now turn.
II The Anarchical Structure of the International System: Constitutive 
Elements
In elaborating his account of the underlying, anarchical structure of 
the international system postulated by the explanatory theoretical 
method sketched above, Waltz stresses the importance of strictly 
separating the former from the historical dimension of unit-level 
interaction between states. "To claim to be following a systems approach 
... requires one to show how system and unit levels can be distinctly 
defined. Failure to mark and preserve the distinction between structure, 
on the one hand, and units and processes on the other, makes it 
impossible to disentangle causes of different sorts and to distinguish 
between causes and effects. " 1 3 In fact, as we shall see below, within 
Waltz's perspective this structural dimension represents an abstract, 
apriori level of the international system which determines, but is 
itself unaffected by, the temporal relations between states.
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According to Waltz "the concept of structure is based on the idea that 
units differently juxtaposed ... behave differently and, in interacting, 
produce different outcomes."14 In order to establish the nature of a 
system's structure one must ignore how its units relate to each other 
and concentrates on how they stand in relation to one another. This 
formal element of the organization of the units of the system imposes a 
set of distinct, constraining conditions upon all states which shape 
their political behaviour. In this manner the "structure of the system 
acts as a constraining and disposing force and, because it does so, 
systems theories Care able to] explain and predict continuity within the 
system."15 Our analysis of the major constitutive elements of the 
anarchical structure of the international system as defined by Waltz 
will pay particular attention to his account of the way the former 
engender a quasi-'natural' system of relations between states which 
imposes basic limitations upon the nature of their political behaviour.
It is these constraints which are identified as the main factor 
delimiting the type of order formation that may be expected to arise 
among the constituent sovereign units within the international system. 
For they ensure that only one particular form of order can emerge within 
the international system - a technical-rational type of order 
characterised by the imposition of forms of technical control over the, 
otherwise anarchic, relations between states.
Waltz identifies three main defining aspects of the international 
political structure which produce constraining effects upon the unit 
level behaviour of states within the international political system. At 
the most general level of theoretical abstraction is the anarchical
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principle by which states are organized or stand in relation to each 
other. The other elements of the international structure, considered 
below, are presented as articulations of this primary organizational 
principle. In attempting to clarify the character of this anarchical 
organizing principle Waltz draws a direct contrast between it and the 
hierarchical principle governing the organisation of domestic political 
systems. Within the domestic political system, he notes, the individual 
parts stand in relations of super and subordination. Here political 
actors are formally differentiated according to their relative degrees 
of authority. Moreover, the differentiated nature of domestic political 
authority is accompanied by the specification of the particular 
functions of each unit within the larger system. According to Waltz, 
this hierarchically organized domestic political structure facilitates 
the development of relations of dependence between these units. In this 
condition, where "same are entitled to command and some to obey"16, the 
necessary conditions of security exist for the development of a division 
of labour among the constitutive units as the basis of its centralized 
operational system.
By contrast, the international political system, structured in 
accordance with the principle of anarchy, is characterized by a 
decentralized organization of political power. Here each state is 
related as "formally the equal of the others. None is entitled to 
command; none is required to obey... In the absence of agents with 
system-wide authority formal relations of super- and subordination fail 
to develop."17 According to Waltz the principal effect of this 
anarchical ordering of units at the international level is that all
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states are constrained to a basic concern with, self-help as the 
precondition for survival. Given the decentralized, anarchical character 
of international politics the concern for survival becomes the basis of 
action where the security of states is not assured. "To achieve their 
objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy 
. . . must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they 
can make for themselves. Self help is necessarily the principle of 
action in an anarchic order."'13
This overiding preoccupation with individual survival and the logic of 
self-help associated with it impose fundamental limitations upon the 
possibilities for unit-level cooperation within the international 
system. "In any self-help system, units worry about their survival and 
the worry conditions their behaviour."13 The nature of this conditioning 
becomes apparent in Waltz's explanation of the second feature of the 
international structure, namely the differentiation of units according 
to the nature of their functions. In this respect the distinguishing 
feature of international politics is identified as the 'sameness* in the 
character of states as functional units. Where "national politics 
manifests a division of labour wherein differentiated units perform 
specified functions... international politics consists of like units 
duplicating one another's activities."20. The reason for this functional 
uniformity is quite simple. Within the decentralized international 
system the absence of political security and the consequent necessity 
for self-help ensure that all states reproduce certain basic functions 
to ensure their survival. Thus, despite major variations of size, wealth 
and power, states "perform, or try to perform tasks, most of which are
34
common to all of them ... Each state has its agencies for making, 
executing and interpreting laws and regulations, for raising revenue and 
defending itself. " 21 At the same time, the insecurity attendant on the 
structural condition of anarchy also limits states' preparedness to 
enSage in highly developed modes of interdependence or cooperation with 
their counterparts. For, to partake in such cooperative associations 
with other states may prejudice one's own chances for survival, either 
by contributing to the increase in power of a potential enemy or by 
weakening one's capacity for self defence owing to overdependence on 
other states in a system governed primarily by the principle of self- 
help. In this way the general condition of insecurity engendered by the 
anarchical international structure and the accompanying uncertainty 
about others' future intentions and actions works against states' 
cooperation.
Seemingly then, the outcome of these structurally imposed constraints 
upon cooperation between states is a political condition where "each 
country is constrained to take care of itself, [while! no one can take 
care of the system. " 2 2  Despite these restrictions, however, Waltz notes 
that a minimal form of cooperation between the units of the system does 
arise and it does so as a result of the very concern for security which 
precludes over dependence of the type noted above. For, given the 
competitive nature of international politics, states will seek, at a 
minimum, to ensure their survival and at maximum, to achieve a position 
of international domination as the means to ensuring their security in a 
condition of international anarchy. According to Waltz there are 
basically two ways of achieving this end - either internally, by
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increasing one's economic and military strength, or externally, by 
building alliances with other states. In the second case it is the 
dictates of self-help which themselves lead to the development of 
cooperative relationships between states, albeit of a highly contingent 
and transitory nature. Through the external practice of alignment and 
realignment states seek to "strengthen and enlarge ... Ctheir] own 
alliance or to weaken and shrink an apposing one"23 thereby enhancing 
their own security. To isolate oneself from this process is to minimize 
one's defensive capabilities vis a vis other states and to leave oneself 
vulnerable to the insecurities flowing from this in a condition of 
political anarchy. Thus for Valtz "a self-help system is one in which 
those who do not help themselves or do so less effectively than others, 
will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers ... Fear of 
such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend 
towards the creation of balances of p o w e r . T h e  formation of strategic 
alliances constituting such balances of power is, therefore, an 
imperative dictated by the anarchical structure of the system itself.
The consideration of this phenomenon of alliance formation and power 
balancing brings us, finally, to the third aspect of the international 
political structure posited by Valtz. The element referred to here is 
the distribution, and specifically the uneven distribution, of 
capabilities between the units of the international system. Constituting 
the central feature of Waltz's more specific account of the technical 
process of international order formation, this aspect of the system's 
structure is of particular concern to us. According to Valtz, although 
"capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities
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is . . . a system wide concept. " 2 5  Moreover, the formation of 
international balances of power regulating relations between states 
presupposes the prior, assymetrical distribution of such capabilities 
among the units of the system. Although identical in their formal 
functions then, Valtz observes that states are distinguished by their 
greater or lesser capabilities for performing those similar tasks.
Herein lies the key to an understanding of the possibility for the 
creation of some degree of stable order within the structural condition 
of international anarchy. Possessing, as they do, the greatest 
capabilities to perform these functions, it is the major powers of the 
system which find themselves in the position of being able to engage in 
the formation and management of system wide power balances which provide 
a degree of stability at the international level.
Demonstrating the logic behind this process Valtz introduces an analogy 
drawn from economic theory concerning the operation of the market under 
conditions of perfect competition as opposed to an oligopolistic 
situation. In a condition of perfect economic competition, he notes, 
small individual producers are equally dominated by the market and 
unable to exert any direct influence over its general operation. Because 
of the predominance of market forces beyond their control these 
producers consider only how to plan and conduct their own operations, 
remaining vulnerable to the overall trends of the market. They are 
subject to the 'tyranny of small decisions', the collective outcome of 
the multiplicity of individual decisions made within the economic 
system. In an oligopolistic situation, by contrast, the size of the 
dominant, large firms enables them to influence both the market and one
37
another. Under these circumstances, and especially because the market 
does not uniquely determine outcomes, “all are impelled to watch their 
competitors and to try to manipulate the market."2e According to Valtz a 
similar process operates in the production of order within the 
anarchical international system.
Here, smaller states, owing to their limited capabilities, are 
predominantly constrained to the immediate concern with self 
preservation imposed by the anarchical structure of the international 
system. Their scope for acting in the international sphere is sharply 
limited by the onerous burden of providing for their basic political 
survival in a system over which they can exercise little influence. By 
contrast, the great powers, with their far greater power capabilities, 
are able to provide for their own immediate security needs while 
simultaneously retaining sufficient capabilities to act on a wider stage 
and impose forms of regulation on the system more generally. Given this 
measure of self-sufficiency deriving from the possession of great power 
capabilities, such states can insulate themselves by muting the effects 
of adverse external movements, thus enabling them to direct their 
surplus capacities to broader concerns. Accordingly, great powers are 
"like major corporations ... at once limited by their situations and 
able to act to affect them. Further, they have to react to the actions 
of ... [other great powers] whose actions may be changed by the 
reaction. USZ7
The superior capabilities of these great powers then, confer upon them 
the role of managing the international system by engaging in system-wide
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power balancing activities. "Great tasks can be accomplished only by 
agents of great capability. That is why states, and especially major 
ones, are called on to do what is necessary for the world's survival."20 
The relatively concentrated nature of power within the international 
system gives to the small number of states at the top a larger interest 
in exercising power and a greater ability to do so. Accordingly, in 
Waltz's systemic view of things,the great powers represent the strategic 
or technical managers responsible for introducing a degree of stability 
and order into the quasi-natural, anarchical system. Such order is 
produced by the imposition of countervailing checks upon the otherwise 
unconstrained exercise of international political power through the 
operation of the regulative structure of the balance of power. In this 
respect "to interdict the use of force by the threat of force, to oppose 
force with force ... [represents] the most important means of control in 
[ international] security matters. With a highly unequal distribution of 
world power, some states, by manipulating the threat of force, are able 
to moderate others' use of force internationally."23
A further implication of this third dimension of the system's structure 
for the process of international order formation outlined here relates 
to the possibility for fundamental change in the international balance 
of power and the structure of international order which it implies. 
Insofar as the source of international order within a particular system 
is the assymetricai distribution of capabilities between its sovereign 
units, any fundamental change in the overall distribution of 
capabilities between states necessarily produces a transformation in the 
structure of the system itself. According to Waltz such radical change
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in the overall distribution of capabilities among the system's units is 
expressed, in practical terms, by an expansion or contraction in the 
number of powers involved in the management of the system. This type of 
change in the relative distribution of unit capabilities is particularly 
significant insofar as it brings with it a general transformation in the 
manner and relative effectiveness with which the affairs of the whole 
system are organized.
Thus Waltz notes that the emergence of different distributions of unit 
capabilities, insofar as they produce different numbers of great powers, 
"mark the transition from one [anarchical] system to another because the 
opportunities offered for balancing through combining with others vary 
in ways that change expected outcomes. " 3 0  The variations produced by 
such changes in the number of great powers managing the system are 
expressed, first and foremost in the different forms of technical 
control facilitated by the different forms of international power 
balancing to which they give rise. Moreover, as we will see below, these 
different types of technical-rational control over the condition of 
international anarchy involve highly divergent implications for the 
relative stability of relations between states. In turning now to 
examine Waltz's conception of the technical process of order formation 
as it is manifested within the modern western international system we 
will give special attention to his views concerning the relative 
effectiveness of the different types of power balancing accounting for 
the reproduction of stable order between modern states.
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III Bipolar versus Multipolar Balances and the Technical Production of 
Order within the Modern States-System
Having considered the major aspects of Waltz's systems theory of 
international politics in general terms we can now turn to our central 
concern with his account of the nature of order formation within the 
modern international system. Expanding upon his basic view of 
international order formation as the product of the uneven distribution 
of power within the international system, Waltz identifies two major 
types of international order which have characterised the history of the 
modern states-system corresponding to two very different structural 
forms of the distribution of power capabilities among modern states. 
These he identifies as the multipolar system existing prior to the 
second world war, and the bipolar system characterizing the current 
postwar phase of international history. Waltz's theoretical account of 
order formation within the modern states-system is, in essence, a 
comparative analysis of these two types of international power balancing 
and their relative efficacy as forms of technical rational control 
generating order out of the condition of international anarchy.
Moreover, in comparing these two forms he argues strongly in favour of 
the bipolar system as the most effective mechanism for securing 
technical control over the international system as the basis for the 
reproduction of a stable system of relations between states.
Accordingly, in examining his account of order formation within the 
modern international system we shall pay particular attention to Waltz's 
reasons for preferring the former, bi-polar, internal form of power
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balancing as opposed to what he describes as the external mode 
associated with the multipolar balance of power.
In Theory of International Politics Waltz observes that "in all of 
modern history the structure of international politics has changed but 
once. We have only two [modern] systems to observe. " 31 What 
distinguishes these two systems primarily is the structurally different 
distribution of capabilities they involve. The first of these, 
characterised by a relatively diffuse distribution of power capabilities 
among a multiplicity of great powers, existed in Europe prior to 
nineteen forty five. The second system, characterising the contemporary 
global order, is one in which the distribution of capabilities is highly 
concentrated in favour of two great powers possessing greatly superior 
capacities relative to other states. Waltz's main concern in analyzing 
these two types of modern anarchical structure is to highlight the 
different types of technical control over international political 
relations to which they have given rise and the relative degrees of 
stability which they have generated within the multipolar and bipolar 
systems respectively. It should be noted that these modern systems of 
order formation are offered by Waltz, simultaneously, as typological 
models from which to draw general conclusions concerning expected 
outcomes wherever multipolar or bipolar systems are operative. 
Accordingly, Waltz's thought moves constantly between the historically 
particular and the general in analyzing these modern forms.
The focus of Waltz's comparison of these two modern systems of 
international order formation are the different external and internal
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modes of power balancing characterizing the multipolar and bipolar 
systems respectively. Within the pre-nineteen forty five system, Waltz 
argues, the politics of power and the production of order turned 
primarily on the diplomacy by which inter-state alliances were made, 
maintained and disrupted. This was basically because of the more diffuse 
distribution of capabilities within that system which enabled a 
multiplicity of great powers to actively participate in the process of 
balancing at the international level. The condition of multi-polarity 
thereby created was disinguished by a high degree of flexibility in the 
relations between the major states which involved major ramifications 
for the stability of the balance of power. Contrasting this situation 
with a bipolar world where temporary imbalances in the distribution of 
power can be righted by the internal efforts of the two preponderant 
powers, Waltz notes that "with more than two [great powers], shifts in 
alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility 
to the system. " 3 3  It was this ability of states to constantly shift 
alignments which is traditionally seen by scholars as the great strength 
of European multipolar politics and the central element in the 
maintenance of international stability, particularly in ninteenth 
century Europe.
Taking up this argument Waltz notes two interrelated, positive 
implications of this flexible mode of power balancing for the stability 
of the European states-system traditionally emphasised by students of 
international relations. The first of these is the argument that the 
more diffuse systemic distribution of capabilities, by producing 
flexibility in alliances, "keeps relationships of friendship and enmity
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fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and future relation 
of farces uncertain."3A Such uncertainty is identified as generating a 
healthy caution in the foreign policy of the great powers and, as such, 
operated as a major deterrent to aggressive action on the part of any 
individual state. In addition to the indirect deterrent effect produced 
by this general condition of uncertainty, this mode of external 
balancing also provided a more direct check on the unconstrained flow of 
anarchical forces through the direct combination of states to counter 
the potential thrust of aggressor powers. The constant changes in 
alliances facilitated by this flexible system of external power 
balancing created a system of countervailing farces working, more or 
less successfully at different times, to check the hegemonic tendencies 
of any particular great power. In this manner the mode of balancing 
deriving from the multi-polar structure gave rise to a mode of technical 
regulation of the 'quasi-natural' power processes of the international 
system which brought with it a significant degree of order and 
stability. Such stability within this system was dependent upon a highly 
dynamic form of regulation of interstate relations by the great powers 
characterized by a continual state of relational flux. It was through 
the operation of this system, when functioning effectively, that any 
systemic imbalances were righted and potentially destabilizing 
tendencies kept in check.
According to Valtz, however, this external form of power balancing 
involves some major weaknesses which severely limit its effectiveness as 
a technical means for producing order at the international level, 
particularly when compared with the alternative bi-polar form.
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Moreover, it is the traditionally argued virtues of diplomatic 
flexibility distinguishing this system which he identifies as 
constituting its primary weakness. This is because of the inherent 
fragility of the external system of balancing and the major 
destabilizing effects entailed by the former for the international order 
produced by this regulative mechanism. Thus Waltz notes that, within the 
multipolar system there are "too many [powers] to enable anyone to see 
for sure what is happening and too few to make what is happening a 
matter of indifference."35. The ultimate consequence of this inherent 
fragility of the multi-polar system is to significantly undermine the 
degree of strategic control which the mechanism of balancing is able to 
generate over power relations within the states-system. Elaborating upon 
this theme Waltz identifies a number of specific problems for the 
maintenance of international order deriving from this external, 
multipolar system of power balancing.
Firstly, there is the problem of the high level of insecurity and 
distrust in alliances. Here Waltz argues that the flexibility of 
diplomatic alliances in such a multipolar system effectively precludes 
the possibility of states drawing clear and fixed lines between allies 
and adversaries. Furthermore, there is the ever-present threat of 
defection by an ally which may prove fatal to its partners. 
"Uncertainties about who threatens whom, about who will appose whom, and 
about who will gain or lose from the actions of other states accelerate 
as the number of [major] states increases.H3S Given this fact none of 
the major powers can afford to ignore the activities of other states in 
the system. All must be sensitive to the changing state of alliances and
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its implications for their own security owing to the relatively high 
degree of military interdependence associated with the system of 
external balancing. At the same time, this preoccupation with securing 
alliances has the effect of limiting the policies which a state can 
pursue within the international sphere. Waltz's basic point here is that 
alliance strategies are always the product of compromise since the 
strategic interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them 
are never identical. The relative freedom of major powers within a 
multipolar system to make decisions is accordingly restricted. In 
connection with this point, Waltz argues that it is more likely in these 
circumstances that states' own interests would become less well defined 
as they seek to accommodate the interests of potential or existing 
allies. Thus he concludes that, in "balance of power old style Ci.e. 
pre-1945 multi-polar] flexibility of alignment made for rigidity of 
strategy or the limitation of freedom of decision."37,
A further problem arising from this external mode of power balancing 
relates to the assessment of relative capabilities of units within the 
multi-polar system. Here Waltz argues that, given the level of reliance 
of states on alliances with others within a multipolar system and the 
constantly shifting character of such alliances, attempts to assess the 
relative strength of apposing nations within the international system 
become particularly difficult. As a result states may easily misjudge 
the relative strength of their own and opposing coalitions. "Rather than 
making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances of peace, 
[such] uncertainty and miscalculation causes wars."3® In Waltz's view 
then, the general condition of systemic uncertainty and the inherent
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fragility associated with the external mode of power balancing 
characterising the multi-polar system of European international politics 
generated a system of order where dangers were diffused, 
responsibilities unclear and definitions of vital interests unclear.
Under these circumstances the effectiveness of the technical balancing 
mechanism in checking the development of major imbalances within the 
international system was significantly compromised. The limited 
effectiveness of the regulative force of power balancing ensured that 
the degree of international stability produced by it was considerably 
diminished.
In marked contrast with the former is the internal system of 
international power balancing characterising the current bipolar 
international order. This system, Waltz maintains, is, in all the 
essential points noted above, superior to the preceding multipolar one. 
The key to its greater effectiveness lies in the superior capacity it 
offers for technical control of international power relations because of 
the immensely preponderant capabilities possessed by the two major 
powers whose exclusive role it is to manage the system. Specifically, 
Waltz observes that this concentration of the greatest capabilities in 
these two major powers produces a system of power balancing whereby the 
former balance each other by internal, rather than external, means, 
relying primarily upon their own capabilities rather than on the support 
of their allies. In Waltz's view this internal mode of balancing 
provides far greater efficiency in the technical regulation of the 
anarchical international system because of the greater freedom from 
political dependence which the preponderance of the two great powers
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confers upon them. Immensely superior capabilities ensure that the 
degree of their reliance upon other states is very low, a fact which 
involves major consequences for the efficacy of power balancing and 
order formation within the contemporary bipolar system.
Foremost among these for Waltz is the high degree of autonomy it confers 
upon the great powers in their efforts to carry out their international 
management role. "In a bipolar world, alliance leaders make their 
strategies according to their own calculations of interest. Strategies 
can be defined to cope more with the adversary and less to satisfy one's 
allies. " 3 3  In particular, the major powers do not need to worry 
excessively about changes in alliance by lesser states. "The gross 
inequality between the two superpowers and the members of their 
respective alliances makes any realignment of the latter fairly 
insignificant. " 4 0  As a result of this greater autonomy then, the 
complications and uncertainties associated with reliance upon other 
states in external forms of balancing are largely absent. At the same 
time, the greater capabilities and higher degree of self dependence of 
the two major powers allow potential threats to stability to be more 
easily identified and defined. Whereas "in the great power politics of 
multi-polar worlds, who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to 
deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty ... in the 
great power politics of bi-polar worlds who is a danger to whom is never 
in doubt. " 41 Furthermore, this enormous superiority of the superpowers 
and the relative insignificance of lesser states enable a far more 
effective definition of their respective strategic interests while also 
expanding their freedom to act on those interests within the
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international sphere. Both are relatively free to formulate and carry 
out long-range policies according to their own interests as they need 
not accede to the demands of third parties.
The consequent diminution in the degree of confusion and uncertainty 
associated with the operation of the internal bipolar form of balancing 
thus makes it easier for the dominant powers to clarify their respective 
interests and, thereby, to negotiate with each other to secure those 
interests. "Because they eliminate the difficult business of choosing, 
the smallest of groups manages its affairs most easily ... On matters of 
ultimate importance each can only deal with the other. No appeal can be 
made to third parties. " 4 2  According to Valtz this general clarity in 
diplomatic relations is further sharpened because of the tendency of the 
bipolar structure to encourage a system wide interest on the part of the 
two dominant states. "Their worries about each other cause their 
concerns to encompass the globe. For the United States and the Soviet 
Union regional problems are part of their global concerns. Each of them 
takes a system-wide view. " 4 3  Insofar as any loss for one power within 
the system is a gain for its opponent it is likely that they will 
respond promptly to unsettling events within the system.
According to Valtz then, self dependence of parties, clarity of dangers 
and certainty about who has to face them are the central characteristics 
of the internal form of balancing characterising the contemporary 
bipolar system. It is these features, when taken in combination, which 
account for the more reliable character of power balancing within this 
system. The exceptional clarity provided by the contemporary bipolar
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distribution of unit capabilities with respect to the assessment of 
relative strategic strengths and in the definition of the broad 
strategic interests of the apposing enemy make this internal mode of 
balancing a far more reliable and precise mode of technical control than 
previous multi-polar forms of power balancing. In particular, these 
features of its operation reduce the possibility of the major powers 
misjudging their relative capabilities thus leading to war. Furthermore, 
by limiting the degree of confusion and maximizing the level of 
certainty in the relations between the great powers, the internal 
bipolar mode of power balancing makes the development of imbalances 
between them less likely as each can quickly discern and respond to 
variations in the strength of their opposing number. For Valtz the 
overall outcome of these features of the bipolar system of balancing is 
a technical mode of strategic control displaying a superior level of 
effective regulation of the quasi-natural, anarchical, processes of the 
international system
This is not to imply that the bipolar system does not have its own 
problems and limitations. On the contrary, as was the case with the 
multi-polar system, the major virtues of this particular type of 
anarchical structure also constitute the source of its particular 
shortcomings, the most significant of these being the difficulties 
arising from over management of the system. Thus Valtz notes that "the 
clarity with which dangers and duties are defined in a bipolar world 
easily leads the country that identifies its own security with the 
maintenance of world order to overreact. Insofar as the major burden 
of managing the system rests with two powers and,to the extent that
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their system-wide interests are well delineated» the pressures imposed 
upon them are extreme. Within a system dominated by two dominant powers 
Mfew changes in the world at large or within each other's national realm 
are likely to be thought irrelevant. Competition becomes more 
comprehensive as well as more widely extended. Not just military 
preparation, but also economic growth and technological development 
become matters of intense and constant concern."AS Accordingly, the 
contemporary bipolar system is one characterised by a high sensitivity 
to change and, more often than not, a high state of tension between the 
balancing states. Minor disputes may well assume a far greater 
significance than their indigenous character would warrant. Indeed, 
within the contemporary system "bipolarity encourages the United States 
and the Soviet Union to turn unwanted events into crises...Since world 
war two the United States has responded expensively in distant places to 
wayward events that could hardly affect anyone's fate outside the 
region. "
Where miscalculation by major powers is the major threat to stability in 
the multipolar system then, it is overreaction brought on by the 
acuteness of the system of power balancing which is the major threat 
posed in the contemporary bipolar system. Such overreaction has the 
potential to lead the major powers to rash behaviour which threatens to 
undermine the stability of the international system as a whole. 
Neverthless, Waltz maintains that this problem does not negate the 
superiority of the internal, bipolar system of power balancing as a 
mechanism for generating international order. For even here the internal 
mode of power balancing ensures that the potential destabilisation
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arising from such, overmanagement is much less serious than that deriving 
from the misjudgements associated with the multipolar system. The 
greater precision and efficiency of bipolar balancing ensures that any 
dispute may be identified, defined and dealt with quickly. Attention to 
crises is more rapid as the incentives to securing a diplomatic 
settlement are more clearly apparent. Thus, in comparing their relative 
shortcomings, Waltz is led to affirm the superiority of the contemporary 
bipolar international order and its internal form of balancing in 
engendering stability within the international system. The respective 
characteristics of these types of technical regulation of international 
anarchy mean that “miscalculation [in the multipolar system] is more 
likely to permit the unfolding of a series of events that finally 
threatens a change in the balance and brings the powers to war. 
Overreaction [in the bipolar system] is the lesser evil."*7
IV Critiscisms of Waltz's Systems Theory
Having considered the main features of Waltz's technical conception of 
international order formation I want now to offer some major critiscisms 
of his system's theory as a theoretical model for understanding the 
process of order formation within the modern states-system. In doing so 
I will not dwell upon his specific arguments concerning the relative 
merits of multipolar as opposed to bipolar forms of power balancing. 
Rather, I want to concentrate upon some more general problems associated 
with this theoretical perspective. The most important of these concerns 
the nature of his understanding of the anarchical structure of the
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international system and, in particular, his tendency to reify this 
structure as a dimension of international politics capable of being 
analyzed and understood in abstraction from the level of historical 
process. As we have seen, it is this reification of the system's 
structure which largely explains his quasi-naturalistic view of the 
nature of political relations within the international sphere. In 
presenting various critiscisms of this aspect of Waltz's systems theory 
below I shall seek to show how the tensions implicit in his own systemic 
account of international order formation indicate that the maintenance 
of such a rigid distinction between the structural and the historical 
levels of this process is ultimately untenable. Furthermore, I will 
argue that the acknowledgement of their integral connection in the 
process of order formation among modern states raises the need for a 
more generative, historical understanding of the nature of this process 
than Waltz's work provides.
As we saw above, the central imperative of Waltz's methodological 
approach is to clearly separate the structural level of the 
international system from the unit level interactions between states. 
This represents the necessary precondition for determining the nature of 
those recurring structural features explaining the anarchical character 
of international politics and the particular type of order formation 
characterising that condition of political anarchy. However, a central 
problem arising from this isolation of the system's structure concerns 
the inadequacies in Waltz's account of transformations in the anarchical 
international structure itself. This problem arises at two levels of 
Waltz's analysis. On the broadest level it is reflected in his inability
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to account for the fundamental historical transformation responsible for 
creating the very anarchical international structure which Waltz 
identifies as the basic conditioning factor in the modern process of 
international order formation. Secondly, it is evident in his inadequate 
account of the specific nature of change in the forms of international 
order occuring within the modern international system. Let us consider 
each of these limitations in more detail.
First, then, the broader question of systems' transformation and the 
nature of the anarchical structure conditioning modern order formation. 
Within Waltz's systems perspective the anarchical structure of the 
modern states system is not identified as, in any way, distinctive in 
form. Rather, as we have seen above, his explanatory, systems approach 
leads Waltz to a formal deduction of the properties of this anarchical 
structure which are simultaneously presented as universal in their 
application, potentially characterising all systems distinguished by a 
plurality of sovereign political actors. However, as Ruggie has argued, 
this formal derivation of the modern structure of international anarchy 
specifically precludes Waltz from grasping its qualitatively distinctive 
historical character in contrast with those political systems preceding 
it. 4 0  More specifically, Waltz's formal, systems theory "provides no 
means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important 
contextual change in international politics in this millenium: the shift 
from the medieval to the modern international system" 4-3 and the radical 
change in the nature of political authority accompanying this change.
The source of this major inadequacy Ruggie locates in Waltz's 
misunderstanding of the second dimension of the international system* s
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structure, namely the level of the differentiation of units and the 
specification of their functions.
According to Ruggie this element of the differentiation of unit 
functions is not to be interpreted, as Valtz does, in terns of 
functional differences between units but, rather, in terms of the type 
of separateness characterising the units of the system. He contends that 
"the modern [international] system is distinguished from the medieval, 
not by 'sameness' or 'differences' of units, but by the principles on 
the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another. 
If anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, 
differentiation tells us on what basis the segmentation is 
determined. " 5 0  From this perspective then, the essential factor 
distinguishing the medieval and modern anarchical systems is the general 
type of political authority characterizing the units of each system 
which, in turn, determines the nature of their mutual separateness.
These respective defining types of political authority Ruggie identifies 
as the heteronomous medieval form and the autonomous, sovereign modern 
form. Citing the work of Strayer and Munro, he notes that, within the 
medieval system, the distinction between internal and external political 
realms separated by clearly established boundaries was only very weakly 
developed. In fact, the medieval system of political order typically 
involved a "patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government 
... in which 'different juridicial instances were geographically 
interwoven and stratified and plural allegiances [and] assymetrical
suzerainities ... abounded" 51
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Accordingly, while this system was anarchical, the form of segmental, 
territorial rule accounting for the character of the broader condition 
of anarchy entailed a heteronomous organization of territorial rights 
and claims. The medieval form of political rule involved juridicial 
allegiances which were geographically interconnected. Adding further to 
this complex, segmented political system were common inclusive bodies of 
law, religion and custom which embraced the political units but which 
"posed no threat to ... [their! integrity ... because the units viewed 
themselves as municipal embodiments of a universal community. " 5 2  In 
contrast with this heteronomous, medieval type of political authority, 
Ruggie notes that the modern form of political power is defined by the 
institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive 
territories. In the modern international system "the institutional 
framework of sovereignty differentiates units in terms of juridicially 
mutually exclusive and morally self-entailed domains. " 5 3  Here the 
character of political rule is autonomous or sovereign and the extent of 
sovereign rule is delimited by clearly defined political and 
geographical boundaries.
As Ruggie's work indicates then, the fundamentally distinct forms of 
medieval and modern political authority have given rise to highly 
distinctive modes of separateness between the political units of the 
respective international systems. To talk of international anarchy 
within the medieval and the modern international systems is, thus, to 
talk of qualitatively different forms of anarchy which produce quite 
divergent forms of political relations within those respective 
conditions of anarchy. Thus, the medieval international system, based on
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a more porous and flexible principle of separateness, allowed for the 
integration of diverse territories within an overarching system of 
imperial, political order. By contrast, within a modern states-system 
predicated upon clearly defined and mutually exclusive principles of 
political separateness it is the mechanism of power balancing that 
operates to produce a degree of order among formally sovereign, 
independent political units.
Of particular interest to us in Ruggie's work is his account of the 
principal cause of this decisive historical transformation to the modern 
anarchical principle of organistion defining the political separation of 
states within the international sphere. Drawing on a central theme of 
Dürkheim's thought, he argues that the emergence of the modern sovereign 
form of political rule was the consequence of the effects of a growth in 
the dynamic density of European society. The term dynamic density here 
refers to the "quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions which go 
on within society which profoundly affect the conditions of collective 
e x i s t e n c e . I t  was the effects of this historical increase in the 
dynamic social density of European society, principally manifested in 
the transformation of its basic socio-economic structure, which Ruggie 
identifies as accounting for the change in the general type of political 
authority defining modern states and, by implication, the form of 
sovereign separateness characterizing the modern international system.
In advancing this argument Ruggie points to the integral connection 
between the domestic form of property rights and the nature of the 
political authority characterizing political units. Particular 
historical types of domestic socio-economic formation, he notes, can be
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expected to correspond with distinct forms of political-legal 
jurisdiction within the state and, by implication, different types of 
political segmentation between states within the same system. "From the 
vantage point of ... domestic and international systems private property 
rights and sovereignty may be viewed as being analogous concepts ...
[as] they differentiate among units in terms of possession of self and 
exclusion of others."ss
Developing upon this theme Ruggie contends that the historical change in 
the dynamic density of European society produced a profound 
transformation in the basic social structure of property rights shaping 
the form of political authority within the political communities of 
these international systems. "Just as the medieval state represents a 
fusion of its particular forms of [feudal] property and [political] 
authority, so does the modern. The chief characteristic of the modern
concept of private property is the right to exclude others from the
possession of an object. And the chief characteristic of modern 
[political] authority is its totalization, the integration into one 
public realm of parcelized and private authority. The age in which 
Absolutist public authority was imposed was simultaneously the age in 
which absolute private property was progressively consolidated."5e It 
was this change in the internal nature of political authority within the 
modern state, itself a product of the restructuring of the state/society
relationship, which ultimately gave rise to a distinctive, external
structural condition of political segmentation between states based on 
the mutually exclusive principle of sovereign separateness.37
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These arguments advanced by Ruggie are important because of the way they 
illuminate, in most general terms, the limitations in the explanatory 
power of Waltz's technical conception of international order formation 
associated with his reification of the anarchical structure of the 
modern international system. For, while the delineation of structure may 
be an important element of a theory of international politics, Ruggie's 
arguments suggest that too rigid a separation of structure and 
historical process is made only at great cost. Indeed, what they suggest 
is that historical processes and the dynamic changes they engender are 
of crucial importance in understanding the anarchical character of the 
structuring of political space between modern states which limits the 
process of order formation occuring between them. The specific form of 
anarchy and the functional 'sameness' of the international system's 
units which Waltz's theory tends to portray as an unchanging, invariable 
systemic component, is here shown to be a relatively recent, 
historically generated phenomenon. Waltz's failure to examine the 
dynamic relationship between the structural and historical levels of 
international politics prevents him from recognising the character of 
the modern anarchical, international system as a distinctive historical 
phenomenon having its origins in the transformative processes associated 
with the historical dynamics of unit-level practice.
By drawing too rigid a distinction between the dimensions of its 
anarchical structure and the unit-level historical processes occurring 
within that condition of anarchy then, Waltz's systems theory 
effectively precludes any account of the qualitatively differentiated 
nature of the modern international system. Cut off from the historical
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processes it shapes and which, in turn shape it, this structural 
dimension takes on a naturalistic, objective character and the 
constraints flowing from it are conceived in highly naturalistic and 
invariable terms. Accordingly, international political existence is 
depicted as an invariable condition of necessity, a struggle for 
survival governed by the unchanging dictates of a 'quasi-natural' 
structure of international anarchy. As a result, Waltz's systems theory 
is unable to adequately explain the distinctive forces accounting for 
the development of, and the formation of order within, the modern 
international system, nor to grasp the possibilities for the qualitative 
transformation of its anarchical structure which they may engender.
This brings us to my second criticism of Waltz's conception of 
international order formation which concerns his account of the specific 
nature of order formation between states within the modern international 
system. The main problem which arises here is the failure of Waltz's 
theory to provide a satisfactory explanation of the changes in the 
character of international order occurring within this system itself, 
changes which are actually posited by Waltz's own theory. The nature of 
this problem is most clearly revealed when we examine more closely his 
account of the third element of the international system's structure, 
namely the distribution of capabilities among the units of the system.
As we saw above, for Waltz the formation of order within the modern 
international system presupposes the existence of an assymetrical 
distribution of capabilities among the system's units. The fact that 
some states possess relatively superior capabilities to others confers 
upon them both the ability and the incentive to engage in processes of
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power balancing which impose a degree of stability upon the anarchical 
system as a whole. Furthermore, as we saw from Waltz's comparison of the 
modern multipolar and bipolar systems, change from one form of 
anarchical order to another within the modern international system is 
the direct outcome of major shifts in the relative distribution of 
capabilities among the system's units which either increase or decrease 
the number of states capable of participating in the balancing process, 
thereby transforming the outcomes produced by the balancing mechanism.
Implicit in Waltz's theory then, is the idea that broad historical 
changes in the distribution of capabilities, and, specifically, in the 
relative uneveness of the distribution of unit capabilities, produce 
different structures of international anarchy at different stages of 
modern history. In this context he notes that "the economic, military 
and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately 
weighed ... Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following 
items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence.,,se 
But within his own systems theory we are provided with little 
explanation of the general historical forces accounting for such major 
changes in these relative capabilities of the system's units which allow 
some of them to achieve hegemonic status within the international system 
at particular historical moments as the prerequisite for engaging in the 
formation and management of international balances of power. Instead, 
Waltz merely takes such change as a historical given, excluding any 
theoretical explanation of the former as beyond the scope of a properly
structural theory.
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Here again we confront the inherent difficulties arising from Waltz's 
reification of the international system's structure which prevent him 
from grasping the complexities involved in the modern process of 
international order formation. For, such a historical analysis is 
arguably indispensible to an understanding of variations in the uneven 
distribution of states' capabilities (the third dimension of Waltz's 
systemic structure) which form a major determinant of the type and 
quality of order formation occurring within the modern international 
system. At the same time, such an historical analysis introduces factors 
for consideration which are not easily reconciled with Waltz's technical- 
rational conception of the modern process of order formation.
Particularly significant in this respect is the influence, noted by 
various commentators, of cultural factors in explaining the relative 
effectiveness of the different forms of power balancing identified by 
Waltz as responsible for engendering political order in the different 
historical phases of the modern states-system.
Thus, in the case of the European states system of the nineteenth 
century arguably one of the major factors explaining the effectiveness 
of the multipolar balance of power in maintaining relative peace between 
states was the common acknowledgement by the great powers of cultural 
norms of collective responsibility for the reproduction of international 
order mutually constraining their behaviour.531 Viewed on a more general 
level, another crucial factor affecting the stability of the different 
historical forms of power balance within the modern-states system has 
been the impact of changes in the nature of the war-making capabilities 
of modern states produced by processes of scientific change and
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technological innovation, themselves a reflection of broader processes 
of cultural transformation. * 0 The acknowledgement of such significant 
cultural influences affecting the modern process of international order 
formation clearly raises major problems for Waltz's Neo-Realist, 
naturalistic paradigm of modern international relations and its 
conception of states as mere units of power capabilities. Indeed, as we 
can see from the preceding analysis, the articulation of the assumptions 
implicit in Waltz's own account of this process of international order 
formation raises implications which suggest the need for a more 
historically-oriented, generative theory as the condition for an 
effective understanding of that process.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have sought to highlight the basic features and the 
important limitations of Waltz's technically-oriented systems theory of 
international order formation. This theory is particularly valuable, I 
would argue, for the way it highlights the limitations of a purely 
descriptive, or empirical explanation of the modern process of 
international order formation. Above all, what it indicates is the need 
for an adequate theoretical explanation of the latter process to take 
account of the effects of the modern international system's overall 
anarchical structure as a dominant force constraining the possibilities 
for action open to states, thereby shaping the broad character of order 
formation at the international level. This is an aspect which cannot be 
accounted for by adopting a purely empirical analysis of international
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politics. At the same time Waltz's theory also indicates the importance 
of the uneven nature of the development and distribution of power 
between states as a crucial factor influencing the production of such 
systems of international order.
However, as the preceding critique indicates, it is necessary to locate 
this structural dimension within its proper historical context and to 
consider the way this anarchical structure, and the constraints which it 
imposes on states' behaviour, have varied in response to the 
transformative effects of dynamic interactions between the political 
units of the modern states-system. In simple terms, a generative theory 
of this sort must manifest a sensitivity to the way the modern 
anarchical structure of international politics is itself formed and 
transformed by the effects of historical relations among states 
including phenomena such as war, diplomatic relations and changes in the 
relative political and economic capabilities of states. Acknowledging 
the historical uniqueness of the modern condition of international 
anarchy, such a theory needs to consider the dynamic relationship 
between these mutually affecting aspects of the international system and 
the way it produces distinctive types of anarchical order at particular 
stages of its history.
The upshot of our preceding critical analysis then, is not that we 
should reject outright Waltz's systems theory as unhelpful in the 
formulation of such a generative, historical perspective on the modern 
process of international order formation. Rather, as I seek to show in 
the following chapters, it is possible to elaborate the bases of such a
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theory by reformulating and, in the process, transforming the main 
elements of Waltz's systems perspective so as to provide a more 
satisfactory understanding of the diverse factors accounting for the 
process of order formation within the modern international system. As I 
shall seek to demonstrate in chapter two, it is by thus drawing out the 
implications contained in Waltz's own theory and, in this way 
reformulating his systems perspective, that we begin to move beyond the 
minimalist, technical-rational conception of international order 
formation deriving from the Neo-Realist, naturalistic understanding of 
the character of modern international relations. With these points in 
mind I will now proceed to a consideration of the Neo-Realist, technical 
conception of international order formation presented in the work of 
Robert Gilpin. In doing so, I shall pay particular attention to the way 
Gilpin's theory of international order formation elaborates upon Waltz's 
important, though underdeveloped, idea of the assymetrical, synchronic 
distribution, and the uneven historical diffusion, of the capabilities 
of states as the decisive factor in the formation and transformation of 
systems of political order within the modern international system.
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Chapter Two
Gilpin and the Historical Reproduction of Hegemonic Orders of 
International Stability
The Neo-realist conception of modern international order formation 
developed by Robert Gilpin offers a dynamic, transformational view of 
this process which would appear, on first appraisal, to overcome many of 
the deficiencies identified in Waltz's structurally oriented perspective 
in chapter one. Indeed, it will be a major concern of this chapter to 
determine just how far Gilpin's historicised Neo-Realist perspective 
actually does transcend the shortcomings associated with Waltz's 
approach. As we shall see below, Gilpin's theory is wide ranging, 
presenting an historical account of the processes of international order 
formation embracing, not only the modern international system, but also 
the international systems of premodern times. In this chapter I will 
first outline the general themes which underlie this sweeping historical 
conception of international order formation. Here I give attention to 
Gilpin's account of the general drive to international dominance 
engendered among states by the transhistorical condition of 
international anarchy. Consideration is also given to the systemic 
process of uneven development which constrains states' opportunities to 
develop those structures of international dominance which he identifies 
as the principal source of stable order at the international level.
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Hy focus then shifts to the historical level and Gilpin's account of the 
historical manifestation of these general processes of order formation 
within the modern international system in the specific form of the 
cyclical production of hegemonic systems of international stability. In 
the remaining part of the chapter I will offer a critical assessment of 
this conception of international order formation, my primary aim being 
to highlight some of the more significant problems associated with 
Gilpin's technical-rational approach to the understanding of the nature 
of international behaviour and historical change in the modern states- 
system. Here I shall argue that Gilpin's theory either ignores or 
understates the significance of some crucial dimensions of the modern 
process of international order formation which, when taken into account, 
pose major problems for the Neo-realist, naturalistic conception of 
international relations upon which his theory is predicated. As we shall 
see, this critique ultimately suggests the need to move beyond the 
limited categories of Neo-Realism to a more sophisticated historical 
view of international order formation within the modern states-system.
I International Anarchy and The Historical Logic of Order Formation 
Between States
In War and Change In World Politics. Gilpin contends that "the history 
of ... [the! international system is that of the rise and decline of the 
empires and dominant states that during their periods of reign over 
international affairs have given order and stability to the system. " 1 
Viewed in most general terms Gilpin's work represents an attempt to
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outline both the perrenial conditions and the historically specific 
forces explaining this dynamic, transhistorical process of the formation 
and reformation of such systems of international order. Before examining 
his distinctive account of the modern process of international order 
formation, therefore, we shall need to give some consideration to 
Gilpin's views concerning the nature of those transhistorical forces 
which delimit the process of order formation in every epoch. 2 This will 
provide the essential background against which his more specific 
conception of the nature of order formation within the modern states- 
system may be understood.
Gilpin identifies two major factors affecting the process of order 
formation within the international sphere in any historical period.
These are, firstly, the role of states as political actors and, 
secondly, the constraining influence of the structure of the 
international system. Like Waltz, he emphasises the importance of the 
overriding structure of the international system as a central force 
shaping the ordering process between states. However, in elaborating his 
distinctive historical perspective Gilpin supplements his views on the 
influence of the system's structure with an account of the autonomous 
role of states as rational political actors. In doing so he draws 
directly on the resources of rational choice theory. More particularly, 
Gilpin appropriates, as the informing model for his own theory, the 
latter's account of social interaction as an anomic, potentially 
anarchical condition wherein individuals, as independent, rational 
actors, are motivated by an exclusive interest in securing their 
rationally defined goals by the most efficient and effective means. In
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terms of this rational choice model of political action,the special 
concern of the theorist is to explain how it is possible for forms of 
collective action to emerge among such self-oriented actors which make 
possible the production of those public goods required by all 
individuals if they are to be able to successfully realise their own 
rational ends. The types of public goods referred to here include such 
basic values as social services and, most notably, those institutional 
structures enforcing public order. 3
Translating this rational choice model to the situation of states in the 
international system, Gilpin proceeds to define the former as rational 
actors whose political actions are governed by a calculative interest in 
manipulating international political processes to secure their 
rationally defined goals. Thus he notes that these political actors 
"enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance 
particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests. " 4 
However, once established these structures impose their own autonomous 
constraints upon the actions of states in pursuing their rationally 
defined goals. "Once in place, the international system itself has a 
reciprocal influence on state behaviour; it affects the ways in which 
individuals, groups and states seek to acheive their goals. The 
international system thus provides a set of constraints and 
opportunities within which ... states seek to advance their interests. " 5 
These different, systemically defined constraints upon, and 
opportunities for, significant political action within the international 
sphere are manifested most clearly in the effects upon states’ behaviour 
deriving from the structural condition of anarchy which Gilpin presents
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as a basic defining characteristic cf international relations in all 
historical periods.
As was the case with Valtz, the crucial factor identified here 
constraining states' behaviour is the inherent insecurity associated 
with the anarchical structure of the system wherein states must act. 
Vithin this state of anarchy "each group ... is concerned about being 
attacked or dominated by other groups... Land] therefore strives to 
enhance its own security by acquiring more and more power for itself."e 
The anarchical structure of the system then, dictates a preoccupation 
among its constituent units with a specific form of action. Citing the 
views of Cohen, Gilpin concurs that, given the lack of security and the 
inherent rivalry and competition produced by the anarchical structure of 
the international system, "the survival of any one unit is ...
[ultimately determined by] the range of strategies open to it... The 
state with only one strategic option can never feel truly secure: if 
that strategy fails the state will ... [most likely] be absorbed by 
others ... or be compelled to abandon certain of its core national 
values...The rational solution is to broaden its range of options - to 
maximize its power position, since power sets the limits to the choice 
of strategy"7 and, hence, to the possibilities for states' survival.
According to Gilpin then, the perrenial condition of international 
anarchy generates an inherent tendency among states to expand their 
power in order to enhance their material capabilities and their 
consequent capacity for political survival. Moreover, a primary means by 
which states seek to enhance their power and thereby attain the rational
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goal of security is through the extension of their control over the 
international system. This is because of the enormous benefits which 
such control potentially confers on those exercising it. The material 
and political advantages deriving from such systemic control can be used 
to enhance the state's power and, thereby, to ensure its security within 
the sphere of international anarchy. More particularly, by attaining 
dominance over the international system in this way a given state is 
able to organise the system's operations to suit its own interests and 
needs. In the process of doing so, Gilpin notes, it also introduces 
those basic structures of systemic regulation (i.e. those public goods) 
providing the necessary preconditions for orderly relations among the 
members of the anarchical international system understood as a single, 
collective unit.
However, this inherent drive by political units to secure a position of 
international dominance and the ability of any particular state to 
successfully achieve such dominance, is itself delimited by another 
systemically determined process. For, according to Gilpin, the 
"structure of the system [which generates this drive to international 
dominance, also]... imposes a cost on any behaviour that seeks to change 
the international status quo."e The specific form of this opportunity 
cost associated with such attempts to attain dominance within the 
international sphere is identified as the cost involved in waging 
system-wide war. Before it can succeed in its goal, any potential 
aspirant to international dominance must first overcome the existing 
dominant power and the institutionalised system of power relations which 
support its dominant position. It is in this context that we encounter a
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further crucial effect of the anarchical structure constraining states' 
actions. For the degree of this opportunity cost involved in challenging 
the status quo, and therefore the likelihood of change in the 
international system at any particular historical juncture, is 
intextricably linked with the relative nature of power within that 
system.
This relativity of international power identified by Gilpin involves two 
main aspects. On the one hand it refers to the unequal distribution of 
power between states at any given time which is responsible for the 
development of synchronic systems of hegemonic order. On a second level 
it refers to the process of the uneven diffusion of power between the 
units of the system over time. It is on this second aspect that I want 
to focus for the moment. For, a central contention of Gilpin's work is 
that power within the international system is constantly diffusing and, 
further, that this diffusion of power always assumes an assymetrical 
character. Indeed, because of the absence of any overriding sovereign 
authority capable of regulating the exercise of power between states, 
the international power relation is necessarily a zero sum game. The 
loss of power by any particular state inevitably entails an increase in 
the power of others and, consequent upon this, an increase in the 
potential threat posed by these other members of the system to its 
security. Thus, according to Gilpin, "because power is a relative matter 
the rise or decline of one state by definition entails the decline or
rise of another. " 3
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It is this inherent relativity characterising international power 
relations and the uneven nature of the historical diffusion of power 
associated with it which is identified as the primary determinant of 
change within the international system. "The critical significance of 
the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost 
of changing the international system and, therefore, the incentives for 
... [seeking such change.] As the power of a state increases, the 
relative cost of changing the system and of achieving the state's goals 
decreases and vice versa. 1 0 Accordingly, Gilpin notes that states will 
seek to change the existing international order where they believe the 
distribution of political power is weighted in their favour. A logical 
implication of this argument is that only the most powerful states are 
likely to be in the position to change the system as "a more powerful 
state can afford to pay a higher cost than a weaker one" 11 in seeking to 
secure international dominance. Thus, the possibilities for attaining 
dominant influence over the system are invariably restricted to the most 
powerful states of the system possessing the greatest capabilities.
The fundamental point about the relative nature of the historical 
diffusion of international power for Gilpin then, is its transformative 
effect upon the relative capabilities of states and, consequently, upon 
their capacity to act and assert their dominance at the international 
level. By increasing the power of particular states relative to others, 
these shifts in the distribution of international power reduce the cost 
involved in attempts to transform the system, thereby encouraging the 
efforts of those advantaged states to create a new international order 
serving their own needs and interests. Thus we arrive at the pivotal
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feature of Gilpin's historical theory of international order formation,
namely his notion of the historical law of the uneven development of
power within the international system and the cyclical formation of
international orders which this generates. According to this law, "as
the power of a group increases that group or state will be tempted to
try to increase its control over its environment. In order to increase
its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic and
territorial control; it will try to change the international system in
accordance with its particular set of interests."12. In terms of this
general transformative process noted here then, the overriding concern
of states in their external relations is identified as that of
constantly measuring and assessing their relative power capabilities as
the principal determinant of their capacity to impose their dominance 
over, and to manipulate the international system to serve their own
interests. In this respect the differential growth of power among states
forms the catalyst stimulating an ongoing, cyclical process of change
involving the historical formation and reformation of structures of
international order.
For Gilpin then, the history of international relations is characterised 
by the recurrent formation and transformation of such structures of 
domination by preponderant states which engender systems of order within 
an otherwise anarchical international system. Moreover, despite the fact 
of constant historical change in the nature of the relations between 
states, the attempts by different political units at different 
historical times to institute new orders of international dominance are 
seen as inevitably governed by an invariable, rationalistic logic of
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self interested action and the calculative considerations it engenders. 
Moreover, given his basic conception of the perrenial nature of 
international relations as a quasi-natural sphere of political anarchy, 
Gilpin discerns little possibility for the emergence of any alternative, 
more sociable mode of behaviour between states. The anarchical structure 
of international relations and the condition of political insecurity to 
which it gives rise ensures that actions at this level are inevitably 
governed by an instrumentalist, calculative interest in self 
preservation as the rationale determining states' behaviour and the 
process of order formation occurring between them. Let us now turn to 
consider Gilpin's historical account of this process of the rise and 
decline of such technical systems of international order as they develop 
in response to the law of the uneven development of power between 
states.
II The Emergence of the Modern Cycle of Hegemonic Order Formation
For Gilpin the broad developmental process described above is universal 
in its operation. "From the earliest civilizations states and empires 
have sought to expand and extend their dominion over their neighbours 
... However, the precise mechanisms they have employed have differed. " 1 3  
He identifies two major types of systemic dominance and corresponding 
modes of international stability produced by this transhistorical 
process of uneven development. These are the premodern imperialist, and 
the modern hegemonic forms. Before turning to the modern international 
system I want to briefly outline Gilpin's account of the factors which
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are responsible for the breakdown of the former, premodern system of 
international order formation and which have produced the distinctive 
anarchical condition giving rise to the modern cycle of hegemonic order 
formation which is our major concern.
According to Gilpin "the predominant form of political organization 
before the modern era was the empire... Vorld politics [during this 
period] was characterised by the rise and decline of powerful empires, 
each of which in turn unified and ordered its respective international 
system."14. The prominence of this imperialist mode of order formation in 
the premodern world is largely explained by the predominantly agrarian 
character of the socio-economic systems of premodern communities. In 
this context Gilpin observes that a "fundamental feature of the era of 
empires was the relatively static nature of wealth ... [Given the 
prevalence of this agrarian social formation] the growth in the wealth 
and power of the nation was primarily a function of its control over 
territory that could generate an economic surplus. " 1 5 Under these 
circumstances the ability of a premodern state to expand its power and 
impose its dominance over the international system was dependent upon 
the amount of territory and, thus, the size of the economic surplus it 
commanded. "The greater the territorial extent of an empire and its 
political control, the greater the taxable surplus and the greater the 
power of the empire. " 1 5 Consequently, the primary goal of great powers 
in the premodern period was to build up systems of political dominance 
involving direct political control over other communities.17.
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According to Gilpin the cyclical formation of such imperialistic 
systems, generated by the uneven development of international power, 
formed the major source of stable order in the premodern world. However, 
this premodern cycle of empires was ultimately broken as a result of 
profound changes in international political and socio-economic 
structures. The outcome of these epochal historical transformations was 
the emergence of a new, anarchical western international system 
involving a fundamentally different mode of international order 
formation. Three central factors are identified as responsible for this 
transformation of the nature of the international system. Most 
significant in political terms was the triumph of the political 
organisation of the nation state. As Gilpin observes, "in the modern 
world the nation-state has eclipsed every other type of political 
actor. " 1 0 The principal reason for the success of this new type of 
political organisation he identifies as its unique ability to combine 
large geographical size, essential for material growth and development, 
with intense loyalty from its subjects. In achieving this crucial 
compromise the nation-state has been able to overcome the basic 
limitations of such earlier political forms as the multi-national 
empire, which commanded great power but could not generate the sustained 
allegiance of its subjects, and the city-state, which commanded strong 
allegiance but possessed limited political and economic power because of 
its small geographical size. Through its ability to maintain and enforce 
its sovereign control over an extensive geographical area and population 
the modern nation state has been able to utilise its internal resources 
to great effect. In particular, through its "taxation and conscription 
policies the modern state has [acquired] the capacity to mobilize the
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services and wealth of its citizenry to advance its power and 
interests."13
This transformation in the character of the political units of the 
international system has developed in close association with a profound 
reconstitution of their internal socio-economic systems. Here Gilpin 
stresses the breakthrough to economic growth facilitated by the 
industrial revolution. The primary effect of the process of 
industrialisation was to greatly enhance the state's capacity for 
economic growth and development. Where earlier, preindustrial, agrarian 
societies were severely limited in their potential for economic growth, 
the rise of the modern industrial mode of production has enabled the 
emergence of a sustained form of development allowing the state to 
expand its capabilities in a variety of areas. In particular, “the 
advent of modern industry ... [enhanced] the direct relationship between 
wealth and power. LIn the modern world] economic wealth and military 
power ... [have become] increasingly synonomous. "20 With the development 
of an industrial economy then, western nation-states have become more 
able to generate within their own borders the resources necessary for 
the provision of those capabilities crucial to their survival and 
security.
The third major transformative influence within the modern international 
system noted by Gilpin was the historical creation of a modern world 
economy. This crucial development was the outcome of the progressive 
historical extension of the market economy, originating initially in 
Western Europe, on a global scale. Indeed, with the diffusion of the
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market economy and its associated system of property rights and a 
monetarised form of economic exchange throughout the world the former 
"became an increasingly important nexus of international relations. As a 
consequence of these developments the position of a state in the world 
market (the so-called international division of labour) became a 
principal determinant ... of its status in the international system. " - 1 
As a result the benefits to be derived from dominant influence over the 
operation of the new international economic system increasingly came to 
exceed those rewards offered by the farmer imperial system of 
territiorial domination.
Thus, according to Gilpin, within the new international environment 
created by the combined impact of these profound political and economic 
changes the tendency of dominant states to expand as their power grew 
underwent a profound transformation. The dominance of the uniquely 
cohesive political unit of the nation state, balancing scale and loyalty 
and incorporating a dynamic system of economic production, has had the 
effect of creating a new form of international anarchy. Within this 
anarchical system of separate sovereign states Gilpin notes that the 
costs involved in attempting to impose direct imperial control over the 
international system have become prohibitive while, at the same time, 
the emergence of a modern world market has meant that the achievement of 
international dominance no longer requires such direct territorial 
control. The same end can now be acheived through the extension of 
influence over the international sphere. Thus, as a result of these 
distinctive features of the modern international system,"expansion by 
means of the world market economy and extension of political influence
S3
have largely displaced empire and territorial expansion as the means of 
acquiring wealth“22 and, hence, as the means of attaining greater 
security within the international sphere. It has been the practical 
creation of such systems of hegemonic influence which have constituted 
the central feature of the process of order formation between states 
within the modern condition of international anarchy.
Ill The Cyclical Formation of Orders of Hegemonic Stability within the 
Modern States-System
As a consequence of the developments noted above then, “first in the 
European system and then on a global scale successive political and 
economic hegemonies have supplanted the pattern of successive empires as 
the fundamental ordering principle of international relations.“23 In 
turning now to examine Gilpin's account of this modern process of 
hegemonic order formation we will direct our attention again to those 
two, interrelated dimensions of the relativity of international power 
mentioned earlier in this chapter as the major, structurally defined 
forces shaping the international ordering process. To recapitulate, 
these are the uneven distribution of international power and its 
translation into formal, synchronic structures of international 
dominance in specific historical periods and, secondly, the uneven 
diffusion of power between states which engenders the historical 
transformation and ongoing reproduction of such systems of dominance 
within the international system. Considering these two interrelated 
aspects of international power as they operate to shape the process of
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order formation within the modern states system we shall be especially 
concerned to delineate those common features which Gilpin identifies as 
characterising the different historical structures of hegemonic 
dominance produced by the uneven distribution of power among states. At 
the same time, we shall give close attention to the nature of those 
major historical forces engendering the uneven development of power 
between these states as the primary factor accounting for the historical 
transformation of such synchronic, hegemonic orders.
In developing his analysis of the modern process of international order 
formation Gilpin begins with the general assumption that "the 
international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful 
states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, 
political and economic arrangements ... [An] equilibrium condition is 
one in which no powerful state ... believes that a change in the system 
would yield additional benefits commensurate with the anticipated costs 
of bringing about change in the system. n '2 A  Vhere such a historical state 
of equilibrium has developed the preponderant state is able to translate 
its superior capabilities into a formal set of hegemonic structures of 
international dominance serving its own needs and interests.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, it is the historical tension 
emerging between this formal, hegemonic superstructure created by such 
dominant states and the constantly changing distribution of 
international power upon which such superstructures are predicated, 
which provides the dynamic source of change in these synchronic systems 
of hegemonic order. Before considering this transformative process,
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however, let us consider more closely the formal structures of 
domination underpinning these modern systems of hegemonic stability.
According to Gilpin the actual possession and overt exercise of superior 
power has not been the decisive factor in the operation and maintenance 
of these different modern systems of hegemonic dominance once 
established. Clearly, the threat of the use of force is an ever present 
reality able to be used by a superior state in extreme cases. However, 
in circumstances where a state of equilibrium has been established 
between states it is the translation of this overt power into forms of 
international influence which Gilpin identifies as the most important 
factor in the maintenance of hegemonic dominance by a preponderant 
power. This central element of hegemonic influence is identified by 
Gilpin as synonomous with the prestige attaching to the great power's 
preponderant position in the larger international system. Thus he notes 
that "prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of 
international relations, much as authority is the central ordering 
feature of domestic society."2 5  In its broadest sense prestige implies a 
reputation for power derived from success in war. For the most 
significant effect of such military success is to "reinforce the 
perceptions of other states with respect to ... [the dominant state's 
superior] capacities and willingness ... [to use those capacities] to 
deter or compel other states to acheive its objectives. "'•2e
On the basis of this common wariness of, and respect for, its superior 
power the dominant state is able to develop a more general system of 
international dominance involving the creation of practical forms of
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political and socio-economic influence. The structures of hegemonic 
influence thus constituted represent the basic means by which dominant 
states have established formal systems of stable order within the modern 
condition of international anarchy - systems of order which have 
enhanced their own strategic and material interests. More particularly, 
according to Gilpin the structures of dominance engendered by such 
hegemonic powers have served to engender a condition of general 
consensus among the other states of the system to the dominant state's 
position of international leadership, in the process securing the 
legitimacy of the hegemon's rule. At the same time, the maintenance of 
this 'right to rule', has itself been dependent upon the hegemon's 
continued capacity to reproduce this set of formal structures of 
practical influence at the international level.
Vhat is the specific nature of these general structures of hegemonic 
dominance which Gilpin identifies as the practical source of order among 
states within the international system? The most important of these 
forms of hegemonic influence are the different types of political 
leadership exercised by the dominant power. As noted above, such 
political leadership ultimately derives from the hegemon's ability to 
enforce its will on other states. In this respect "the treaties that 
define the international status quo and provide the constitution of the 
established order have authority in that they reflect this reality. " 2 '7 
In this manner military prestige is translated into forms of political- 
legal influence manifested in the legal arrangements developed between 
the hegemon and other states. Complementing this influence over the 
operation of the international political-legal system is the important
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factor of socio-economic leadership. Gilpin notes that the "rule of the 
dominant power is frequently accepted because it provides certain public 
goods such as a beneficial economic order.'*2 '3 By accepting the 
international leadership of their more powerful counterpart, co­
operative states are able to take advantage of the considerable material 
benefits deriving from relations with an economically more powerful, 
industrialised nation.'-2 3 Finally, and of much less significance for 
Gilpin, is the ideological influence exercised by the hegemonic state 
within the international sphere. Thus he notes that "prestige, like 
authority, has a moral basis ... Every dominant state promotes a 
religion or ideology that justifies its domination of other states in 
the system. " 3 0  Accordingly, the maintenance of systemic dominance of the 
hegemonic state involves the dissemination of a set of cultural values 
which serve to provide a cohering, integrative influence within the more 
general system of international hegemonic order.
These, then, are the general characteristics shared in common by the 
more specific historical systems of hegemonic order which have resulted 
from the uneven distribution of power among states at different stages 
in the history of the modern states system. It is through the creation 
of such political, economic and ideological systems of dominant 
influence that the successive preponderant powers of France, Britain and 
the United States have been able to assert their control over the 
operation of the modern anarchical international system as the 
precondition for ensuring the ongoing expansion of their own power and 
the reinforcement of their material and strategic-political well being. 
Moreover, the operation of these hegemonic structures of international
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dominance embodying the superior capabilities of these hegemonic states, 
have given rise to structures of order providing relatively stable 
relations between states, first within the European system and, in more 
recent times, on a global level.
But what, according to Gilpin, are the major historical forces which 
have been responsible for undermining such synchronic systems of 
hegemonic stability, thereby engendering the cyclical production of new 
hegemonies in their place? Here he stresses the importance of the 
historical phenomenon of economic transformation affecting the major 
states of the modern international system. In particular, it is the 
continually changing capacity of these states to accumulate large 
economic surpluses which represents the key factor explaining the more 
general transformation of the hegemonic structures of international 
dominance outlined above. The growth and decline of the power of states 
and their corresponding capacity to expand their influence over the 
external environment has been fundamentally constrained by this 
underlying economic process. In this respect Gilpin observes that, as 
the economic "power of a state increases it seeks to extend its 
territorial control, its political influence and/or its domination of 
the international economy. " 31 In practical terms the rise and decline of 
successive modern systems of hegemonic stability has been an integral 
product of this more basic process of economic transformation of state 
power and Gilpin's account of the modern historical cycle of hegemonies 
is primarily an explication of the particular historical forces which 
have altered the relative economic capabilities of major states as the
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principle determinant of such hegemonic order formation. Accordingly, 
these forces require our close consideration here.
Most important among the elements explaining this transformation of the 
relative economic capacities of modern states' has been the effect of 
the cycle of technological innovation occurring within the modern 
international system engendered by industrial capitalism. The tendency 
for the centre of economic initiative and dynamic industrial growth to 
shift to different regions of the system over time is, according to 
Gilpin, a basic and inherent feature of the operation of the modern 
capitalist mode of production. In accordance with this process the "most 
important technical and organisational innovations which underlie the 
evolution of the capitalist world economy tend to cluster in time and 
space. Major advances in industrial methods and technological products 
have constituted a discontinuous process, characterised by sudden 
clusterings or jumps ...[and! the emergence of successive dominant 
cores" 3 2  or technologically advanced states. By its very nature this 
shift in technological initiative has tended to be from the most 
advanced to the less developed units of the system. Moreover, this 
cyclical process of technological innovation has provided a major 
impetus to the growth in the relative strength of less powerful states 
by generating increased levels of production and greater economic 
surpluses for their development. 3 3  According to Gilpin the creation of 
economies of scale which such technological innovation facilitates has 
enabled these states to develop their domestic socio-economic 
infrastructures and to gradually expand their political and economic 
capabilities. On the basis of this expanded internal growth such states
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could then look towards extending their influence within the wider 
international system.
Corresponding with and further stimulating this process of capital 
accumulation deriving from the cycle of technical innovation are the 
benefits to less advanced states arising from the 'advantages of 
backwardness'. Here Gilpin refers to the ability of less developed 
states within the international system to absorb and apply the 
technology inevitably diffused from the existing hegemonic state in 
order to accelerate their own economic development. Here he notes that, 
by adopting the technological forms of the leading, hegemonic nation, 
these rising states are able to literally skip stages of economic 
growth, effectively telescoping those developmental stages through which 
the hegemon has had to pass in establishing its position of 
international dominance. Thus, "the imitators, who have lower standards 
of living and less wasteful habits, can use the imported technology more 
efficiently...[They] can adopt the most advanced and most thoroughly 
proven techniques whereas ... costs and vested interests deter the more 
advanced economy from substituting the very latest techniques for 
obsolescent techniques." Their relatively underdeveloped condition 
thus becomes an important advantage to these rising states in seeking to 
extend their domestic capabilities and thereby enhance their potential 
capacity to attain greater influence over political and economic 
processes at the international level.
At the same time, Gilpin notes that this process of the rise of newly 
powerful states as potential challengers to the mantle of international
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leadership has proceeded in tandem with the simultaneous decline of the 
capabilities of the existing hegemon. Given the strains associated with 
the maintenance of hegemonic dominance and the effects of the law of 
diminishing returns characterising the process of economic growth the 
latter must, sooner or later, reach the limits of its own economic and 
political expansion. Moreover, once reaching this stage the hegemon 
encounters great difficulty in arresting the decline in its capacity to 
maintain the structures of hegemonic dominance it has created. "A 
declining society experiences a vicious cycle of decay and immobility 
much as a rising society enjoys a virtuous cycle of growth and expansion 
... Once caught up in this cycle it is difficult for the society to 
break out."3& It is in this context of hegemonic decline that the 
relative nature of the development of power within the modern states 
system becomes particularly apparent. For the relative decline in the 
power of the existing hegemonic state is itself the outcome of its loss 
of economic leadership within the international system, a deficit 
arising directly from the shift in the centre of technological 
innovation to more peripheral states who are able to use the resulting 
technical advantages to enhance their power as potential challengers to 
the hegemon's position. "At best states can only slow the diffusion of 
technology underlying their military or economic power; they cannot 
prevent it, especially today in a world in which technology rests on 
easily accessible scientific knowledge. "3e In accordance with this 
process Gilpin notes that the hegemon's power begins to erode. Its 
capacity to create economies of scale and to generate economic surpluses 
underpinning its preponderant power progressively declines. The hegemon 
finds it increasingly difficult to stay ahead of its rising competitors.
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The problems posed by this process of economic decline for the hegemon's 
position in the system are further compounded by the financial burdens 
involved in maintaining those structures of hegemonic dominance outlined 
above. Here Gilpin notes that "increases in the number and strength of 
rival, challenging powers force the dominant state to expend more 
resources to maintain its superior military or political position. " 3 7  
Also significant in this respect are the increasing costs associated 
with the maintenance of spheres of strategic-political influence and the 
political allegiance of client states. In particular, it is often 
necessary for the hegemon to compensate for the 'free rider' problem - 
the situation where client states are increasingly unprepared to share 
the costs of maintaining military alliances. Thus Gilpin observes how, 
"because the dominant power will defend the status quo in its own 
interest, lesser states have little incentive to pay their 'fair share' 
of ... protection costs. " 3 '3 The hegemonic power is therefore burdened 
with the greater part of the cost of maintaining the hegemonic order.
As a consequence of the developments noted here then, the relative 
capabilities of the hegemonic state are progressively and profoundly 
altered. The gradual erosion of the hegemon's power due to the factors 
outlined above progressively undermines its capacity to maintain its 
control over the international system. As the "power base on which ... 
[its! governance of the system ultimately rests [is] eroded ... [the] 
disjuncture among the components of the international system creates 
challenges for the dominant state and opportunities for the rising 
states in the system. " 3 3  The continuation of this decline of its power 
ultimately creates a disparity between the hegemon's formal role of
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governing the system and maintaining the formal structures of hegemonic 
influence on which its dominance is predicated, and its practical 
capacity to sustain that role. At the same time the increasing power of 
those rising states within the system confers upon them both the 
capabilities and the incentive to assume this hegemonic, ordering role. 
In effect the "international balance of power among the actors ... 
underlying the international system ... [of order] evolves more rapidly 
than the other components of the system, particularly the hierarchy of 
prestige and the rules of the system Ci.e. the formal superstructure of 
hegemonic dominance] ... It is ... [this] differential rate of change 
between the international distribution of power and the other components 
of the system that produces a disjuncture ... that, if unresolved, 
causes a change in the system. " 4-0
The inevitable outcome of this increasing contradiction between the 
declining power base of the existing hegemonic state and the practical 
requirements involved in maintaining the formal superstructure of the 
wider hegemonic system of international order is a hegemonic war in 
which one or more of the rising states seeks to translate their 
preponderant power into a new, formal system of hegemonic dominance 
replacing that of the existing, now exhausted hegemon. According to 
Gilpin, such hegemonic wars, brought on by these fundamental changes in 
the underlying configuration of international power, ultimately result 
in the construction of new formal systems of hegemonic influence 
reflecting the new distribution of international power and serving the 
interests and needs of a new hegemonic state.
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As a result of such transformative processes, outlined in very general 
terms here, Gilpin notes that there has occured a process of uneven 
development in the power of states which has engendered the successive 
formation of modern systems of hegemonic order at the international 
level. The dynamic historical forces of uneven development have produced 
an historical cycle of hegemonic order formation expressed*,first within 
Europe in the form of French dominance under Napoleon and in the 
ascendancy of Britain in the nineteenth century, and later, within the 
global states system, in the hegemonic dominance of the United States. 
More particularly, in the gradual erosion of the hegemonic structures of 
the Pax Britannica and the subsequent emergence of the Pax Americana of 
the contemporary, postwar era Gilpin discerns the most recent 
manifestation of the transformative effects arising from the operation 
of the perrenial law of uneven development examined above. For Gilpin, 
as we have seen this ongoing, assymetrical process of international 
development constitutes the central stimulus to the cyclical formation 
of systems of hegemonic order within the modern international sphere. 
Moreover, even in the case of the contemporary international order this 
process of uneven development is identified as operating to erode the 
economic and political structures of postwar hegemonic stability created 
by the preponderant power of the United states. Thus the "law of uneven 
growth continues to redistribute power, ... undermining the status quo 
established by the last hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium replaces 
equilibrium and the world moves towards a new round of hegemonic 
conflict. It has always been thus and always will be, until men either 
destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective mechanism of 
peaceful change. " 4-2
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IV Critiscisms of Gilpin's Historical Theory of Hegemonic Order 
Formation.
Arguably the most important feature of the theory of international order 
formation outlined above for the broader concerns of this work is the 
way in which it historicises the basic categories of the Neo-Realist 
perspective presented in the work of Waltz. In this respect Gilpin's 
theory constitutes an ambitious attempt to theorise the dynamic 
interrelationship between those temporal, unit-level processes of 
political, economic and military activity characterising relations 
between modern states and the more general effects of the constraining 
anarchical structure as they mutually function to generate ongoing 
change in the forms of modern international order. In contrast with 
Waltz's approach, these two dimensions of international relations are 
integrated by Gilpin into a single historical account of international 
order formation manifest in the cyclical development of systems of 
hegemonic stability - a process engendered by the actions of states in 
response to the uneven development of power within the modern 
international system. While the anarchical structure is still conceived 
as a major constraining force upon international action and the type of 
order produced at the international level, Gilpin's theory paints to the 
way in which that anarchical structure undergoes transformation in 
response to the historical activities of its constitutive political 
units. Through his elaboration of this distinctive dimension of the 
influence of states as rational actors within the international system 
the general process of order formation is redefined in dynamic,
historical terms.
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In developing this historical approach Gilpin arguably provides some 
important insights into the historical forces explaining change in those 
structures of international domination engendering order in the modern 
states-system. Moreover, his theory suggests that such international 
order formation is not purely limited to ensuring basic political 
survival, as Waltz's work posits, but also reflects the concern of 
states with securing other, material interests and benefits through the 
creation of structures of hegemonic consensus at the international 
level. In highlighting this latter aspect of the process of order 
formation between states Gilpin's account of the formation of systems of 
hegemonic influence introduces a theme which will become increasingly 
significant in later sections of this thesis. This is the concept of 
international consensus and, specifically, the idea of modern 
international order formation as a process involving the construction of 
forms of legitimate, consensual order binding states in cooperative 
relations at the international level. In terms of the points noted here 
Gilpin's theory may be seen to represent an important advance on that of 
Waltz considered in the preceding chapter.
However, as I intend to illustrate below, Gilpin's attempt to 
historicise the Neo-Realist perspective involves certain major 
shortcomings and ommissions which significantly limit its explanatory 
power as an account of the modern process of international order 
formation. Moreover, his emphasis upon the historical reproduction of 
legitimate structures of hegemonic stability between modern states 
raises important considerations which suggest the qualitative 
limitations of his technical-rational approach as an effective mode for
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understanding the process of international order formation within the 
modern international system. In elaborating these critiscisms I want to 
begin by considering more closely Gilpin's account of those constitutive 
forces accounting for the institutionalisation of modes of hegemonic 
stability at the international level. Our analysis of the deficiencies 
of this aspect of his work will enable us to discern the significant 
shortcomings of the general methodology underlying Gilpin's broader 
historical perspective. At the same time, it will allow us to highlight 
the important substantive limitations of his account of the general 
process of international order formation as it is engendered by the 
uneven development of power within the modern system of states.
As we have seen above, in explaining the historical constitution of 
modern systems of hegemonic order Gilpin stresses the technical-rational 
nature of this constitutive process. Here the primary consideration 
motivating states' behaviour is identified as the concern to maximise 
their power as the means to securing their rationally defined goals. The 
logic governing international order formation is an essentially 
calculative one in terms of which each state constantly seeks to 
ascertain its relative power capabilities and the possibilities for the 
extension of practical control over the international system arising 
from historical shifts in the distribution of international power. The 
subsequent attempts by a particular state to establish its dominance 
over the system are essentially a "response to developments that 
increase its relative power or decrease the costs of modifying political 
arrangements ... [These efforts] continue until an equilibrium is 
reached between the costs and benefits of further change."^-3 It is this
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invariable, technical-rational logic which represents the principal 
motivating factor in the genesis of hegemonic orders within the modern 
international system. This technical-rational logic has its origins, in 
turn, in the deeper motivating force of national self interest inherent 
to the natural condition of international anarchy. At the international 
level, Gilpin maintains, the "purposes and natures of social 
institutions Ci.e. states! are determined principally by [their! self 
interest and relative power. "'1"1
The main problem with this explanation of international order formation 
lies in its narrow understanding of the nature of states and the 
considerations motivating their actions at the international level. More 
specifically, I want to argue here that the process of international 
order formation does not merely involve the extension of technical 
control over an international condition of natural, objective power 
processses as Gilpin contends. Rather, there are important cultural 
motivations to be taken into account. In order to grasp the importance 
of this cultural dimension we need to consider more closely the 
implications of Gilpin's idea of the generation of international 
consensus as the practical basis of modern systems of hegemonic order.
As the central element in the everyday operation of systems of hegemonic 
stability the phenomenon of consensus is given a strictly limited 
formulation by Gilpin. While acknowledging that the "position of the 
dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious or other 
values common to a set of states"AS Gilpin focusses mainly on the more 
tangible material and political sources of such consensus formation 
implicit in the cohering effects of perceived and actual political and
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economic advantages deriving from acceptance of the hegemon's dominance. 
In doing so, he fails to go further and consider exactly what is 
involved in the cultural dimension of hegemonic order formation. As we 
shall see below, however, a more adequate treatment of this cultural 
dimension of international order formation raises considerations which 
actually bring into question the validity of Gilpin's own technical- 
rational understanding of this historical process.
In elaborating this cultural dimension of international order formation 
I want to draw on the notion of national perceptions and their role in 
shaping the international behaviour of states developed in the work of 
Rosen and Jones.4e A major concern of Rosen and Jones's work is to 
examine how the international behaviour of states is influenced by 
concepts, values, and ideologies originating from the domestic, cultural 
order within the state. In opposition to the tendency of traditional 
theory to rigidly differentiate between the domestic and international 
levels of political life it is their contention that, "to a 
considerable degree, the foreign actions of states are continuations of 
essentially domestic processes and demands . . . International perceptions 
cannot be separated from the broader [domestic] value base that gives 
rise to them. " 4 7 On this view then, a state's external behaviour is 
integrally linked with the cultural forms characterising its internal 
social and political life. National actors always view the international 
system through a perceptive grid which presupposes specific values and 
cultural preconceptions shaping their understanding of international 
affairs and their relations with other states. According to this 
argument the international sphere cannot be understood, as Gilpin would
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have us believe, as a sphere of behaviour governed solely by rational 
considerations of technical control in view of the perceived 
relativities of international power. Rather, such international power 
processes are always interpreted by states from particular, pre-formed 
cultural perspectives which exercise a major influence upon the way they 
conduct their international affairs.
In order to grasp the implications of this cultural dimension of 
national perceptions for the formation of consensual systems of 
international order let us consider the example of the postwar rise of 
America to hegemonic dominance within the international system. Here 
Rosen and Jones stress the important influence of the deeply engrained 
democratic tradition emerging from the historical process of American 
national, cultural formation in shaping its postwar international 
behaviour. This democratic tradition, they note, has its roots in the 
earliest history of the nation and the founding fathers^attempts to 
build a society of religious tolerance free from the tyranny and 
repression of the old European society. Moreover, this democratic ethos 
has been reinforced over time becoming part of the national political 
psyche. With America's emergence from its pre-war isolationism and its 
establishment as a major actor in international politics this internal 
democratic tradition began to exercise an increasingly powerful 
influence over American foreign policy perceptions. According to Rosen 
and Jones the domestic, democratic ethos translated at the international 
level into a national perception of the nation's role as the champion of 
democracy within the wider world. In line with this perception 
successive postwar American political administrations have viewed their
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role as principally that of defending western democratic political 
systems against the threat of political tyranny represented by the 
expansion of international communism.
According to this argument then, the cultural values and preconceptions 
characterising the American cultural and political system were an 
important factor explaining the emergence, in the postwar period, of a 
national perception and a corresponding foreign policy, one of whose 
principal aims was to create a world in America's own ideal democratic 
image. This point is reinforced in the writings of historical 
commentators on this period. Thus Ambrose has argued that "America's 
rise to globalism was by no means mindless, just as it was not 
exclusively a reaction to the communist challenge or a response to 
economic needs...[In the postwar years] Americans had a sense of power, 
of bigness, of destiny ... [They] wanted to bring the blessings of 
democracy, capitalism and stability to everyone ... The whole world, in 
their view, should be a reflection of the United States."*'3 The postwar 
construction of the Pax Americana was shaped, to a considerable degree 
then, by this national perception of America's mission within the 
international system. The development of a postwar order of hegemonic 
international alliances was guided, to a significant extent, by an 
ideological interest in preserving and extending this internal 
democratic model of cultural organisation globally as the basis for the 
attainment of freedom by other countries. Moreover, the extension oi 
such hegemonic forms of cultural influence, in association with the more 
tangible political and economic aspects of hegemony, can be seen to have
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provided an important cohering, integrative force serving to reinforce 
and consolidate the American hegemonic system in later decades. 5 0
The influence of the element of national, cultural perceptions, evident 
in this example of the postwar American hegemonic order, is arguably 
informative for the modern process of international order formation more 
generally. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter three, the 
universalisation of dominant states' cultural value systems has played a 
crucial role in the creation of coherent systems of consensual 
international order through the provision of those discursive rules of 
communicative interaction and political co-operation forming the 
indispensible framework for the operation of more general, legitimate 
structures of international order. The concern of powerful states to 
create a world in their own cultural image has arguably been an 
important factor in the construction of those institutional forms 
providing a degree of stability in the relations between states at 
different stages in the development of the international system. In this 
way such dominant powers have provided, not only the political and 
socio-economic bases, but also the cultural or normative principles of 
consensus upon which relatively stable interstate relations have been 
predicated and reproduced historically.
In painting to this broader understanding of the culturally constituted 
character of the modern process of international order formation, we 
need also to note a second crucial dimension of this process which is 
largely ignored by Gilpin, namely the formation of those structures of 
order focussed around the mechanism of the balance of power emphasised
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in Waltz's work. In this context a striking limitation of Gilpin's 
theory is its neglect of those phases in the uneven development of power 
within modern international history where no one state has been able to 
acquire hegemonic dominance over the international system and where, 
consequently, structures of legitimate order have arisen as a result of 
the combined action of a number of powerful states. Indeed, the 
acknowledgement of this dimension of the evolution of the modern states 
system suggests that the process of hegemonic order formation described 
by Gilpin constitutes the exception rather than the norm in modern 
western history.51 3Jor does his work give adequate consideration to the 
historical role of such strategic balances of power in constraining the 
development of those systems of hegemonic domination emphasised in his 
own theory through the deployment of countervailing military force by 
those states threatened by the ambitions of a would-be hegemon.
Thus, it would appear that an account of the historical constitution of 
legitimate structures of order between modern states cannot be limited, 
as Gilpin's work does, to an analysis of the historical formation of 
structures of hegemonic stability within a system of sovereign states 
defined in narrow terms as rational actors. In order to acquire a more 
adequate understanding of the historical process of order formation 
occuring within the modern western states-system attention needs to be 
given to the way the culturally located process of uneven international 
development emphasised in his own work has, more often than not, 
engendered situations in which the relative commensurability of the 
power of a few large states has received expression in the formation of 
international balances of power regulating the behaviour of multiple
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sovereign actors. Moreover, it must consider the manner in which the 
operation of such multi-actor structures of international order have 
themselves been influenced by the broader cultural context of 
international political action. In particular, as was indicated in our 
earlier critique of Waltz's theory, it needs to take account of the way 
such ordering structures have been predicated upon culturally engendered 
principles of consensus among the great powers, the historical operation 
of which has played a major role in the reproduction of stable 
interstate relations at different stages in the history of the western 
states-system.
Conclusions
Arguably the major insight arising from the foregoing analysis of 
Gilpin's work is that a theory concerned with the historical development 
of modern systems of international order must assume a much broader 
focus than is evident in the theory of hegemonic stability elaborated by 
Gilpin. In particular, it must take cognisance of more than the 
political and socio-economic processes stressed in the theory of 
hegemonic order formation developed by Gilpin. While these are important 
factors in this general process, such a theory needs also to take 
account of the wider context within which structures of consensual order 
between states arise. In particular, it must consider the complex nature 
of states as international actors and the way the more powerful among 
them have, at different historical moments, engendered normative systems 
of international dominance conferring legitimacy upon more general
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systems of international order. At the same time such a theoretical 
perspective needs to examine the way the ongoing dynamic of the 
transformation of these systems of consensual order engendered by the 
process of the uneven development of power within the international 
system has engendered very different normative systems of order, 
including among them those hegemonic structures of international 
dominance stressed by Gilpin and the multi-polar balances of power noted 
above, as the basis of order production at different stages of the 
development of the modern states-system.
However, as I have sought to indicate in this chapter, the articulation 
of such an approach requires a theoretical model of a very different 
nature to that embraced by Gilpin. For, as we have seen, Gilpin's 
historical perspective, derived from rational choice theory, effectively 
reifies the logic shaping the behaviour of states. By separating the 
'rational' motivations guiding states' actions from the historical 
process of political and cultural change occurring within the 
international system Gilpin is led to a highly naturalistic view of 
modern international relations and a technical model of the process of 
order formation which is unable to accommodate the insights raised by 
his own historical approach. Instead we are offered a limited view of 
modern international history as a recurrent cycle of the construction of 
technical- structures of hegemonic dominance within an objective 
condition of international political anarchy. The result is a historical 




1. R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, U.K., 1981, 
p. 42
2. These broad themes are elaborated principally in Var and Change in 
World Politics. The particular focus of Gilpin's work has rested 
upon the more specific processes of hegemonic order formation 
operating within the modern states-system. See especially,
R. Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-National Corporation: The 
Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment. New York, 1975, and 
R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. 
Princeton, 1987.
3. For some representative accounts of the main themes of rational 
choice theory which give particular attention to the central problem 
of the production of public goods see M. Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action. New York, 1968, and M. Laver, The Politics
Of Private Desires: The Guide To The Politics of Rational Choice. 
Middlesex, 1981. For an approach to the construction of a theory of 
international politics based on an extended, Pareto-ian model of 
rational choice theory see S.D. Krasner, Defending the National 
Interest. Princeton, 1978.
4. Var and Change in World Politics, p.9
5. Ibid., p.26
6. Ibid. , p.94
7. Ibid., p.87
8. The different historical types of such systemic control are 











18. The specific factors engendering this cycle of empires are
summarised by Gilpin in Ibid., p.115. Significant here is Ruggie's 
point, noted in chapter one, concerning the weakly developed form of 
sovereign authority in the pre-modern period facilitating the 
formation of such multi-national empires. For his views on this 
issue see also P. Anderson, Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism, 
London, 1974, Part 1.
19. Ibid., p.116 
20 Ibid., p.122
21. Ibid., p.124. The process described here by Gilpin corresponds very 
closely to Ruggie's account of the increase in dynamic density noted 
in chapter one.
22. Ibid., p.132. A major account of the historical development of this 
international division of labour is that found in Vallerstein's 
study of the historical emergence of the modern capitalist world 
economy. See especially I. Vallerstein, The Modern World System 







29. For some accounts of the different political and economic structures 
of hegemonic cooperation and their role in the reproduction of 
international order at different stages in the history of the modern 
states-system see S. D. Krasner, International Regimes. London, 1984. 
More detailed accounts of the structures generated by the postwar 
American hegemonic state are presented in F. Block, The Origin of 
International Economic Disorder. California, 1977, and R.0. Keohane, 
After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, 1984.
30. Var and Change in World Politics, p.30
31. Ibid., p.106
32. Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-Rational Corporation, p.67.
The primary examples of this cycle of technological innovation 
noted by Gilpin are the technological breakthroughs in Britain 
associated with the industrial revolution and the managerial and 
technological advances underlying the growth of the American economy 
in the first part of this century.
108
33. G i l p i n  d e r i v e s  t h i s  n o t i o n  of  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  from t h e  work 
of  S c h u m p e te r  and h i s  a c c o u n t  of  modern c a p i t a l i s m  a s  a s y s t e m  of  
c r e a t i v e  d e s t r u c t i o n .  See J .  Schum pete r ,  C a p i t a l i s m .  S o c i a l i s m  and 
D em ocracy . New York, 1962.
34. War and  Change i n  World P o l i t i c s , p p . 178-79 .  For  some e a r l i e r  
a c c o u n t s  of  t h i s  p r o c e s s  of  uneven  economic  d e v e lopm en t  w i t h i n  
M a r x i s t  l i t e r a t u r e  upon which G i l p i n  h i m s e l f  d raws ,  S. Amin, Unequal 
Deve lopment:  An Essay  on t h e  S o c i a l  F o r m a t io n  o f  P e r i p h e r a l  
C a p i t a l i s m . New York: Monthly Review P r e s s ,  1976, and  A. Emmanuel, 
Unequal  Exchange:  A S tu d y  of  t h e  I m p e r i a l i s m  o f  T r a d e . New York,
1972.
35. I b i d . , p p . 189-190 .  G i l p i n  p o i n t s  t o  a number o f  methods whereby 
modern hegemonic  powers  have s o u g h t  t o  h a l t  t h i s  p r o c e s s  of  d e c l i n e .  
These  have  i n c l u d e d  s t r a t e g i c  r e t r e n c h m e n t  f rom  i m p e r i a l  commitments  
and ,  a l t e r n a t e l y ,  i n c r e a s e d  commitment  t o  b o l s t e r  t h e  hegemonic  
o r d e r .  But su c h  m ea s u res  u l t i m a t e l y  o n l y  s e r v e  t o  d e l a y  t h e  
i n e v i t a b l e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e c l i n e .  See I b i d . , p p . 187-197.
36. I b i d . , p . 177
37. I b i d . ,  p . 169
38. L oc . C i t . .
39. I b i d . ,  p . 186
40. I b i d . , p . 48
41. Fo r  h i s  more s p e c i f i c  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  modern p h a s e s  o f  t h i s  
c y c l i c a l  p r o c e s s  a s  t h e y  have been  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  Pax B r i t a n n i c a  
and t h e  Pax Americana  s e e  G i l p i n ,  US Power and  t h e  M u l t i - N a t i o n a l  
C o r p o r a t i o n .
42. War and  Change i n  World P o l i t i c s , p .2 1 0
43. I b i d . , P r e f a c e  x i - x i i
44. I b i d . , P r e f a c e  xi
45. I b i d . ,  p . 34
46. S . J .  J o n e s  & W.S. Rosen,  The Logic  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s .
( 4 t h  e d . ) ,  Bos ton ,  1974.
47. I b i d . ,  P r e f a c e ,  x i v
48. I b i d . ,  p p . 5 8 -6 7 .  T h i s  i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t  o f  n a t i o n a l  p e r c e p t i o n s  and 
t h e i r  e f f e c t s  upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r  i s  n o t  d e v e l o p e d  a t  g r e a t  
l e n g t h  by Rosen and J o n e s .  N e v e r t h l e s s ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e  below,  t h e i r  
a r g u m e n t s  r a i s e  i s s u e s  which a r e  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  
b r o a d e r  c o n c e r n s  of  t h i s  work.
109
49. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eise to Globalism. Middlesex, 1983, p.45. For 
some alternative interpretations of these cultural dimensions of the 
development of the American hegemony which stress the expansionary 
ideology implicit in the democratic program of the New Deal see
F. Schurmann, The Logic of World Power. New York, 1974, and
R. V. Cox, Production. Power and World Order. New York, 1987.
50. At the same time, to acknowledge this important cultural dimension 
of international order formation does not require that one must 
subscribe to a form of cultural determinism. But nor can this 
cultural dimension be reduced to a simple reflection of economic and 
political processes as Gilpin's work would suggest. For a survey of 
the conflicting views on the causes of American postwar expansionism 
as expressed in the debate over the origins of the cold war see
S. Hoffman, "Revisionism Revisited", in L.H. Miller &
R. V. Preussen (eds.), Reflections on the Cold Var. Philadelphia, 
1974, pp.5-27
51. For a major account of the different phases of the historical 
evolution of the balance of power in modern European history see 
Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in 
Europe 1494-1945. London, 1963.
110
PART OHE CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters we have identified some important themes 
arising from the Neorealist technical approach to the explanation of 
modern international order formation for the elaboration of our more 
general theoretical perspective. Arguably the most important of these is 
the point, advanced by both Valtz and Gilpin, concerning the way such 
order formation is shaped by the influence of the anarchical structure 
of the international system and the relative nature of the distribution 
and historical diffusion of power therein which it engenders. At the 
same time, I have indicated how the tensions within their general 
approaches raise the need for a more sophisticated theoretical 
perspective which is able to incorporate these important insights within 
a more adequate account of the nature of order formation within the 
modern states-system. In particular, I have sought to show how the 
implications involved in Gilpin's attempt to historicise Valtz's formal 
conception of international order formation in terms of the mutually 
conditioning influences of the anarchical structure of this system and 
the relative nature of the distribution of power arising from the 
actions of states leads us beyond the technical-rational interest 
informing the Neorealist perspective.
The modified perspective suggested by the foregoing critique of 
Neorealist thought involves the transcendence of the latter's highly 
objectivised, naturalistic understanding of international relations and
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its technical conception of the order constitutive process between 
modern states understood as mere units of power capabilities. More 
particularly, I have argued that the problems associated with this 
paradigm, deriving from its informing, technical interest, indicate the 
need for the development of a different, socio-cultural understanding of 
modern international relations and the process of order formation among 
states. In this respect, our modified theoretical perspective would need 
to adopt a more interpretative approach to these phenomena. While 
incorporating Gilpin's insights concerning the central role of the 
uneven development of power as the dynamic agency engendering consensual 
systems of order at the international level, the reformulated 
theoretical perspective suggested here needs to grasp the complex nature 
of this historical process and the diverse cultural forces contributing 
to the historical constitution of the former.
With these considerations in mind we shall turn in Section Two to 
consider certain representative theorists of the Rationalist school of 
international relations theory. Examining the distinctive societal 
paradigm informing their work, we shall consider whether this 
Rationalist perspective is able to provide a more adequate understanding 
of the historical process of order formation between modern states than 
is offered by the Neorealist paradigm.
PART TVO




In this second part of the thesis I will examine the general model of 
international order formation presented within the Rationalist school of 
international relations theory. In doing so my main concern will be to 
consider the potential offered by this particular theoretical 
perspective for the development of a more sophisticated understanding of 
the modern international system and the process of order formation 
occuring therein which incorporates the points of value raised by the 
limited NeoRealist approach examined in Section One. As we shall see the 
Rationalist perspective examined here represents a major paradigmatic 
shift in international political theory. For, what it offers is a basic 
redefinition of the nature of the object studied by such theory and of 
the methodology considered appropriate for establishing an understanding 
of that subject matter.
As I indicate in more detail in chapter three this basic paradigm shift 
derives from the highly distinctive knowledge-constitutive interest 
which informs the theoretical approach of Rationalist theory and which 
gives definitive shape to the conception of modern international order 
formation articulated in the writings of those theorists encompassed by 
this theoretical perspective. This I define as the practical cognitive 
interest. In accordance with this practical cognitive interest in 
international order formation the Rationalist perspective offers a 
distinctive socio-cultural conception of the nature of modern 
international relations and of the central ordering processes operating
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within the international system. Here the focus of attention is directed 
to the process of international order formation understood as the 
constitution of systems of regulative socio-political relations between 
states and to the major historical forces contributing to the 
maintenance and transformation of such systems of social order.
This Rationalist conception of international order formation will be 
examined in detail in chapters three and four. Chapter three outlines 
the basic features of the societal model as it is articulated in the 
writings of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight and its application by those 
theorists to the modern European states-system. It then considers 
Wight's account of the historical process of legitimate order formation 
characterising this European international society in the absolutist and 
nationalist periods respectively, focussing on the different principles 
of international legitimacy definining this process of societal order 
formation in these historical periods. Elaborating upon this theme in 
chapter four, I consider the accounts presented in the writings of Bull 
and others of the historical expansion of this European international 
society in more recent times and the corresponding extension of the 
nationalist principle of international legitimacy as the legitimating 
basis of this expansionary process and the formal discursive foundation 
of an evolving global international society. In this context, we shall 
examine Bull's account of the major problems confronting the historical 
reproduction of stable order within this expanded international society 
resulting from its incorporation of new nations advancing demands for 
substantive equality with their more developed sovereign counterparts. 
Moreover, we shall see how these problems bring into focus certain
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significant limitations of the Rationalist perspective which suggest the 
need for a more critical approach to the reproduction of legitimate 
order within this modern international society than is provided by the 
Rationalist perspective.
Chapter Three
Elements of the Societal Model of International Order Formation
As noted in the preceding pages, the theoretical approach of the 
Rationalist thinkers examined below reflects a distinctive theory- 
orienting interest which I have defined as the Practical interest. In 
proceeding to outline the societal model of international order 
formation as it is elaborated in the writings of the two major 
representatives of the Rationalist school of international relations 
theory, namely Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, I will begin by examining 
this distinctive knowledge-constitutive interest which informs their 
work. This will lead us directly to a consideration of the general 
features of the Rationalist account of international relations as a 
distinctive sphere of social interaction and its associated view of the 
modern European states-system as a specific historical example of this 
anarchical form of society. Examining Bull's account of the principal 
institutions defining the interaction of states within this modern 
international society we shall see how the former have engendered a 
distinctive process of social order formation between them.
Elaborating upon this theme in the second part of the chapter, I will 
consider Martin Wight's account of the historical reproduction of those 
principles of international legitimacy which he identifies as providing 
the broad discursive framework for the development of particular systems 
of social order at different stages in the history of modern European
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international society. Particular attention is given here to Wight's 
views concerning the way these broad regulative principles of legitimacy 
have been transformed within modern European history in line with 
historical changes in the sovereign character of the states constituting 
this international society. This analysis will form the background to 
our examination, in chapter four, of Bull's account of the historical 
expansion of European international society in more recent times and the 
problems arising from this process for the reproduction of legitimate 
order within an emerging global international society.
I The Practical Interest and the Sccio-Cultural Conception of 
International Order Formation
As we saw in part one, for Neorealism international relations is 
understood as an objectified sphere of anarchical power processes where 
states are conceived of in the most minimal terms as units of power 
capabilities. Within this objectified sphere the behaviour of states is 
governed by the dictates of an unchanging logic of necessituous action - 
a logic integrally connected with the perennial nature of international 
politics as the condition of competitive power politics par excellence. 
In contrast with this approach, the practical interest informing the 
Rationalist perspective engenders a view of the international system as 
a distinctive sphere of social interaction. According to this 
perspective the condition of international anarchy is not to be 
understood as a quasi-naturalistic condition of inevitably clashing and 
competing power units. Rather, it is an historically evolving, socially
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constituted sphere of political action - a meaningful realm of social 
interaction between political subjects circumscribed by historically 
developed traditions and discursive cultural practices.1 Moreover, the 
analysis of this sphere of political activity and the process of order 
formation occuring within it is seen to require a very different 
methodological approach to that adopted by STeorealists. In accordance 
with the practical cognitive interest informing this Rationalist 
perspective the primary concern of theoretical analysis for both Wight 
and Bull is understood as that of comprehending this sphere of social 
meaning and the complex, culturally constituted forms of social 
understanding and political interaction underpinning the formation and 
transformation of structures of order among states.
Thus, where Ueorealism's principal concern is to describe modes of 
technical control engendering relatively stable order within an 
objectified international system, the emphasis in Rationalist thought is 
upon interpreting those historically constituted forms of socio-cultural 
relations developed between states which form the indispensible 
framework within which the practical structures of order formation 
between these states are able to emerge. In this respect, as Martin 
Wight notes, "international society ... can be properly described only 
in historical and sociological depth. It is the habitual discourse of 
independent communities beginning in the Christendom of western Europe 
and gradually extending throughout the world."2 More particularly, this 
practical, interpretative orientation leads Rationalist theory to an 
examination of the way such discursive socio-political practices operate 
to constrain the behaviour of states by engendering among them a
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recognition of, and conformity with, general principles of political 
interaction providing the basis for orderly relations between these 
states in any given historical period. Accordingly, such theory seeks to 
delineate the distinctive nature of these historically evolved forms of 
social interaction between states and the corresponding rules and 
regulations which are seen to regulate their substantive, political, 
power relations. At the same time, it is also concerned to examine the 
way such regulative systems of socio-political practice between states 
undergo historical change and the implications of such social change far 
the nature and reproduction of legitimate social order within modern 
international society.
In addition to this, and in accordance with its more hermeneutical, 
interpretative approach to the study of international relations, the 
practical interest guiding Rationalist theory engenders a quite 
distinctive attitude to the general function or purpose of theoretical 
analysis. Specifically, neither Wight or Bull entertain the possibility 
of adopting an overtly critical standpoint in relation to the study of 
international society. Neither of them accepts the possibility of 
establishing some form of independent criteria or normative measure 
which might provide the basis for a critical evaluation of the different 
types of international social order examined in their work in terms of 
their greater or lesser effectiveness in producing order between states 
(a tendency which we have seen to characterise the technical-rational 
perspective of Waltz and which we will witness again in our analysis of 
Cox’s Critical theory in Part Three ), Rather, the primary aim of this 
methodological approach is to acquire an empathetic understanding of the
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nature of the societal structures underpinning the relations between the 
sovereign subjects of international society at any particular moment of 
its historical development. The essential function of theoretical 
enquiry for Rationalism is to comprehend and delineate the distinctive 
socio-political relations which have operated as the cohering force 
integrating the sovereign members of the international system into a 
larger societal totality in any historical period.
In view of this distinctive theory-orienting interest, the attempt to 
introduce an overtly critical standpoint by invoking same higher 
'objective* standard of judgement is seen to involve an over-simplified 
understanding of the nature of theoretical inquiry which threatens to 
obscure the complexities of international relations and to hinder the 
goal of attaining an effective understanding of the particular, 
culturally formed socio-political practices which underpin the process 
of order formation within different international societies.
Accordingly, implicit in the practical methodological approach of Wight 
and Bull is a view of the superior value of a detached or passive 
scholarly approach to the object of study as free as possible from 
externally imposed value judgments. Hence, in rejecting such overtly 
critical approaches it is Bull's basic contention that "for a moral 
justification of the study of International Relations we need not look 
beyond inquiry itself which has its own morality and saps the strength 
of political causes of all kinds, good and bad. " 3 The emphasis here 
then, lies upon interpreting and clarifying, in a critically detached 
manner, the different historical forms of socio-political interaction 
and co-operation shaping order formation within international society.
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It is through the adoption of this critically detached approach to the 
analysis of international order formation that the theorist is best able 
to elucidate the nature of those norms whose observance by the sovereign 
members of international society facilitates the reproduction of social 
consensus and the maintenance of coherent, ordered relations between 
states.A
II The Elements of the Societal Paradigm of European International 
Order Formation
Having clarified these basic methodological orientations of Rationalist 
theory we can now proceed to examine the substantive features of the 
societal model of European international order formation which flow from 
this methodological approach. The basic elements of this societal 
account of international relations are elaborated most clearly in the 
context of Hedley Bull's critique of the naturalistic account of 
international relations identified with traditional international 
relations theory. I shall briefly consider this critique of traditional 
international relations theory by way of introducing the main 
substantive elements of the Rationalist societal model of modern 
international order formation which Bull opposes to the former.
According to Bull the Realist conception of international relations as 
a natural condition of political anarchy has its roots in the idea of 
the domestic analogy. The origins of this notion he traces to English 
political thought and, in particular, to Hobbes's account of the
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fictional state of nature which precedes the formation of civil society. 
According to Hobbes this hypothetical pre-societal state of nature 
presents a human condition of unconstrained interaction between 
atomistic individuals characterised by the absence of any overiding, 
regulative legal or moral rules governing men's actions. Given the 
absence of a common regulative, sovereign authority which could 
legislate and enforce common rules upon them,the individuals inhabiting 
this state of nature exist in a condition of endemic conflict - a state 
of war in which life is nasty, short and brutish. Moreover, in 
developing this theme, Hobbes draws a direct analogy between this pre- 
societal 'anarchical' state and the condition of relations between 
states at the international level.
In taking up this Hobbesean conception of the state of nature as its 
model for understanding international relations, Bull maintains, 
traditional Realist international theory considers that "states or 
sovereign princes, like individual men who live without government, are 
in a state of nature which is a state of war."5 Two basic conclusions 
are drawn from this agonistic depiction of the nature of modern 
international relations. Firstly, as was the case with individuals 
within Hobbes' fictional state of nature, the absence of a superior 
sovereign authority in the international sphere is seen to preclude the 
possibility of social co-operation at the international level. This 
major deficiency engenders a condition of necessary or forced behaviour 
where competition and conflict predominate and moral principles can have 
no purchase on political actions. Within this inhospitable, asocial 
environment "states do not form any kind of society; ... [Moreover] if
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they were to do so it could only be by subordinating themselves to a 
common authority."e Here we encounter the second assumption concerning 
international political affairs drawn from the domestic analogy. This is 
the belief that the production of social order within the international 
system requires nothing less than the "total transcendence of the 
states-system and the reproduction of institutions of domestic society 
on a universal scale."7 The forms of life characterising the spheres of 
society and international anarchy are, from this standpoint, deemed to 
be mutually exclusive modes of existence.®
In elaborating the main elements of his own conception of international 
order formation Bull systematically critiscises these principal Realist 
assumptions concerning the anomic, agonistic character of international 
relations defined as a 'state of nature' and the rigid differentiation 
between domestic society and international nature associated with the 
former. Indeed.it is Bull's contention that the absence of an absolute 
sovereign authority within the international system does not inevitably 
entail a state of governmentlessness in the sense of a total lach of any 
form of social cohesion or regulation in relations between states and 
the consequent predominance of a state of war.3 Vhile lacking an 
overiding sovereign power capable of providing centralised regulation of 
inter-state relations equivalent to that operating within the state,
Bull argues that international politics nonethless displays its own 
distinctive system of social rules and institutions which regulate the 
character of interactions between states and engender systems of 
international order in different historical periods.
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Vhat then, are the factors which make possible the emergence of this 
societal condition among states and some degree of social order at the 
international level? In outlining the major forces explaining the 
formation of social order within the modern international system Bull 
focusses on two central factors. Firstly, operating at the deepest level 
is the influence of a common, cohering civilisational culture 
facilitating the historical emergence of this anarchical international 
society. Secondly, and most importantly, Bull points to the actions of 
states themselves as the central political actors of international 
society and the principal institutional agents engendering forms of co­
operative social interaction among themselves on the basis of this pre- 
exisiting, homogeneous civilisational heritage. Of special significance 
here is the development by these states of discursive regulative 
practices and international ordering institutions incorporating the 
normative principles of social interaction engendered by such practices. 
Let us consider these two aspects of international order formation more 
closely.
According to Bull an important pre-condition for the emergence of any 
international society is the existence of a shared cultural tradition 
embracing all the states of a system. He notes that "a common feature of 
... [international societies] is that they are all founded on a common 
culture or civilisation or at least some of the elements of such a 
civilisation: a common language, a common religion, a common ethical 
code, a common aesthetic tradition."10 Such a common civilisational 
background Bull notes as a characteristic of all the major international 
societies in human history including those of classical Greece and the
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Chinese states-system during the period of the Warring states. A society 
of states is likely to arise only where such a pre-existing cultural 
heritage of common values is apparent and exercises a relatively strong 
influence over the behaviour of the states incorporated therein. 
Elaborating upon this point Bull distinguishes between what he defines 
as the societal, as opposed to those systemic forms of international 
civilisation. Thus international systems, he argues, manifest a low 
level of cultural commonality in the nature of the relations between 
their constituent units. Within this type of international civilisation 
the level of interaction between states is such as to make the actions 
of each a significant element in the calculations of the other "without 
them being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving 
themselves bound by a common set of rules or co-operating in the working 
of common institutions."11 By contrast, international societies, 
distinguished by the existence of a shared cultural heritage influencing 
the actions of its members, facilitate the formation of just such 
societal practices.
The significance of this shared cultural background stressed by Bull as 
the common foundation of international societies lies then, in its role 
as the main factor engendering an embryonic sense of social community 
and mutual understanding among the territorially discrete political 
units of such societies. It is through the medium of shared cultural 
prejudices that more substantial modes of socio-political cooperation 
are able to develop. Assuming this common cultural milieu and a 
corresponding, relatively highly developed degree of cultural commonality 
there exists the facilitative basis for the development of forms of
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intensive social interaction between the political units of an 
international civilisation. Thus common cultural traditions, "on the one 
hand . . . make for easier communication and closer awareness and 
understanding between one state and another ... [thereby facilitating 
the definition of common rules and the evolution of common 
institutions.] On the other hand they may reinforce the sense of common 
interests that impels states to accept [these] common rules and 
institutions. " 1 2
In the specific case of European international society it is the 
latter's historical roots in the preceding civilisation of Medieval 
Christendom which has provided the common historical tradition 
facilitating the evolution and consolidation of this society.
Commenting on the origins of the European society of states in the 
disintegration of this single community of Christendom, Bull observes 
that "throughout its history modern European international society has 
been conscious of the memory of the theoretical inrperium of Pope and 
Emperor and the actual imperium of Rome. " 1 3 Despite their own manifestly 
distinct patterns of historical evolution, the common antecedents of 
early modern European states in this universalistic civilizational order 
meant that they shared certain deeply rooted traditions and assumptions. 
Moreover, in the process of developing their own autonomous, secular, 
sovereign identities they have drawn upon these commonly shared ideas, 
attitudes and assumptions including a common legal heritage deriving 
from Roman law, a common scientific world view originating in Greek 
civilisation and a common ethical perspective deriving from the 
religious tradition of Christianity. Insofar as these have formed the
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prior matrix of shared cultural meaning such traditions have exercised a 
profound influence upon the development of European international 
society. For they have provided the grounds for the development of a 
system of mutual understanding between the independent political 
entities of this society based on practices of mutually acknowledgement 
of their separate sovereign identities.
As a result of the cohering, integrative influence of this pre-existing 
civilisational heritage of common cultural traditions then, Bull notes 
that there have developed the substantive socio-political forms which 
represent the practical source of order formation within European 
international society. Most importantly, this pre-existing framework of 
cultural tradition has helped to facilitate the development and 
consolidation of the substantive political institutions of modern 
international society. Here we need to focus on states themselves as the 
primary agents of social order formation within this international 
society and the forms of cooperative interaction developed by them. 
According to Bull, the common civilisational background shared by these 
states has provided the basic preconditions for the evolution of a 
community of mutually acknowledging political-legal identities, a group 
of moral-political sovereign subjects possessing certain "duties and 
rights attaching to . . . [them] as members of international society. " 1 "1 
It was the emergence of this community of states and the mutual 
recognition of their status as right possessing, sovereign political 
actors within the international sphere which has been crucial to the 
modern process of international order formation.
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In considering Bull's account of the role of these states as the 
principal agents in the formation of international social order it is 
important to emphasise here a feature of Rationalist theory which 
radically distinguishes it from the Neo-Realist perspective. This is the 
distinctive Rationalist conception of the nature of the state as the 
basic political actor in modern international society. According to 
Rationalist theorists like Bull and Wight states cannot be reduced, in 
either their internal or external behaviour, simply to abjective units of 
power capabilities as was the case with the Neo-Realist theorists 
considered in Part One. Vithin this Rationalist, societal perspective 
the state is understood in more complex terms as a legal-political 
subject having its origins within broader cultural processes of 
civilisational formation. As we saw above, these major international 
actors have evolved historically as ethico-political subjects possessing 
political rights and incuring obligations as part of a wider political 
society of sovereign political personalities.15 Indeed, the 
establishment of the sovereignty of the state and its legal-political 
identity as an autonomous political entity has been inseparable from its 
formal recognition by the other sovereign members of the international 
system.
According to Bull it is this fact of the moral-political subjectivity of 
states (albeit an artificial historical, cultural construct) which is 
the main factor explaining the practical historical creation of forms of 
social order within modern international society. Acknowledging the 
legal-political identity of their counterparts, states have formally 
recognised their position as members of a larger international political
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community. Moreover, in accordance with this mutual acknowledgment of 
their reciprocal duties and obligations as members of this political 
community, states have been prepared to co-operate in the establishment 
and management of those regulative socio-political practices upon which 
specific structures of international social order have been predicated. 
The mutual recognition of the reciprocal rights and obligations inhering 
in states as sovereign powers then, has provided the general context for 
the elaboration of political-legal relations and associated 
institutional practices shaping the political interactions between these 
political actors. Let us now consider the specific elements of 
international social order arising out of this inter-subjective process 
of co-operation between modern sovereign states.
At the most basic level Bull argues that the emergence of this mutually 
acknowledging community of sovereign political subjects has involved the 
identification by these political subjects of certain basic, shared 
interests forming the minimal goals to be pursued in common as members 
of international society. He observes that the "maintenance of order 
... [within] international society has as its starting point the 
development among states of common interests in elementary goals of 
social life."ie Within modern European international society states have 
come to accept a number of such elementary goals as appropriate ends to 
pursue and have co-operated in the management of the institutional 
structures through which those ends have been realised. Most important 
among these has been the concern for the preservation of international 
society itself. Thus Bull notes that, "whatever the divisions between 
them, modern states have been united in the belief that they are the
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principal actors in world politics and the chief bearers of rights and 
duties within it. The society of states has sought to ensure that it 
will remain the prevailing form of universal political organisation, in 
fact and in right. " 1 '7 Deriving from this overiding common purpose are 
the other basic interests shared by states, most notably those of the 
maintenance of the external sovereignty of individual states and the 
goal of the limitation of violence in external state relations. 1 0
Complementing this process of the identification of the elementary goals 
of social life held in common by the sovereign subjects of international 
society has been the corresponding development of rules prescribing the 
type of behaviour sustaining these goals and the institutions which have 
helped to give these rules effect within international society.
According to Bull "if states today form an international society this is 
because, recognising certain common interests and ... values, they 
regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one 
another. At the same time they cooperate in the working of institutions 
such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of 
diplomacy ... and the customs and conventions of war. " 1 3 Here again it 
is states themselves which have been responsible for articulating these 
social rules and managing the international institutions through which 
they are translated into practice. The "enforcement of [these rules of 
co-existence] in the absence of a central authority is carried out by 
states ... States undertake the function of making the rules or 
legislating ... [They] communicate the rules through their official 
words ...[They] legitimise the rules ... by employing their powers of 
propaganda to mobilise support for them in world politics as a whole...
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[They] undertake the task of changing or adapting operational, moral and 
legal rules to changing circumstances" 2 0  and they also 'protect' these 
rules through diplomacy and war. Among the most important of these rules 
of co-existence Bull notes those defining the legitimate use of violence 
and the rules covering the formation and maintenance of agreements 
between states.21
These rules of co-existence, together with the mutually accepted goals 
underlying them, have provided the criterion for the operation of the 
substantive ordering institutions of international society. Moreover, as 
we shall see below, such regulative rules have assumed quite different 
forms in accordance with their incorporation within different discursive 
systems of international legitimacy informing the reproduction of social 
order within modern European international society. But before 
considering these different historical systems of international 
legitimacy we need to give some consideration to the major institutions 
constituted and managed by states within modern international society in 
accordance with the rules of co-existence noted above. Of these the most 
important for Bull is the balance of power and the role of the great 
powers in managing that balancing mechanism. This is the case, he 
maintains, because it has been the practice of preserving a balance of 
power between states within European international society which has 
constituted the central factor ensuring the historical maintenance of 
the society itself. The balance of power has secured this end both by 
preventing this society from being "transformed by conquest into a 
universal empire ... [and by providing] the conditions in which other 
institutions on which international order depends . .. have been able to
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operate. In doing so, however, the nature of the balance of power has 
itself undergone transformation along with the historical development of 
European international society more generally.
Thus, according to Bull, the idea of using countervailing force as the 
basis for maintaining order between states has varied in character, 
assuming at different times more socially limited and, alternatively, 
more sophisticated forms. Emerging initially as a purely fortuitous, 
unconscious response by states to aggressor powers, the balance of power 
later developed into an institution consciously contrived by the members 
of European international society to secure their common interests - a 
form most significantly expressed in the highly developed system of the 
nineteenth century concert of European powers. The development of the 
institution of the balance of power and the obligations attaching to the 
great powers managing such balances reflects the influence of these 
duties and obligations between states which Bull identifies as the 
hallmark of international society. According to him the idea that the 
preservation of the balance of power throughout the international system 
as a whole should be the common goal of all states "implies that each 
state should not only frustrate the threatened preponderance of others 
but should recognise the responsibility not to upset the balance itself: 
it implies self-restraint as well as the restraint of o t h e r s . T h i s  
self-restraint has been integrally connected with the recognition and 
observance by the most powerful states of the obligations and 
responsibilities associated with great power. Moreover, Bull argues that 
these obligations have traditionally extended to encompass the mutual
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reccgnition of their independent spheres of influence and their role in 
preserving order within these spheres.
It is the operation of this central institution of the balance of power 
which has provided the relatively stable conditions within which the 
other ordering institutions of European international society, notably 
international law and diplomacy, have been able to function. With 
respect to international law Bull observes "that there are rules which 
states ... regard as binding on one another there can be no doubt. It is 
by virtue of this fact that we may speak of the existence of an 
international society.Moreover, in emphasising their contribution to 
international order formation Bull is especially concerned to 
distinguish the distinctive binding nature of these rules forming the 
body of customary international law. In contrast with the compulsorily 
binding character of municipal law existing within the state, backed by 
the authority of the sovereign, the efficacy of international law 
derives from a number of unique factors. Thus "states obey international 
law in part because of habit or inertia; they are, as it were, 
programmed to operate within the framework of established principles."23 
On a more deliberative, calculative level conformity with the law may be 
the result of actual or threatened coercion or, alternately, of states' 
perceptions of the practical benefits associated with following such 
law. Whatever the motivations explaining its practical efficacy, in 
terms of the broader process of the production of international order 
this institutional body of law developed between states has served to 
delineate and clarify the body of customary rules of co-existence among 
states. It has also helped to mobilise compliance with these rules by
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states by channeling states' actions in the direction of compliance with 
agreements, specifying "what the nature of an agreement is . .. and ... 
[solemnising agreements] in such a way as to create an expectation of 
performance."
Integrally connected with international law has been the development of 
the practice of international diplomacy. Through the development of a 
professional body of diplomats and a system of resident embassies, an 
institutionalised form of social discourse facilitating regular 
communication between the sovereign actors of international society has 
been created - a system which itself pressuposes the acknowledgement of 
those moral-legal rights and obligations between states noted above.
Bull notes that this diplomatic system has contributed to the broader 
process of order formation between states in a number of ways. Kost 
importantly, it has provided the medium through which the agreements 
between states forming the source of the rules of international law have 
been negotiated. Such agreements are possible "only if the interests of 
the parties overlap at some point and if the parties are able to 
perceive that overlap. The art of the diplomatist is to determine ... 
this area of overlapping interests ... and to bring the parties to an 
awareness of it."27 Besides this important function of identifying and 
clarifying the mutual interests of states, diplomatic intercourse has 
also served to maintain the system of international order produced by 
the operation of the balance of power by minimising the destabilising 
effects arising from disagreement between the sovereign members oi 
international society. In this context the legal conventions of 
diplomatic relations have often provided a peaceful alternative to the
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resort to violence and the disruption of the existing international 
order as a means of resolving differences arising between states.
Lastly, Bull points to war, understood as a system of organised violence 
between states, and the rules governing the waging of such war as an 
important institution contributing to the maintenance of social order 
within modern international society. In doing so he immediately notes 
the paradoxical nature of war as both a force for order and as a source 
of disorder within international society. The "rules and institutions 
which international society has evolved reflect ... [this] tension 
between the perception of war as a threat to international society which 
must be contained and ... as an instrumentality which international 
society can exploit to acheive its purposes. " 2 '3 In its former, 
disruptive aspect war has clearly had a negative effect upon the 
constitution and maintenance of social order within international 
society. But even here, Bull argues, the waging of war has been 
circumscribed by rules whereby the society of states has sought to 
modify its destructiveness.2 3 In its latter aspect, however, war has, in 
different ways, served a positive order maintaining function where the 
resources of diplomacy have failed to resolve major differences between 
states. At such times, Bull notes, war has been invoked as a "means of 
enforcement of international law" 3 0 both in the context of war waged in 
self-defence by states whose rights of territorial sovereignty have been 
violated and where war has been waged by third parties on behalf of a 
victim of territorial violation. At the same time war has been important 
in maintaining the central institution of the balance of power within 
European international society. "At least from the beginning of the
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eighteenth century Cinternational society] has seen in war a means of 
preserving the balance of power. “ 31 Indeed, insofar as it has 
contributed to the maintenance of such a balance in different periods 
through the frustration of the imperialistic ambitions of a preponderant 
power, the use of war has performed a decisive role in the very 
maintenance of international society itself.
Ill The Constitution of Legitimate Social Orders within Modern European 
International Society - From Dynastic to Nationalist Society
The modern system of international relations, as it is articulated here 
then, presents a picture of the development of an international society 
of sovereign subjects whose practical reproduction has been predicated 
upon the operation of the major institutional forms noted above. The 
mutual acknowledgement of the rights and obligations pertaining to the 
political subjects constituting this society, understood as sovereign 
legal personalities,has formed the basis of the development of those 
international socio-political practices and institutional forms of co­
operative action which have functioned to regulate the relations between 
states and to engender distinctive forms of societal order within this 
anarchical society. At the same time, however, Bull notes that the 
particular form of social order and the nature of the rules and 
institutions shaping the latter within this modern anarchical society 
have not always remained the same. In fact the character of social order 
within the European society of states has varied historically, most 
notably in the periods of the Absolutist and nationalist periods.
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In the remaining section of this chapter I want to consider the 
historical process of the formation and transformation of these systems 
of social order constraining the relations between European states in 
these different periods as they are outlined in the work of Xartin 
Wight. In doing so I will focus on Wight's account of the principles of 
international legitimacy informing the ordering institutions which have 
regulated states' external relations in these periods and, specifically, 
his account of the historical transition from the dynastic to the modern 
nationalist system of legitimate international order. As we shall see in 
chapter four, this process forms the prelude to the expansion of 
European international society in the later nineteenth century and the 
subsequent universalisation of the nationalist principle of 
international legitimacy as the basis of an emerging global states- 
system.
In his essay "International legitimacy" 3:2 Wight examines the different 
types of discursive legitimating principles which have operated within 
modern European international society to define and validate the 
regulative systems of social order at different periods of its history. 
Distinguishing the notion of legitimacy from international law on the 
one side, and ideology or international doctrine on the other, Wight 
defines the former as "the collective judgement of international society 
about rightful membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may 
be transferred within that society and how state succession is to be 
regulated" 3 3  These legitimating principles represent then, the broad 
regulative norms which have defined rightful membership of, and 
appropriate behaviour within, modern international society at particular
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phases in its historical development. As such they form the primary 
determinant of the modes by which states may legitimately exercise their 
power in their interrelations within the international system. These 
different historical principles of international legitimacy outlined by 
Wight have circumscribed the broad discursive rule systems defining 
legitimate societal relations between states, thereby delimiting the 
type of social order operating between them at any given stage in the 
history of modern European international society.
In describing the historical formation of these general legitimating 
principles Wight emphasises the integral relationship between the nature 
of the dominant legal-political, sovereign personality defining the 
political subjectivity of states in any period and the corresponding 
character of the external system of legitimacy regulating relations 
between those states within international society. These broad 
legitimating principles originate on the boundary which divides, but, on 
this view, also connects domestic and international society. They mark 
"the region of approximation between domestic and international 
politics" 3 4  insofar as their historical formation is the result of the 
externalisation of the dominant internal sovereign personality of any 
age. It is this dominant, mutually acknowledged sovereign identity 
characterising the states of international society in any historical 
period and the moral concepts attaching to it which are projected into 
the realm of external state relations to form the paradigmatic 
discursive structure of international legitimacy. The legitimating 
principles thus engendered represent "principles that prevail within a 
majority of states that form international society as well as between
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them. " 3 0  According to Wight it is the great powers of each period which 
play the central role in the constitution of these legitimating 
discourses through the universalisation of their sovereign identities.
In each historical period these discourses have given rise to 
regulative, discursive rules circumscribing the operation of 
international ordering institutions and defining what is accepted as 
legitimate behaviour in the relations between states.
At the same time, Wight notes that historical changes in the dominant 
sovereign character of states has been the catalyst for the 
transformation of these broad legitimating principles and, hence, of the 
forms of international social order operating between states. The 
breakdown of an existing principle of international legitimacy resulting 
from the erosion of the dominant, system-wide form of state sovereignty, 
he argues, brings with it the collapse of the very fabric of 
international society predicated upon the former. With the erosion of 
the broad, discursive system of legitimate rights and obligations 
governing international relations the coherence of international society 
itself dissolves as divergent perspectives come into conflict. "A 
doctrinal fracture or schism in the states-system Cof this type] 
undermines the tacit understanding that every member of the states- 
system, in claiming sovereignty and political independence for itself, 
acknowledges the same claim by every other member. . . In these 
circumstances the regular working of the states-system is deranged. And 
there is thus introduced within the system the assumptions and attitudes 
of holy war and heretics or political opponents are assimilated to 
barbarians."3G It is only with the establishment of a new dominant form
141
of sovereignty involving a new system of legitimating rules of 
international behaviour that societal order is ultimately re- 
established.
In the history of modern European international society Wight identifies 
two major legitimating principles which have informed the process of 
societal order formation between states. These are. first, the dynastic, 
prescriptive principle of the Absolutist period and, second, the 
popular, Nationalist principle emerging since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. I shall consider each of these in turn. Within pre­
nineteenth century Absolutist international society Wight notes that 
legitimate interstate relations were defined by a dynastic principle of 
legitimacy concerned with the status and claims of rulers. Here the 
dominant Absolutist form of sovereign authority, vested in the legal 
personality of the monarch, was based upon an internal, hierarchical 
political structure in which the prescriptive rights of the royal 
dynasty assumed primacy. This translated, at the international level, 
into a system of political action in which legitimate behaviour was 
defined as that which conformed with the norms of dynastic, prescriptive 
authority. Within the Absolutist states-system "prescriptive rights were 
sacrosanct and power politics were conducted in a litigious and not an 
... ideological idiom. " 3 '7 The "dynastic principle of legitimacy was 
rooted in custom"30, the focal point of this prescriptive, customary 
system of inter-societal relations being the royal, dynastic families 
and relations between Christian monarchs as the legal-political subjects 
of international society. It was from the legal discourse of familial
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relations between ruling monarchs that the legitimating rules of 
international social order and behaviour in this period were derived.
According to Wight then, the dynastic principle gave rise to a 'dynastic 
idiom' of international politics. The distribution of political power 
and the process of the constitution of international order was shaped by 
the political-legal discursive system of hereditary rights and marital 
relations associated with this dynastic idiom of inter-societal 
relations. In this international social system "alliances were 
consolidated by dynastic marriages. Reversals of alliances were marked 
by matrimonial disengagements. Territorial aggrandisement was justified 
by dynastic claims. Foreign revolutions were fomented by cultivating 
dynastic pretenders."AO Within the international community of dynastic 
families the pursuit of power by its dominant members and the formation 
of balances of power among them was articulated through the medium of 
claims and counter claims to rightful succession to disputed 
territories. Great powers sought to achieve international political 
dominance by asserting their purported dynastic claims (or defending the 
hereditary rights of others families) to contested territories, and by 
enforcing those claims through military force."11 The regulative 
institutions of power balancing within the Absolutist system were 
constituted and reinforced through the construction of political 
alliances invariably consummated by marriages between dynastic families 
as the legitimate form for consolidating political relations between the 
subjects of international society.
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At the same time, Vight nates that the prescriptive, dynastic principle 
served to engender societal order by imposing significant constraints 
upon both the internal transformation and the external expansion of 
international society. The dominance of a prescriptive, customary form 
of legitimacy helped to minimise the level of internal opposition to the 
regulative social principles of Absolutist international order by 
introducing a high degree of obedience to the monarchy. At the same time 
a major limitation upon the external expansion and historical 
transformation of this society derived from the Christian character of 
its legitimating principle. Here Vight notes that ’Dynastic legitimacy 
was limited to Christendom, insofar as marriage between a Christian and 
a non-Christian required that the infidel party be converted to 
Christianity.1,42 The possibility for the expansion of European 
Absolutist international society and its legitimate, dynastic forms of 
international order here confronted a major ideological constraint 
having its ultimate origins in that prior Christian civilisational 
matrix from which it evolved historically.
According to Vight this prescriptive principle of international 
legitimacy and the dynastic mode of international order formation it 
engendered were progressively eroded during the nineteenth century, 
ultimately being replaced by a new, non-prescriptive, contractual 
principle. The origins of this epochal transformation in the form of 
international legitimacy he discerns in the transformative effects upon 
the dominant sovereign personality of European states resulting from the 
French revolution and its aftermath. The central effect of the 
revolution, consequent upon the widespread disemmination of its
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universalistic, nationalistic ideals in the Napoleonic period, was to 
produce a major shift in the locus of political sovereignty within 
European international society from the monarch and the royal court to 
the person of the state embodied in the nation. Thus, within European 
international society the "sovereignty of the individual prince 
[gradually] passed into the sovereignty of the nation he ruled."4-3 The 
consequent breakdown of the monarchical form of legal sovereignty and 
the disintegration of the prescriptive system of international 
legitimacy predicated upon it formed the prelude to the emergence of a 
very different system of legitimate relations between European states 
from the later ninteenth century - one based upon the new idea of the 
sovereign state as a self determining national political subject.
According to Wight then, "since 1789 national self determination has 
replaced prescription as the doctrine of international legitimacy".44 
The basis of this new legitimating societal discourse was a distinctive 
conception of state sovereignty based on the notion of a contract 
between the people, or nation, and government. In terms of this new 
principle,the formal source of sovereign authority now derived from "the 
claims and consent of the governed."45 Moreover, this new sovereign 
principle of popular legitimacy undermined "and at length ...
[abolished] prescription ... [For, according to this principle] all that 
is not popularly based is illegitimate."45 Translated to the external 
sphere of international society this new, dominant principle of 
sovereign state subjectivity introduced a profoundly different 
discursive system of international legitimacy among European states 
based on the nan-prescriptive, universal values of national self
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determination. For, inherent in this new principle was the formal 
"doctrine of the equality of all states ... [and the idea that] all 
states recognize the right of all other states to equal treatment in law 
and in ceremony. " 4-7
It is this new, universal, non-prescriptive principle of international 
legitimacy which, Wight observes, ultimately came to define the formal- 
legal relations of states in the post-nineteenth century era.
Furthermore, where the prescriptive character of the preceding dynastic 
principle of legitimacy served to inhibit the earlier transformation and 
expansion of the legitimate forms of European international society, 
this new, non-prescriptive, universalistic principle proved to be far 
more dynamic, socially inclusive and outwardly directed in nature. 
Although originating in, and first transforming European international 
society, the universalistic values which this new principle of 
international legitimacy involved were to provide the central 
ideological motivation for the historical expansion of international 
society beyond Europe and for the formation of an incipient global 
society of states in the twentieth century dominated by the west.
In chapter four I shall turn to consider the account of the historical 
expansion of these forms of European international society on a global 
scale in the late nineteenth and twentieth century as presented in 
recent Rationalist thought. In particular we shall examine Bull's 
account of the way this expansionary process has entailed the extension 
of the national principle of international legitimacy and its 
universalistic values as the legitimating basis of an evolving global
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society of states. As we shall see, Bull's account of this process 
raises important problems for the Rationalist societal model of 
international order formation. In fact, it is in this context that we 
can begin to discern the need for a more critical approach to the 
analysis of the formation of order within modern western international 
society than that provided by the practical interest orienting 
Rationalist thought- one concerned with the possibilities for the 
practical extension of the universal values underlying the nationalist 
principle of international legitimacy as the precondition for the 
production of a stable global international society.
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Chapter Four
The Reproduction of Legitimate Social Order Vithin an Emergent 
Global International Society
In The Anarchical Society Hedley Bull notes that "since the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century there has arisen for the 
first time a single political system that is genuinely global. Order on 
a global scale has ceased to be simply the sum of the various political 
systems that produce order on a local scale; it is also the product of 
what may be called a world-wide system."1 The major factor explaining 
the emergence of this world political system has been the "expansion of 
the European states system all over the globe and its transformation 
into a states system of global dimensions."2 In the present chapter I 
will consider the accounts presented by Bull and Watson of this epochal 
transformation of European international society into a global society 
as a result of the universalisation of the forms of European 
international society examined in chapter three. More particularly, I 
will consider their accounts of the different phases of the formation of 
legitimate political order within this emerging global society.
Beginning with the processes whereby European states established their 
political dominance over this global society through the imposition of 
an imperial system of domination over non-western communities I then 
consider their explanations of the subsequent decline of this European 
imperial order with the emergence of non-European communities from
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colonial subordination to formal sovereign political independence within 
an embryonic global society of nation states.
Focussing on this latter development in the second part of the chapter I 
examine Bull's views on the major problems confronting the reproduction 
of legitimate international order within this newly emergent global 
society of nation states as manifested in the revolt against western 
dominance by the recently liberated, third world nations. My principal 
concern here will be with Bull's arguments concerning the need for the 
creation of a more just and equitable, global political order as the 
precondition for the reproduction of a stable, legitimate international 
society which satisfies the demands of these third world states' for 
justice. Considering the views of Bull on this issue, as well as 
arguments against his perception of the proper response by western 
states to this 'revolt against the west', I will suggest that the issues 
they raise suggest the need for a different theoretical approach to 
modern international order formation - one which takes theory beyond the 
detached, practical interest orienting Rationalist theory.
I The Expansion of International Society and the Creation of European 
World Hegemony
The expansion of European international society in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries forms part of a much longer historical 
process of European exploration in the non-European world extending as 
far back as the voyages of Christopher Columbus and the discovery of the
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new world by the Spanish. 3 However, it is the Rationalist account of the 
phase of European expansion beginning in the later nineteenth century 
which is of primary concern to us here. For it is in this period, 
according to Bull and Watson, that European states began to undertake a 
conscious and, in many cases, co-operative policy of imposing their 
political dominance over the non-European world. This involved the 
practical extension of the institutional forms of European international 
society to non-European territories as the basis of a global political 
hegemony. In tracing the nature and forms of the development of this 
system of hegemonic political dominance we need to keep in mind the 
principle of legitimacy noted at the end of chapter three as forming the 
dominant legitimating principle of European international society from 
the later ninteenth century. For, according to Bull and Watson, it is 
this nationalist principle and the institutional forms and political 
practices associated with it which were to be universalised through the 
expansionary activities of European states. These European cultural 
forms represented a primary factor shaping the character of the global 
political hegemony which these states constructed in the name of the 
introduction of political civilisation to the 'backward' communities 
they encountered in the non-European world.
In looking outward to the non-European world during the nineteenth 
century, Adam Watson notes, European states became "increasingly 
convinced of the superiority of their capacities ... and also of their 
institutions and moral values...In their eyes modern civilisation was 
synonomous with European ways and standards which it was their duty and 
interest to spread in order to make the world a better and safer
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place.'"1 In accordance with this belief in their manifest cultural 
superiority European states began actively to extend their political 
dominance and, with it, western civilisational forms to the non-European 
world.s The major powers of European society "became involved in 
imposing their administration and civilisation on almost all of Asia and 
Africa. They did so ... usually in the interests of what they called 
order and security ... [In this process] the non-European states ... 
were expected and induced to conform to the rules and institutions of 
European international society. [Moreover] in carrying out this 
expansion the great powers recognised the same need to curb their 
rivalries and act in concert as in Europe itself."* As a result of this 
expansionary process there had emerged, by the turn of the present 
century, a global states-system, the chief pillars of this system of 
dominance being the European colonial powers. Moreover, Bull observes 
that the dominance of these European powers was expressed "not only in 
their superior economic and military power and in their commanding 
intellectual and cultural authority, but also in the rules and 
institutions of international society. This society was still seen as an 
association of mainly European and Christian states to which outside 
political communities could be admitted only if and when they met the 
criteria for membership laid down by the founding members."7
Thus a key element informing the development of this system of global 
political dominance was the fact of the extension, along with other 
economic and military forms of dominance, of the 'civilised' political 
standards of European international society, and particularly the 
concepts and practices attaching to the western idea of sovereign
155
personality, as the basis of legitimate political relations within this 
emerging, global international society. More particularly, in extending 
their political influence to non-European territories in the later 
ninteenth century European states sought to reproduce on a global scale 
the forms of international relations to which they were accustomed in 
Europe. To this end, Bull notes that they "insisted on criteria of 
admission to membership of international society [for non-European 
societies] ... [Furthermore] they used these criteria to acquire special 
priveieges for themselves" 3 within this expanded society. In this way 
the colonial powers sought to shape their political relations with non- 
European communities in accordance with the legitimate standards 
governing their mutual relations within European international society. 
As we shall see shortly, this process of the reproduction of European 
international societal forms within a wider global system was far from a 
simple process. Ultimately it would entail the forcible imposition of 
European political institutions and practices on, often strongly 
resistant, non-European communities.
Those criteria referred to by Bull which were invoked by European states 
as the determinant of rightful entry to this expanded international 
society derived directly from the political standards implicit in the 
popular principle of international legitimacy which we have seen 
increasingly to have defined legitimate societal relations amongst the 
states of European international society in the later nineteenth 
century. As noted in chapter three, the main feature of this principle 
of legitimacy was its identification of the nation-state as the central 
legal personality of international society. According to the former,
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rightful membership of international society and formal acceptance as an 
equal participant within the larger international political community 
depended upon the existence of a formally independent, sovereign 
national government acknowledging the reciprocal rights and duties 
existing between itself and its fellow sovereign counterparts making up 
the larger society of sovereign states. Moreover, legitimate forms of 
political behaviour within international society were equated with those 
diplomatic and other political practices reflecting a recognition of the 
formal equality of the sovereign political bodies of this society.
It is this principle of international legitimacy and its associated 
standards of acceptable behaviour and rightful membership of 
international society which, Bull notes, were applied by European 
imperial powers as the formal political-legal system regulating their 
relations with non-European countries. In line with these discursive 
standards of international political intercourse,the acceptance of any 
non-European political community as a fully fledged political subject of 
the expanded European international society was identified as 
conditional upon the existence in that political community of 
appropriate forms of political organisation, their acceptance of 
European diplomatic practices and, in connection with this, the 
recognition of the reciprocal rights and obligations associated with 
membership of the political community of sovereign states. The 
possibility for the entry of these non-western communities into the 
European 'political club' then, required their first attaining the 
political standards of 'civilisation' laid down by the dominant European 
powers. The application of these standards of legitimacy formed the
157
guiding discursive basis for the construction of a complex system of 
political dominance by western nations over this new global society.
According to Bull the primary medium through which these criteria of 
legitimate membership received practical expression was in the form of 
the application of the doctrines of European international law. Indeed, 
those legal principles shaping the political relations between European 
and non-European communities in the later ninteenth century represented 
the practical embodiment of the standards of the European principle of 
popular legitimacy outlined above. Arguably the most important of these 
was the doctrine of constitutive recognition applied by European states 
to their relations with non-European states. As Brownlie has noted, in 
terms of this doctrine of constitutive recognition "legal subjective 
personality ... depended upon recognition by the European states ... and 
recognition ... [of] statehood became a more important concept and was 
associated with political thinking about nations."3 More particularly, 
Bull observes that "by the early twentieth century international legal 
doctrine came to insist that political entities were entitled to 
recognition as sovereign states only if they met certain formal criteria 
of statehood e.g. that there be a government, a territory, a population 
and a capacity to enter into international relations or fulfil 
international obligations."10 As we shall see, when applied to those 
communities beyond Europe these legal requirements necessary for the 
attainment of constitutive recognition as a subject of international 
society helped to facilitate the establishment of a complex and 
extensive system of political dominance by the European powers.
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In accordance with the criteria of membership embodied in this doctrine 
then, the non-European societies coming under European political 
influence were considered eligible for acceptance into international 
society only where their political institutions and behaviour 
approximated to the political forms of 'civilised' community as defined 
in European terms. However, Bull notes that, as they were encountered by 
the expanding European states of the later ninteenth century, non­
western societies "did in fact differ radically in their capacity to 
conduct the new forms of international relations and the tests devised 
by the Europeans recognised that this was so."11 Accordingly, in 
applying the criteria of rightful membership of international society to 
the non-European communities which they encountered in Asia and Africa, 
the European powers proceeded to create a hegemonic system of political 
relations in which different communities were classified and treated in 
different ways in accordance with the degree to which they were 
considered to approximate these European standards. Thus Bull notes the 
significant "gradations of independence recognized by the European 
powers in the extra-European world, the spectrum of positions 
intermediate between full sovereignty and the status of a colony - there 
could be seen alongside the concept of a society of equally sovereign 
states concepts of international relations as relations between 
suzerains and vassals. Uor did this situation change basically in the 
years between the first world war and the second."12
Bull distinguishes two broad categories of non-European community 
created by the application of these hegemonic standards to non-European 
societies corresponding to European states' perceptions of their
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relative capacity to fulfil the criteria required for the attainment of 
political subjectivity. In the first place there were those traditional 
Asian communities such as Japan and China which possessed highly 
developed political institutions and diplomatic systems of their own. 
While these countries retained formal independence in their relations 
with western nations, in practice they were reduced to the status of 
inferior subjects by means of externally imposed regulations on their 
political behaviour. In cases like these, European states sought to 
impose western political forms upon such communities by indirect means 
and primarily through the imposition of unequal treaties stipulating the 
adoption of western political practices. Through these means the attempt 
was made to force these communities to change their existing 
institutional structures and to accept western political concepts and 
practices which would qualify them for constitutive recognition as full 
sovereign members of international society.
This process proved more difficult for some states than others depending 
on their degree of openess to western forms. Thus in the case of China, 
where European and oriental standards of civilisation came into sharp 
conflict, this process was achieved only through major coercion from 
western states. For, as Gong notes, "tradition dictated that China deal 
with the Europeans not in accordance with the developing European 
philosophy that states ... interact as sovereign equals but rather in 
accordance with the Confucian patterns and principles which demanded 
that all from near and far acknowledge China's [hegemonic] standard of 
civilisation."13 Only after considerable coercion was China brought to 
abandon its traditional political practices and perceptions of cultural
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dominance and to accept the western political norms and institutions 
which would entitle her to membership of international society. Thus, 
"beginning with the Nianking and Tientsin treaties, the imposition of 
what gradually became formalised as a Western standard of 'civilisation' 
forced China to open its ports, to trade on Western terms and to conduct 
its relations with the west according to international law and Western 
diplomatic practices."1A
In the development of political relations between the European powers 
and 'non-statist' societies such as those encountered in Africa the case 
was markedly different. Here political relations with mainly tribal 
communities were adjusted to European states' perceptions of their 
essentially limited progression towards the condition of sovereign 
political subjectivity and their consequent inability to assume the 
obligations of autonomous international political actors within the 
international system. As communities unable to satisfy the criteria of 
sovereign subjectivity defined according to the European standard, these 
communities were denied constitutive recognition and the corresponding 
rights connected with internal and external sovereignty. In accordance 
with their view of these communities as non-persons (i.e. as societies 
incapable of participating as legal members of international society) 
European states assumed direct control over their territories, imposing 
their own political institutions and cultural forms on the indigenous 
peoples.
Thus Bull observes how, during the process of the partitioning of 
Africa, the "doctrine of constitutive recognition was invoked by
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European powers to show that African rulers did not have the rights of 
sovereign states. ” 1 5 Consequently, in establishing their respective 
spheres of influence within the African continent the colonial powers 
proceeded on the assumption that these communities were to be subject to 
European tutelage as the necessary precondition for them to achieve the 
degree of political maturity essential for fully fledged membership of 
international society. In accepting their obligation, according to the 
partition agreement signed by the European powers, to ensure the 
establishment of authority in the regions they occupied, these European 
states acknowledged a "common commitment to 'preservation of the native 
tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well 
being*."ie In this respect, Bull notes that the European partition of 
Africa included as one of its guiding principles the idea that "colonial 
powers had international obligations to act as trustees for the welfare 
and advancement of dependent peoples. " 1 '7
With the establishment of these different patterns of hegemonic 
political relations between the European imperial powers and non- 
European communities then, there emerged a global system of legitimate, 
international order dominated by Western states and governed by European 
political concepts and practices. As Bull observes, by the time of the 
first world war "European society had ceased to be exclusively European 
and had become universal in its membership. The European powers along 
with the United States held a dominant position. The greater part of 
Asia, Africa, and Oceania comprised colonial dependencies: the universal 
international society was one of states, but not everywhere one of 
peoples or nations. " 1 0 It is to the processes whereby this glGbal system
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cf hegemonic order was transformed into a complete society of nation 
states in which non-European communities attained full, legal, sovereign 
status, and the ramifications of this development for the maintenance of 
legitimate international order, that we must now turn.
II The Breakdown of the Western Hegemonic Order and the Emergence of a 
Global Society of States
According to Bull the legitimate system of global international order 
produced by European political dominance outlined above reached its peak 
by 1900. "At the turn of the century the dominance of European or 
Western powers expressed a sense of self-assurance, both about the 
durability of their position in international society and about its 
moral purpose ... In non-Western societies also the ascendancy of the 
West was still widely regarded as a fact of nature rather than as 
something that could be changed. The spiritual or psychological 
supremacy of the Vest was at its highest point."13 The subsequent 
history of the twentieth century is the story of the decline of this 
European dominated international order and the rise of a post-European, 
global society of states in which new, non-western nations have 
increasingly come to challenge the traditionally dominant position of 
Western states. In this section we will focus on Bull's account of this 
process of European hegemonic decline and the emergence of this new, 
global society of nation-states resulting from the revolt of Asian and 
African peoples against the Western colonial powers. At the same time, 
we shall consider the subsequent attempts of these new nations to
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break down the traditional forms of dominance exercised by Western 
nations through the advancement of demands for the restructuring of 
international society. Here I shall concentrate on Bull's account of the 
problems posed for the production of a stable, legitimate order within 
this universal international society arising from the efforts by these 
new states to actualise their claims for equality.
Bull nates a number of factors responsible for the breakdown of European 
structures of imperial dominance in the first half of this century. Most 
notable among these were the inverse processes of the internal decline 
of the European states themselves, manifested in "the weakening of the 
will on the part of the western powers to maintain their position of 
dominance" 120 and, secondly, the corresponding rise to political self 
consciousness of those non-European societies formerly subordinated to 
the hegemonic political influence of European states in the pre-war 
period. With respect to the internal decline of the European powers, the 
effects of the first and second world wars were particularly significant 
in engendering both the material and spiritual weakening of the imperial 
powers. Thus a major effect of the First World War was the loss by the 
Western powers of "much of the self assurance that had been so central a 
feature of their ability to maintain the old order... [At the same time 
they] became committed to a principle of national self determination 
contradictory of the legitimacy of colonial rule. " - 1 In effect the First 
World War created a crisis of confidence within European society which 
operated to undermine the faith of European states in the moral and 
cultural values of European civilisation upon which the strength and 
resolve of European imperial dominance had been predicated. This
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weakening of the moral foundations of European imperialism is reflected, 
at one level, in the new 'diplomacy of peoples' emerging in the postwar 
period with its espousal of the right of all peoples to national self 
determination, a development which would itself represent an important 
stimulus to future colonial liberation movements.
If the first world war witnessed a major erosion of the moral and 
spiritual resolve underlying western European international dominance, 
the Second World War was to finally undermine the material capacity and 
economic incentive of European states to maintain their positions of 
international political dominance. According to Bull the draining 
effects of the Second World War "left the European imperial powers too 
weak to maintain old kinds of dominance ... At the same time it came to 
be questioned whether colonial dependencies were a source of material 
gain."'2 2 The outcome of the dual forces of imperial decline noted here 
was a progressive weakening of western European states and with it, a 
diminishing of their capacity and, in some cases,the political will to 
maintain imperial dominance over their colonial territories. This 
internal decline of the material and cultural bases of imperial 
dominance on the part of the traditional European colonial powers was 
inseparable from the concurrent process of political mobilisation of 
non-European peoples in the task of attaining formal political 
independence from their Western imperial masters.
In this context Bull notes that "the old European dominated 
international order . . . did not collapse simply by accident ... The 
struggle of subject peoples played an essential role in this, even
165
though it was only one factor. " ^ 3  Underlying this struggle was a 
crucial spiritual awakening of these subjugated peoples manifested in a 
growing perception that the old colonial order was "no longer a fact of 
nature but ... something that could be changed [and] that, by mobilising 
themselves to this end they could indeed change it ... [thereby] 
abandoning a passive for a politically active role in world affairs. 
Particularly important in the growth of these movements of political 
liberation by which many of these colonial peoples sought political 
autonomy were the cultural influences introduced by the western 
imperialist powers. As Watson points out, the introduction of Western 
forms of political organisation and the subsequent "assimilation of 
western ideas like freedom of speech, the rule of impersonal law, 
independence, nationalism, democracy and Marxism prepared the way for 
the drive by [native] elites towards separate and independent statehood 
in this century.M:2S It was the appropriation of such western political 
ideas by indigenous groups which was to form a major stimulus behind 
local movements directed to the attainment of political independence 
from their imperial masters. Most significant in this respect were the 
aspirations of the leaders of such movements to sovereign nation 
statehood, the absence of which, we have seen above, provided the formal 
justification for European political domination of these non-European 
communities through the denial of constitutive recognition to them. Thus 
Bull observes that the "great instrument these peoples have used to 
advance their purposes has been the state: they began by capturing 
control of states and then used them ... domestically to build 
nationhood, to establish control of their economies, to combat local 
vestiges of external dominance.,,:2e
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The rise of non-western communities and their struggle for political 
independence from western imperial dominance thus assumed the form of a 
struggle for the status of sovereign political subjectivity denied to 
these peoples under the colonial system of European imperial dominance. 
The liberation struggles of these communities were essentially struggles 
for the attainment of those characteristics conferring the status of 
sovereign personality upon previously disenfranchised communities and, 
thereby, recognition as rightful political subjects of international 
society. Understood in these terms the "process by which Asian and 
African political communities did come to enter into such reciprocal 
relations and to enjoy full rights as members of international society 
was inseparable from domestic processes of social and political reform 
which narrowed the differences between them and the political 
communities of the Vest and contributed to the process of 
convergence. " 2 '7 According to Bull the emergence of these new nations 
represented the "working out within Asian, African and Latin American 
countries of historical processes that are not unique to them but are 
universal: the emergence of sovereign states, the rise of national 
consciousness on a mass scale the adaptation of society to modern 
science and technology, the development of a modern economy" 2 3
As a consequence of these dual processes of the decline of the European 
imperial powers and the success of colonial liberation movements a new 
global international society has come into existence since the Second 
World Var, a universal international society of nation states 
incorporating diverse national political and cultural communities. 
Moreover, according to Bull this expanded western society of states
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replacing the old imperialist system of legitimate international order 
has been characterised by a growing disagreement between its older 
constituents and those newly incorporated, non-European states - a 
disagreement which represents a potential source of major international 
instability. For, having acquired the formal, political status of 
political equality within this society of states, these new third world 
nations have sought to use their political-legal status in the attempt 
to overcome other, persisting forms of western dominance as the 
condition for equality with their Western counterparts. Let us now 
consider Bull's account of this central contemporary phase of the revolt 
against the west and the problems it is seen to pose for the 
reproduction of legitimate order within the contemporary society of 
states.
Ill Third World Demands for Justice and the Reproduction of 
Legitimate Order Within Global International Society
According to Bull the recent entry of a plethora of new nations into 
western international society consequent upon the process of 
decolonisation noted above, has been the catalyst for the development of 
a renewed challenge to the position of Western states within this 
society. The principal form which this challenge has assumed has been 
the assertion of third world demands for the radical reshaping of 
international society in accordance with principles of distributive 
justice. Moreover, insofar as this challenge threatens the traditionally 
dominant position of western states and the structures of international
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order created by them, Bull argues that this revolt against the west 
represents a major problem which must be addressed if the threat of 
international instability and disorder is to be avoided. What then, is 
the specific nature of this postwar revolt against the west?
"By the revolt against the west I mean the struggle of non-European or 
non-Vestern states ... to challenge the dominant position of the Western 
nations in the international system. In the post-1945 world this 
struggle has found expression in three conditions: the Afro-Asian 
movement ... the Non-aligned Movement ... and the group of 77, the 
caucus of less developed countries ... which collectively are what is 
commonly understood by the term Third World."2'3 While the 
organisational nature of this revolt is diffuse and its specific target 
has differed at different stages of its development, its unifying core, 
according to Bull, is a common demand by its protagonists for justice 
and equality with the Western nations of international society. "The 
alliance of Asian, African and Latin American states and the movement 
that we call the third world has a specific purpose: that of challenging 
the Western dominance against which all of them in one way or another 
have historic grievances."30
Having achieved national self determination and formal, sovereign 
recognition as rightful members of the international system, third world 
states are now seeking equality with Western nations in a range of 
areas in which they have traditionally been treated as 'inferior'.
Their political liberation has become the basis for the attempt by these 
nations to attain equality with the west in more general terms through
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their demands for the transformation of the inequitable structure of 
international society. Moreover, in pursuing these demands for the 
transformation of the structure of international society these third 
world nations have consciously drawn on western values. In fact, "all of 
these demands [for economic, political, racial and cultural equality] 
take Western moral premises as their point of departure."31 Most 
important here have been their attempts to redefine the notion of 
justice implicit in the principle of sovereign constitutive recognition 
defining rightful membership of international society. Taking up the 
traditional, limited concept of reciprocal justice understood as the 
mutually acknowledged right of self help adhering to all states by 
virtue of their sovereign status, these new nations have sought to 
radicalise its formal content.
The new concept of distributive justice espoused by third world states 
thus involves a major extension of the traditional, reciprocal version 
inherent in the popular principle of political legitimacy forming the 
basis of societal relations within the newly emerging global 
international society. In particular, the former advances a much broader 
conception of the equality of states as the sovereign, moral subjects of 
international society and, consequently, of the nature of legitimate 
behaviour in the relations between those states through which that moral 
equality is given practical expression. As we saw in our analysis of the 
doctrine of sovereign constitutive recognition informing the earlier 
expansion of European international society, the traditional, reciprocal 
notion of justice involves a pluralistic conception of international 
society which focusses on the autonomous rights of individual nation
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States defined as discrete sovereign subjects of that society. According 
to this notion, states, as formally equal sovereign subjects, are 
formally obliged to acknowledge those basic reciprocal, obligations and 
rights existing between them, one of the most important of these being 
the right of self-help, or free exercise of their sovereign power.
The new notion of distributive justice advanced by third world nations, 
by contrast, involves a solidary, communal conception of international 
society which is predicated upon a concern with the realisation of 
substantive, as well as formal, legal equality among sovereign states. 
Thus, according to Bull, where reciprocal justice is "justice negotiated 
by the [individual] members of society on the basis of an exchange of 
rights or benefits ... distributive justice is justice allocated by 
society as a whole to its members according to some principles of 
distribution. " 3 2 In advancing this solidary principle of distributive 
justice the primary emphasis of third world states rests upon the major 
disparity between the legitimating 'ideological1 standard of formal, 
sovereign equality and the actual conditions of substantive inequality 
(political, economic etc) existing between the sovereign subjects 
constituting the global international community and the actions 
considered necessary to overcome this disparity. The application of the 
communal, distributive concept of justice to international relations, in 
this context, gives rise to a new, extended notion of obligation between 
states; a mutual obligation to overcome the gap between the formal 
legitimating ideal and the practical reality of inter-societal 
relations. Legitimate international behaviour is here radically 
redefined in terms of the concerted forms of action required to create
1 7 1
the social conditions enabling the attainment of substantive equality 
for all the members of international society.
Thus the contemporary revolt against the west focussed on by Bull 
involves a radical reinterpretation of the very principles upon which 
the legitimacy of post-ninteenth century Western international order has 
been based. Moreover it is all the more significant in that it is 
phrased in the normative discourse of western society and advanced 
through the legitimate institutional political channels of international 
society rather than through revolutionary challenges to that system from 
outside. According to Bull the "demands of Asian, African and Latin 
American states and peoples are demands for justice in this sense - for 
the removal of discrimination, unequal or unfair treatment of certain 
states, nations and ethnic groups."33 In advancing this new idea of 
justice their aim is to secure a collective commitment from Western 
states to the restructuring of the global international society 
according to the principles of redistributive justice in order to 
correct the imbalances and forms of discrimination traditionally 
existing between Western and non-Western states on a number of levels. 
Through their concerted efforts within those international organisations 
constituting the major fora of diplomatic relations between the 
sovereign subjects of this new global international society these 
nations have sought to influence political thinking within the society 
of states and to turn the general climate of opinion within the west in 
favour of their demands for distributive justice.
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Bull notes a number of different types of proportionate or distributive 
justice which these new nations have sought. Most prominent among these 
has been the demand for economic justice in terms of the more equitable 
distribution of the world's resources. During the last few decades, Bull 
notes, there has emerged "a widespread perception of the world as 
divided into 'developed' and [exploited] 'underdeveloped' countries and 
widespread recognition of the obligation of the former to extend aid and 
non-reciprocal trade preferences to the latter. " 3 4  In line with the 
pervasive perceptions of third world economic backwardness as 
principally the product of past Western exploitation the less developed 
states have advanced proposals for the redistribution of the world's 
wealth as a matter of moral right. 3 5  For their part western nations have 
challenged some of the basic assumptions upon which this supposed moral 
right is predicated. In particular, they have challenged the view that 
"the wealth of the advanced industrial countries ... in the past derived 
significantly from exploitation of non-western countries rather than 
having been generated by the scientific and industrial revolutions 
within the Western countries themselves; that the relative backwardness 
of Third World countries is a consequence of colonial or neo-colonial 
exploitation rather than other causes [internal to these communities, 
and] that the economic life of Third World countries was on balance 
harmed rather than enhanced by the impact ... of the international 
economy during the colonial period. " 3 5
Secondly, third world and western states have clashed over the demand by 
the former for racial justice or equality in the form of the abolition 
of discrimination against non-white peoples on the basis of colour. In
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this context Bull notes that "the old European-dominated international 
order was associated with the priveleged position of the white race ... 
Son-white peoples everywhere suffered the stigma of inferior status 
whether as minority communities within white states, like the American 
blacks; as majority communities ruled by minorities of whites, like the 
Indians during the British Raj; or as independent states dominated 
externally by white powers, like China. " 3 7  This claim for racial justice 
is closely linked with third world demands for justice in cultural terms 
- in matters of the spirit of the mind. On this issue third world 
nations have "asserted a right of cultural liberation and issued a 
protest against the intellectual or cultural ascendancy of the west 
which they profess to see as no less a threat to them than its political 
and economic ascendancy. " 3 3  Here again, however, Western states have 
responded to such demands by painting to major inconsistencies in the 
position of the protagonists of this restructuring of international 
society. In particular, they have pointed to the fact that third world 
states' "efforts to achieve equality of rights between whites and non­
whites . . . have seldom been matched by any comparable attention to other 
forms of racial or ethnic oppression ... [within the third world 
including] the oppression of Asian minorities in Africa or Chinese 
minorities in South East Asia. " 3 3
Underlying all these claims by third world states for justice, however, 
and perhaps most significant of all in this debate over the demand for 
the restructuring of contemporary international society^is the implicit 
demand for the redistribution of international political power which it 
involves. For central to the collective experience of the ihird world
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countries and the hopes they have of changing their position Bull 
discerns "the feeling of being vulnerable and dependent. They know they 
can escape from this situation only by making themselves stronger in 
relation to their adversaries. " 4-0 The challenge to western dominance 
articulated in these different claims for justice then, is inseparable 
from a more general demand by these states for greater power as the 
basis for the establishment of their substantive independence and the 
attainment of equality in practice. Herein lies the nub of the dispute 
between third world states and the dominant western nations over the 
demands for the restructuring of international society. For, as Bull 
notes, Western states are aware that "as third world countries grow 
stronger in relation to western countries, the latter will become 
relatively weaker. " 41 Hence, in acquiescing to third world demands, 
Western nations see themselves participating in a process whose likely 
outcome will be their own decline, or, at the very least, the reduction 
of their capacity to ensure their own security within an anarchical 
international society. This apparent tension between third world claims 
for justice and the realities of power relations within international 
society will be of central concern to us as we move to examine Bull's 
views of the implications of this debate over the restructuring of 
international society for the reproduction of contemporary international
order.
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IV Justice, Legitimacy and the Reproduction of International Order
What conclusions does Bull draw from this analysis of the recent revolt 
against western dominance for the broader problem of the historical 
reproduction of legitimate, consensual order within the contemporary 
global society of states? In fact, it is Bull's contention that the 
proper response of Western states is to accept and accommodate third 
world demands for justice. "The challenge presented to the Western 
countries is one that they have to deal with in its own terms... CIt] 
requires the Western countries to make adjustments that are unwelcome,
... to abandon privileges in the international order they once 
enjoyed. " 4 -2 His reasons for adopting this position centre around Bull's 
views concerning the integral relationship between the values of 
international order and justice and his resulting perception of the 
deleterious effects upon contemporary international society which are 
the likely consequence of the failure of western states to respond 
positively to third world demands.
We may best illuminate the nature of Bull's arguments on this issue by 
comparing his approach with that found in the writings of a Realist 
theorist like Robert Tucker. 4 3  In addressing his attention to the 
phenomenon of the revolt against the west Tucker also focusses on the 
central connection between the maintenance of international order and 
the actualisation of forms of international justice. But his treatment 
of this relationship differs radically from Bull's. Concerning the 
question of how the west should respond to this 'new egalitarianism' 
espoused by third world states, Tucker critiscises those who see in this
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development the beginnings of the formation of a qualitatively different 
type of global international order. Rather, he stresses the need to 
locate such third world demands within their proper context as part of 
the perennial struggle for power between states as actors within a 
competitive condition of international political anarchy. In asserting 
this Realist view Tucker, at the same time, emphasises the point that 
the "hierarchical character of this [anarchical] society is the 
indispensible condition for ... [international] order."44- Within this 
competitive condition of political anarchy, he maintains, it is only the 
inequitable distribution of power between states which has enabled the 
reproduction of a minimal degree of order by allowing the more powerful 
states to transcend the necessitous concern for national security, 
thereby enabling them to introduce the basic regulative structures 
providing a minimum of international order.
Applying this Realist perspective to the demands for justice by third 
world states Tucker stresses the point that this "challenge to the 
global status quo ... is a challenge made by states on behalf of states 
. . . The new egalitarianism is little more than a refurbished version of 
the old realpolitik version of equality [i.e. the equal right to self- 
help] . As such there is no reason for seeing in it the necessary 
precursor of a growing equality of states. " 4-5 For Tucker then, third 
world demands for distributive justice are properly seen as little more 
than the ideological instrument by which non-Western states seek to 
enhance their own individual power positions within the existing 
international system. This new egalitarianism challenges, "not the 
essential structure of the international system but the distribution of
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wealth and power within that system."4® As such, its acceptance by 
western nations would not produce a qualitative transformation of the 
present international system towards a more equitable and peaceful 
society of states but would merely entail their own decline and the 
ultimate substitution of non-Vestern nations as the dominant powers 
within a reformulated, inegalitarian international power structure.
While not transforming the existing inequitable structure of 
international order then, the accommodation of such demands does 
represent a serious threat to the stability of the existing order. For, 
insofar as the existence of inequality between states is the inescapable 
foundation of a minimal degree of stability within the condition of 
political anarchy, Tucker maintains that the acquiescence to such 
demands for the creation of a more egalitarian international system 
threatens to create major instability among states. The erosion of the 
power of the dominant Western states entailed by the acceptance of such 
demands "must lead to a ... decline of the old order even while no new 
order has been firmly established. For the beneficiaries of the old 
order will no longer be willing to enforce the order of the past, while 
the challengers of the old order will remain . . . incapable of creating a 
new order ... As long as ... [this] disjunction is not resolved it 
threatens to lead to chaos. " 4-7 Accordingly, western states should not 
acknowledge these general demands for justice from third world nations. 
The avoidance of the potential disorder resulting either from total 
acceptance or complete rejection of third world claims to justice lies 
instead, in "the gradual co-option of the principal Southern 
beneficiaries of a reformed system,"4e and the granting of what they
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really covet, namely political power. This response Tucker identifies as 
most conducive to the maintenance of international order by undermining 
the unity of the third world coalition which is the principal threat to 
the former. 4 3
Tucker's work provides some important insights into aspects of the 
revolt against the west which are arguably understated in Bull's 
writings as a result of his practical, cultural orientation to the 
process of order formation. Most significant here is Bull's over playing 
of the unity of third world states and, closely related to this, his 
understatement of the disparity between the formal principles of 
distributive justice used to justify their demands and the less 
altruistic motivations underlying such demands. As we have seen above, 
this latter disparity is one which is also understated in Bull's account 
of the motivations underlying the actions of imperialist powers in the 
era of European expansion. However, in addressing the problem of the 
revolt against the west Bull's work is arguably concerned with a much 
deeper historical issue of which the above mentioned phenomena represent 
only the most visible symptom. This is the general problem of the 
reproduction of consensual order within a western international society 
which is already undergoing radical historical transformation as a 
result of the incorporation of new nations and cultures within it.
This larger concern of his later writings receives expression in Bull's 
account of the connection between the problem of securing international 
justice and reproducing stable international order within a global 
society of nation states. For, as mentioned above, it is his central
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argument that the maintenance of order within this, now global, 
international society is ultimately inseparable from the realisation of 
international justice. While acknowledging the practical difficulties 
associated with the move from the present inequitable international 
order to a more equitable one, in his later writings Bull neverthless 
maintains that "the requirements of order and of justice in 
international relations are in practice the same ... e.g. the measures 
that are necessary to achieve justice for the peoples of the third world 
are the same measures that will maximise the prospects of international 
order or stability, at least in the long run. " 5 0 In contrast with Tucker 
then, Bull maintains that the normative claims for justice by third 
world nations cannot be reduced purely to an ideology supporting narrow 
self interest. Rather, they have a distinctive significance for 
international social order which transcends considerations of pure power 
politics. This distinctive dimension concerns the dynamics of the 
reproduction of the legitimacy of contemporary international society as 
a fundamental condition of the overall integration and stability of that 
society.
It is here that his societal perspective on the historical decline of 
the old European system of international legitimacy and the rise of a 
new, ideologically divided global society of states outlined above 
becomes crucial. Where Tucker effectively advocates the reinforcement of 
the structures of the old international society, Bull's argument is 
that, within the contemporary global society of states, the legitimating 
structures and principles of the old Western dominated international 
order are no longer justifiable as a basis for engendering societal
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integration. The decline of the traditional western international order 
and the historical forces engendering the revolt against the west have 
produced a transformation in the qualitative nature of inter-societal 
relations in which the old legitimating values have been challenged and 
radically reinterpreted. Once taken as the natural determinant of 
acceptable or legitimate political behaviour within international 
society, the old western values have now been delegitimised and no 
longer provide an effective standard for engendering co-operative, 
stable political relations amongst the sovereign subjects of this 
anarchical society.
Accordingly, the problem which arises for Bull is that of how the 
sovereign subjects of this new, post-Western international society are 
to reconstruct a system of international legitimacy which might form the 
basis for the long term integration of its members in a stable system of 
order; an international order in which the new, non-Vestern nations, 
together with the older western states, possess the material 
capabilities and political willingness to co-operate in undertaking the 
obligations and responsibilities required for the maintenance of stable 
international relations. In this context Bull maintains that "the 
western peoples who created the global international system of today 
have a supreme interest in sustaining a viable international order that 
will endure into the next century. It is not credible that such an order 
can be sustained unless the states of the Third World, representing as 
they do the great majority of states and the greater part of the world's 
population, believe themselves to have a stake in it.,,sl
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In terms of this concern with the production of the legitimacy of 
international order then, it is Bull's argument that the development of 
a stable political order within this contemporary global international 
society requires that the western states respond positively to the 
demands of third world states for its restructuring in a more just, 
equitable form. "The overiding interest of the western countries is to 
seek to accommodate the demands of Third World countries for change ... 
from considerations of international order. " 3 2  The successful 
integration of third world states into the larger, global international 
society will be possible only if these claims for justice are recognised 
and accommodated. Moreover, this is the appropriate response of Western 
states insofar as it entails the "righting of what Western peoples 
themselves can now recognise as historic injustices. " 3 3  However, Bull's 
support for the reconstruction of international society involves a 
deeper dimension transcending this specific concern for the redress of 
third world grievances. While the demands for justice by third world 
states form the major catalyst, it is his view that the process of the 
creation of such a legitimate, global international order ultimately 
requires the acceptance by all the members of this community of 
principles of legitimacy which advance the interests of an emerging 
community of mankind associated with the contemporary incorporation of 
the world within a single international political system.
In terms of this broader consideration the outcome of the dialogue 
between third world and western states over the restructuring of 
international society is not conceived of as a one-sided process of 
reform solely on the part of the latter. To have any chance of success
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this dialogue must be one of mutual learning between ail participants in 
which both third world and western states come to moderate their actions 
in accordance with their recognition of a higher common good. 541 Thus 
Bull observes that, in accepting the challenge of restructuring 
international society, our "conception of justice needs to take account 
of our emerging sense of a world common good...[Moreover! measures ... 
to advance the world common good take us beyond the sense of solidarity 
or common interests among governments that underlies the international 
society of states which is rooted in the desire to preserve states. The 
world common good to which I refer is the common interest not of states, 
but of the human species in maintaining itself. " 5 5  Taken to its logical 
conclusion then, the creation of this legitimate, global international 
order would involve the radical reformation of the moral and political 
attitudes of sovereign states. The historical process of the 
construction of a new, legitimate international order is one which 
should encompass, but also transcend the particular interests of 
individual states or groups of states. It is ultimately inseparable from 
the achievement of an international society where states come to 
recognise an obligation to a moral community of mankind extending beyond 
existing statecentric obligations.
In advancing these arguments Bull is well aware of the practical 
constraints upon this process of restructuring arising from the 
anarchical structure of international society and the concern of states 
for their own security. In particular, he acknowledges the difficulties 
besetting the pursuit of distributive justice resulting from the absence 
of an international authority capable of acting as a distributor.
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"Whereas in domestic society the government has the mower to impose a 
particular distribution of rights or benefits ... in international 
society there is no world government to carry out this role. "■-"=• In 
acknowledging this fact Bull excludes the possibility for the future 
emergence of a world government of this type. His is a much more modest 
perspective, one predicated upon the belief, deriving from his societal 
conception of international relations, in the capacity of states to 
reach consensus on the conditions necessary for the historical 
reproduction of international social order. Accordingly, in taking up 
the challenge posed by the revolt against the west Bull notes that "the 
need is for particular states to seek as wide a consensus as passible 
and, on this basis, to act as local agents of a world common good."s'7
V A Critique of The Rationalist Societal Model
The Rationalist conception of modern international order formation 
examined above presents themes which are of central importance for the 
broader theoretical concerns of this work. In most general terms this 
perspective highlights the historical specifity of the modern western 
states-system as an historically evolved, distinctive form of society.
In articulating this distinctive societal perspective the Rationalist 
approach indicates the deep formative origins of this international 
society in the cultural milieu deriving from the preceding European 
Feudal society. Moreover, the work of Bull and Wight illuminates the 
distinctive character of those societal structures which have evolved as
the substantive basis of order formation between sovereign states within
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the modern western society of states. Emphasising the nature of these 
states as historically constituted sovereign communities, they indicate 
the manner in which the relations between these communities have been 
shaped by the historical construction of socio-political rules and 
institutional practices regulating the behaviour of these sovereign 
subjectivities.
In terms of this societal model the Rationalist perspective provides us 
with a radically different, and arguably more sophisticated 
understanding of the nature of international order formation than the 
quasi-natural, technical one presented in Heo-Realist theory. Hot least 
important here is the manner in which it exposes the inherent 
limitations of the qualitative distinction drawn by Heo-Realist theory 
between the ordered nature of political life within the state and the 
quasi-naturalistic, asocial condition of political anarchy existing 
between states. More specifically, by focussing on the processes 
involved in the historical formation and reproduction of systems of 
legitimate, consensual order within western international society, this 
approach directs our attention to the important interrelations between 
those internal changes in sovereign state subjectivities and the 
external processes explaining legitimate order formation between modern 
states. At the same time, we have seen how the Rationalist perspective 
illuminates some of the distinctive problems involved in the 
reproduction of such historical systems of legitimate order arising from 
the historical transformation of the sovereign structure of modern 
states engendered by the uneven development of international power. 
Especially significant here is the way in which changes in the dominant
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form af sovereign authority characterising different historical phases 
of western international society engender challenges to the existing 
structures of international political domination engendering relatively 
stable interstate relations. As the work of Bull and Wight indicates, 
these historical processes have played a major part in the creation and 
subsequent transformation of structures of legitimate order among modern 
states in three broad historical phases - firstly in the European. 
Absolutist phase; secondly in the expansionist, imperialist phase and, 
more recently, in the contemporary global phase where the prevailing 
nationalist principle of constitutive recognition has been radicalised 
as the basis of demands for the further extension of the qualitative 
character of legitimate order between contemporary nation states.
However, despite providing this more sophisticated paradigmatic 
understanding of the nature of modern international order formation, the 
Rationalist perspective arguably involves some important shortcomings 
which limit its effectiveness as an explanation of the process of 
legitimate order formation within modern western international society. 
Moreover, these limitations may be seen to stem directly from the 
practical cognitive interest orienting the Rationalist approach to the 
study of international society. In terms of the critique advanced here>a 
particularly important implication of this practical theory-orienting 
interest for the Rationalist conception of international order formation 
concerns the limited understanding of the nature of the state and the 
social relations between sovereign states which it engenders. For, to 
the extent that this practical interest induces a critically detached 
concern with the cultural, legal-political dimensions of international
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order formation, the state tends to be presented in largely 
undifferentiated terms as a unitary sovereign subject interacting with 
other sovereign subjectivities within a historical condition of social 
anarchy. Admittedly^consideration is given, particularly in the work of 
Martin Wight, to the connections between changes in the political-legal 
form of sovereign subjectivity characterising powerful states and the 
formation of structures of legitimate order between them. However, as we 
have seen above, the Rationalist approach provides little substantive 
analysis of the broader historical forces contributing to the formation 
and practical transformation of these sovereign states and their role in 
shaping the historical reproduction of systems of legitimate order at 
the international level.
By circumscribing the understanding of the nature of the state in this 
manner then, the practical interest orienting Rationalist theory 
engenders a narrowly defined understanding of the processes accounting 
for the reproduction of legitimate order within modern international 
society. More particularly, as Fitzpatrick points out, "by taking the 
state as the unproblematic starting point of its analysis, this school 
effectively rules out any systematic analysis of the state and of the 
multiple intersections between 'international' and 'domestic' conflicts 
[and processes] which define . . . the problem of the state" 1313 and the 
larger historical practice of order formation between states. In this 
respect the focus of Rationalist theory on the discursive processes 
operating between such 'unproblematic', unitary sovereign political 
communities precludes any detailed consideration of the role of those 
historical influences deriving from the military-strategic and socio-
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economic dimensions of international social practice influencing the 
historical reproduction of legitimate order within modern international 
society. In particular, it leads to a neglect of those processes of 
historical change in the material and strategic structures of state 
power, examined earlier in Gilpin's thought, and their influence upon 
the relative capabilities of states to significantly influence the order 
constitutive processes occurring within the wider international 
society. s'3 Although such an extended societal perspective is 
potentially opened up by the Rationalist perspective's acknowledgement 
of the historically constituted nature of modern states and its 
sensitivity to the relationship between internal processes of sovereign 
state formation and the external development of legitimate systems of 
order between states, this potential is left largely undeveloped because 
of the limiting focus of its practical knowledge-constitutive interest.
Taking this a step further, it can be argued that the necessity for an 
extended societal perspective of this sort is actually raised by the 
historical analyses of modern international order formation presented by 
Rationalist theorists themselves. This becomes especially apparent when 
we consider the implications arising from Bull's account of the problems 
confronting the historical reproduction of legitimate order within the 
contemporary global society of states and his views on the nature of, 
and the appropriate response by western states to, the grievances of 
third world nations. As we have seen, the basic concern of Bull's later 
work is with the problems confronting the reproduction of legitimate 
order within an emergent global society of nation states. Moreover, in 
addressing himself to this issue Bull isolates the problem of third
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world demands for justice as a crucial factor requiring attention. In 
doing so he identifies the diverse forms of international inequality 
characterising contemporary global society which need to be redressed as 
the precondition for the future reproduction of stable, legitimate order 
within this emergent global society.
Elaborating upon this central theme Bull is led to argue the case for 
the practical institutionalisation of principles of distributive justice 
as the most effective basis for the long term reproduction of legitimate 
order within this global anarchical society. In this context he 
articulates views which appear to go beyond the more limited Rationalist 
categories and assumptions which informed his earlier writings. More 
specifically, his analysis of the circumstances affecting the 
reproduction of order within contemporary international society leads 
him to adopt a position which would appear to entail the abandonment of 
the passive, critically detached attitude of those earlier works and 
give-j rise to a commitment to a positive interest in the prospects for 
human emancipation within this society through the actualisation of 
principles of international social justice. Moreover, in advancing this 
positive argument for the practical advancement of principles of 
distributive justice within contemporary international society, Bull 
also considers the different social structures which would require 
practical transformation as the precondition for the 
institutionalisation of these principles of distributive justice. In 
doing so, he implicitly extends the focus of the societal conception of 
international order formation to a consideration of the diverse forms oi 
uneven development (economic, cultural, political) between the states of
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this society and the way they have engendered complex structures of 
international domination forming the basis of legitimate order formation 
within modern international society.
Ve can see here then, how the implications arising from the application 
of the Rationalist societal perspective to the contemnorary global 
society of states implicitly (though not necessarily explicitly in 
Bull's own thought) takes us beyond the critically detached and 
substantively limited practical interest which I have identified as 
characterising Rationalist theory. In effect Bull's concern with the 
possibilities for the practical realisation of international justice 
directs our attention beyond the generalised Rationalist nation of 
international order as a construct of unitary sovereign states.to the 
complex historical logics by which the different structures of 
international domination regulating contemporary interstate relations 
have been historically reproduced through human historical practice. At 
the same time it raises the central question of how such human 
historical practices can be reoriented in order to facilitate the 
historical transformation of those same structures of international 
inequality as major constraints upon the actualisation of a more 
emancipated, self determining system of human social relations within an 
evolving western international society.
Arguably then, the implications arising from the Rationalist analysis of 
the reproduction of legitimate order between contemporary states 
presented in Bull's later writings suggests the need for a movement 
beyond the categories of Rationalist thought and its limited conception
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of the unitary sovereign state as the basic agent of international order 
formation. Xore specifically, it suggests that these processes must be 
relocated within a theoretical perspective which recognises the latter 
as the expression of historical practices of human self determination - 
practices which may be consciously reoriented to enable the further 
extension of the posibilities for human emancipation within 
international society in the future. For the reasons suggested in the 
present critique the full articulation of the implications of this 
broader, societal conception of international order formation would not 
appear possible within the Rationalist paradigm itself. Rather, an 
extended account of international order formation capable of 
accommodating this broader conception of societal order formation 
arguably requires a major reformulation of the societal model deriving 
from Rationalism's practical cognitive interest.
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PART TWO CONCLUSION
In the preceding section I have sought to indicate the valuable insights 
into the nature of order formation within the modern international 
system provided by the Rationalist societal model. At the same time, 
however, we have identified certain basic limitations of this model 
which point to the need for the development of an extended explanation 
of the historical factors accounting for the reproduction of legitimate 
order between modern states. The reformulated societal perspective 
suggested here arguably needs to expand upon Rationalism’s recognition 
of the historically constituted nature of those societal structures 
engendering order within modern international society. At the same time, 
however, it must adopt a more systemic approach to this process which 
examines the way the uneven development of the different forms of 
strategic-political, socio-economic and cultural power between states 
has facilitated the establishment by the more powerful among them of 
complex structures of domination supporting systems of legitimate order 
at the international level. In doing so, I suggest, this reformulated 
theoretical perspective would effectively take us beyond the reified 
societal categories of Rationalist theory noted above*to an 
acknowledgement of these order constitutive structures as the complex 
expression of broader processes of human historical development within 
the modern western society of states.
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More particularly, such a critically engaged societal perspective would 
focus on the way the broad process of uneven international development 
noted here has engendered the practical transformation of the different 
modern structures of legitimate order between states and the 
possibilities raised by such historical transformations for the 
institutionalisation of those normative values most effectively 
facilitating the integration of states within a stable, harmonious 
legitimate international order. While this revised societal model 
suggested by our preceding critique thus leads us beyond the limits of 
the self understanding of the Rationalist perspective and its practical 
orienting interest, I have sought to suggest that the development of 
this extended theoretical model does not necessarily involve a rejection 
of, or radical break with, the concerns of the latter. Rather, I have 
sought to show how it emerges, in some important respects, as an 
elaboration of the implications of the Rationalists' own distinctive 
concern with the logics of the reproduction of western international 
society understood in terms of the ongoing formation of legitimate 
systems of international order.
When viewed in this manner the articulation of the practical interest in 
elucidating and clarifying the nature of those societal structures 
regulating relations between modern states can be seen to point the way 
to a more sophisticated understanding of modern international society 
and the historical process of order formation occuring therein. In 
turning, in Section Three, to examine Cox's Critical theory of 
international relations, I shall explore the resources which this
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theoretical approach offers for the reformulation of the societal 
perspective in accordance with the major themes outlined above.
PART THREE




Our preceding analysis of the Rationalist account of order formation 
within the modern society of states indicated the need for the 
development of an extended societal perpsective if we are to acquire a 
more adequate understanding of the nature of this historical process. In 
particular, it was suggested that the development of such a theory 
requires a major reconstruction of the basic categories informing 
Rationalism's societal perspective to allow the movement beyond its 
critically detached, one-sided explanatory approach. In this third part 
of the thesis I consider a theoretical model which would appear to offer 
an extended perspective of this sort. I focus on the account of modern 
international order formation presented in the theoretical and 
historical writings of Robert Cox. The importance of Cox's work for our 
broader project lies in its distinctive approach to the analysis of this 
modern process of international order formation understood as the 
historical production of hegemonic world orders. As we shall see below, 
the substantive object of this perspective includes, but is not 
reducible to, the dimension of political relations between sovereign 
states which forms the central concern of the Neo-Realist and 
Rationalist theories already examined in this work. For, the structures 
of world order which constitute Cox's central focus potentially embrace 
not only the political and strategic, but also the socio-economic and 
cultural forces accounting for the historical production of legitimate
order at the international level.
201
Moreover, in contrast with the Neo-Realist and Rationalist paradigms 
examined above, this account of the modern processes of world order 
formation is guided by a knowledge-constitutive interest of a 
reflective, emancipatory nature. Specifically, the orientation of 
theoretical inquiry arising from this reflective interest is towards the 
historical transformation of such structures of world orders and the 
potential created by the latter for human emancipation. In this respect, 
as we shall see below, Cox's Critical theory takes as its principal 
concern the task of demystifying the nature of these historically 
generated, legitimate structures of world order, in the process 
illuminating their historically contingent nature and examining the 
constraints they impose upon the further, practical extension of human 
self determination within modern international society. Central to Cox's 
critical perspective then, is an overt normative interest in the 
potential for the extension of human freedom implicit in the historical 
reproduction of hegemonic world orders understood as the complex- 
expression of the historical development of disinctively human creative 
capacities.
In chapter five I shall outline the basic elements of Cox's conception 
of this process of modern international order formation. First 
elaborating the nature of the critical, reflective interest informing 
this theory, I then proceed to examine his holistic account of the 
general structure of such world orders and the different, relatively 
autonomous forces which operate to produce the socially integrated 
hegemonic structures underpinning their practical operation within 
modern international society. At the same time, we shall consider his
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account of the sources of the transformation of these world orders and 
the overiding emancipatory considerations to which the analysis of this 
transformative process gives rise.
Having considered these basic elements of Cox's Critical perspective I 
proceed in chapter six to examine his practical application of this 
perspective to modern international society. Here I focus on the two 
major historical examples of this process of world order formation 
outlined in his historical account of the movement from the nineteenth 
century Pax Britannica to the contemporary Pax Americana. Particular 
attention is given here to Cox's account of the problems confronting the 
reproduction of the contemporary world order and, in particular, the 
possibilities which he discerns in the current historical phase for the 
movement towards a new legitimate world order involving a more 
equitable, emancipated form of international relations. At the same 
time, I note certain problems with his broader theory which raise 
significant difficulties for Cox's attempt to realise his claim to 
provide a holistic account of the historical processes accounting for 
the reproduction of order within modern international society.
Chapter Five
Elements of the Critical Theory of World Order Formation
In undertaking the project of constructing a critical conception of 
international order formation Cox's work involves a conscious attempt to 
go beyond the preoccupations of traditional international relations 
theory and what he identifies as its limited, reified, statecentric 
categories in order to develop a more adequate and comprehensive 
theory.1 As noted above, the basic cognitive interest orienting this 
radical departure from the concerns of traditional international 
relations theory is a reflective, emancipatory one - an interest which 
engenders an understanding of international order formation which is in 
marked contrast to those we have seen to characterise the theoretical 
perspectives considered so far in this thesis. In outlining the 
distinctive elements of this critical theory of modern international 
order formation in this chapter I shall begin by considering the nature 
of this reflective, emancipatory interest arising from Cox's critique of 
the problem solving perspective which he identifies with traditional 
international relations theory. This will provide the essential 
background to our analysis of those general transformative processes 
identified by Cox as the basic agent in the historical reproduction of 
those hegemonic structures of world order which he identifies as the 
central feature of the modern process of international order formation.
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I Critical Versus Problem Solving Theory: The Sources of the 
Reflective, Emancipatory Interest
In outlining the main methodological features of his critical 
theoretical approach to international relations Cox observes that 
"theory is always for someone, for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective."2 Moreover, it his contention that "to each such 
perspective the enveloping world raises a number of issues; the 
pressures of social reality present themselves to [theoretical] 
consciousness as problems."3 In terms of this prior, informing 
perspective or worldview then, any theoretical approach engenders a 
particular problematic, an "historically-conditioned awareness of 
certain problems and issues"4 characterising the wider world which 
constitutes the broad focus of theory. It is these problems or issues 
which form the basic concern of theoretical analysis and in accordance 
with which its purpose is defined. In stressing this perspectival nature 
of theory Cox is also concerned to argue that, depending upon its 
particular problematic, different theories are informed by very 
different objectives or purposes in analysing the object world. In 
advancing this argument he distinguishes two very general types of 
theory characterised by very different perspectives and correspondingly 
distinct purposes. These include, firstly, those theories guided by an 
immediate, problem solving purpose in analysing the object world and, 
secondly, those manifesting a more critical, reflective approach 
involving a transformative, emancipatory purpose in confronting social 
reality. A brief analysis of the differences between these two 
approaches, comparable in each case to the methodologies of traditional
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and critical international relations theory for Cox, will enable us to 
grasp the distinctiveness of the methodological approach orienting his 
own theoretical account of international order formation.
First then, problem solving theory. According to Cox the focus of 
problem solving theory tends to be sharply delimited in both its 
understanding of the objective reality which constitutes its theoretical 
concern and in the practical purpose informing the analysis of that 
social reality. More particularly, the orientation of problem solving 
theory tends to engender an essentially ahistorical, pragmatic 
problematic. The primary purpose of theory is understood here as that of 
providing a guide to "help solve problems posed within the terms of the 
particular perspective which was the point of departure."& In doing so 
Cox argues that this perspective invariably "takes the world as it finds 
it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the 
institutions into which they are organised as the given framework of 
action."e In line with this 'unreflective' attitude to the existing 
social and political order, the general aim of problem solving theory is 
to "make the [existing] relationships and institutions work smoothly by 
dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble."7- Moreover, 
insofar as it accepts uncritically the given reality inherent in a 
particular theoretical perspective and the particular problems defined 
by the former, this type of theory also tends to focus on highly 
specific areas of activity, analysing specialised problems within those 
particular spheres. Thus, according to Cox, the focus of problem salving 
theory is inevitably "fragmented ... [into! a multiplicity of spheres or 
aspects of action each of which assumes a certain stability in the other
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spheres ... when confronting a problem arising within its own."3 Since 
the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into 
question but its constancy merely assumed, particular problems can be 
considered in relation to specific areas of social or political activity 
in a temporally fixed manner.
Problem solving theory is distinguished then, by an ahistorical approach 
to the analysis of the objective world of social reality and by a 
predominant concern with the resolution of specialised problems arising 
within a fixed social and political framework. In this respect the 
“strength of the problem solving approach lies in its ability to fix 
limits or perameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a 
particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable 
to relatively close and precise examination."3 By allowing the 
formulation of general statements of laws or regularities characterising 
political behaviour within these strictly defined areas this approach 
attempts to draw precise conclusions about the best means by which 
political behaviour may be regulated to produce stable order in its 
specialised sphere of interest. At a deeper level, however, Cox observes 
that this aspiration to theoretical exactitude and scientific precision 
represents the great weakness of problem solving theory since the social 
and political order is not fixed in the way the problem solving 
perspective assumes, but is subject to constant change. Thus, in 
assuming, as the necessary basis of its specialised analyses, the 
permanence of general institutions and power relations which are 
subject, in practice, to continual challenge and transformation, problem 
solving theory is led to a false view of the 'objectivity' of its laws
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and predictions. As a consequence of this, it is constantly in danger of 
degenerating into an ideological justification for contingent historical 
structures and practices of domination supporting the status quo.
The second, critical theoretical perspective differs from this problem 
solving approach in virtually every respect. Beginning at the most 
basic, methodological level Cox notes that critical theory is 
"reflective upon the process of theorising itself ... [seeking] to 
become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising 
and its relation to other perspectives ...[and thereby] opening up the 
possibility of choosing a different valid perspective."10 Critical 
theory is concerned then, with establishing the most adequate method for 
understanding the sphere of action which is the common object of inquiry 
for itself and traditional theory. At the same time, the critical 
theorists assumes a reflective attitude to the object world which is 
opened up to it by the theoretical mode of enquiry. Thus Cox notes that 
"critical theory ... stands apart from the prevailing order of the world 
and asks how that order came about... [It] does not take institutions 
and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question 
by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they may be 
in the process of changing."11 Inherent in this reflective theoretical 
approach to understanding social reality is an accute sensitivity to 
history and the historical nature of the existing social world as a 
contingent historical product. In this respect critical theory is also 
"theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the 
past but with a .... [continuous] process of historical change."12
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In accordance with this basic historical orientation the critical 
perspective cannot be satisified with the acceptance of static, 
ahistorical categories of theoretical analysis. Rather, Cox notes that 
the process of theorising necessarily involves a "continual 
confrontation of concepts with the reality they are supposed to 
represent and their adjustment to this reality as it continually 
changes."13. Thus critical theory is inevitably led beyond the 
temporally bounded focus of traditional problem salving theory. In 
contrast with the latter's preoccupation with the resolution of 
particular problems of order production within a fixed, objective social 
reality, critical theory brings into question the totality of the social 
order as an historically produced, contingent object of theoretical 
analysis. "Critical theory ... does not take institutions and social 
power relations for granted but calls them into question ... It is 
directed to the social and political complex as a whole . . . and seeks to 
understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are 
involved. " 1A
In embracing this holistic historical perspective then, the purpose of 
critical theory is not limited to a concern with the practical 
adjustment or management of problems arising within the existing socio­
political system. Rather, when viewed from this broader historical 
problematic, the overiding purpose of the study of the existing social 
world is redefined as that of establishing the potential for its general 
transformation as an historically limited expression of a more general 
historical process of human self determination. Integral to this larger 
emancipatory concern with systemic transformation is the dialectical
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conception of history associated with the critical perspective. By 
contrast with the problem solving approach and its underlying 'ceterus 
paribus' assumption, this critical, reflective perspective emphasises 
the way in which the dynamic processes of historical change continually 
engender forces for social transformation at any given stage of history 
providing the impetus for the practical rearticulation of existing 
structures of social and political order. Understood in these 
transformative terms, the centre of interest for theory is redirected to 
the prospects for the historical construction of new social orders 
opened up by these dynamic historical forces. As Cox points out, "at the 
level of real history, dialectic is the potential for alternative forms 
of development arising from the confrontation of opposed social forces 
in any concrete historical situation."15
It is from this understanding of the dynamic, historical nature of 
social reality that the overt emancipatory purpose of critical theory 
arises. In seeking to construct a more self conscious and comprehensive 
theoretical understanding of the nature Gf the social world than is 
provided by problem solving theory* the reflective interest guiding this 
theoretical approach "allows for a normative choice in favour of a 
social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it 
limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible 
transformations of the existing world."15 Moreover, it is the historical 
knowledge of the origins and nature of the existing socio-political 
order and the dynamic transformative social forces at work therein 
facilitated by this reflective theoretical attitude which provides the 
basis upon which an assessment can be made of the possibilities for the
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emergence of such a reconstituted social system offering the potential 
for the extension of human freedom.
Inherent in the critical perspective, therefore, is a problematic whose 
defining focus is the broad concern with the practical problems 
confronting the historical formation of a reconstituted social world - a 
condition in which traditional forms of domination constraining the 
social interaction and creative co-operation of human beings, generally 
accepted as an inevitable, incontrovertible fact of life by the problem 
solving approach, might be overcome through the introduction of more 
self determining forms of social organisation. Accordingly, critical 
theory contains an "element of utopianism . . . but its utopianism is 
constrained by a comprehension of historical processes."17 Let us now 
consider how Cox attempts to reconstruct the traditional theoretical 
approach to the study of international relations through the application 
of this critical theoretical perspective.
II The Reflective, Emancipatory Interest and the Historical Reproduction 
of Hegemonic Vorld Orders
In isolating these two general perspectives as the basic models 
orienting the various approaches to the study of international 
relations, Cox proceeds to argue the case for the adoption of the 
latter, critical type as the most adequate method for understanding the 
modern international system and the nature of order formation occuring 
therein. Opposing the assumptions of this critical theoretical
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perspective to what he discerns as the predominant problem solving 
orientation of traditional theories of international relations, he 
develops a critique of the latter which provides the paint of departure 
for the construction of his own, expanded, critical theory of 
international order formation.
Thus, the principal deficiency of traditional international relations 
theory according to Cox has been its unquestioning acceptance of an 
anarchical, statecentric conception of international relations as the 
given, unchanging abject for analysis by international relations 
theorists. Addressing himself specifically to postwar Neo-Realist 
theory, Cox notes that the former has "tended to adopt the fixed, 
ahistorical view of the framework for action characteristic of problem­
solving theory. " 1 0 The practitioners of this type of theory have been 
able to maintain this fixed, ahistorical perspective by postulating an 
unchanging substrata or set of underlying substances considered 
fundamental to the system of international relations in any historical 
period. These basic, perennial substances on which the problem solving 
perspective is predicated Cox identifies as "the [unchanging] nature of 
man, understood in terms of Augustinian original sin or the Hobbesean 
perpetual and restless desire for power .... the nature of states ... 
[defined in terms of] their fixation with a particular conception of 
national interest ... as a guide to their actions; and the nature of the 
states-system which places rational constraints upon the unbridled 
pursuit of power. " 1 3
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In adopting this fixed, non-historical perspective and its reified 
categories these theorists have also incorporated the other major 
features of problem-solving theory into their research. Most notably^ 
they have tended to adopt a fragmented approach to the analysis of 
international relations, a tendency manifested in a preoccupation with 
specialised areas or themes of contemporary international politics and 
the particular problems confronting the reproduction of order within 
specific spheres of the existing system. The focus here is on the 
resolution of immediate problems threatening stability within the 
international system. Given its uncritical acceptance of this non- 
historical model of international relations as a repetitive and 
unchanging system of anarchical political relations between sovereign 
states, the broader problem of system's transformation does not arise 
for traditional international theory. Rather, the essential concern lies 
in ensuring the smooth functioning of the exisiting international 
political order in light of its unchanging, inescapable character as an 
anarchical condition of necessary political action.
Thus, according to Cox, this ahistorical, statecentric conception of the 
nature of international relations and its particularised, problem­
solving approach have hindered the development of a more sophisticated, 
historical understanding of the nature of order formation within the 
modern international system. Viewing the international system as a 
basically unchanging sphere of anarchical political relations between 
discrete political units, the former has consequently failed to provide 
any analysis of the diverse historical forces accounting for the 
constitution of order within the modern international system. "Having
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arrived at this view of ... [the nature of international politics in 
terms of] underlying substances, history [for this perspective! becomes 
... a quarry providing materials with which to illustrate variations on 
always recurrent themes. The mode of thought ceases to be historical 
even though the materials used are derived from history ... Moreover, 
this mode of reasoning dictates that, with respect to essentials, the 
future will always be like that of the past. " 2 0
In this way then, the reified categories associated with the problem­
solving orientation of traditional theory have directly the apposite 
effect insofar as they encourage a strictly limited view of the type of 
behaviour possible in the sphere of international relations. From this 
standpoint the "notion of substance at the level of human nature is 
presented as a rationality ... common to the competing actors [within 
the international sphere] ... This idea of a common rationality 
reinforces the non-historical mode of thinking. Other modes of thought 
are to be castigated as inapt. " 2 1 In this way the problem solving 
perspective performs an important normative role within the 
international system. Serving, as it does, to deter any substantial 
theoretical analysis of the dynamic processes of historical change 
operating within the international system and their implications for the 
possible qualitative transformation of that system, it thereby helps to 
reinforce the system of power relations supporting the status quo.
Vithin the paramaters of this theoretical perspective any analysis of 
the possibilities raised by the transformative processes of history for 
moving beyond the current system to a different type of international
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order transcending the condition of political anarchy is specifically 
excluded.
Invoking his critical approach in opposition to this reified problem- 
solving perspective,Cox proceeds to elaborate a radically different, 
historical problematic focussing on the processes involved in the 
formation of modern hegemonic world orders. Pivotal to this critical 
perspective is his rejection of those essential substances forming the 
underlying basis of traditional international relations theory noted 
above. Citing the work of Vico, Cox notes that "one cannot ... properly 
abstract man and the state from history so as to define their substances 
or essences as prior to history. " 2 2  The nature of these elements is not 
fixed but is itself a product of a more general historical process of 
conscious human creativity. States themselves, as the central agents of 
international order formation, are contingent products of complex social 
forces which themselves represent particular, historically evolved 
expressions of conscious human creative activity. It is the complex 
processes engendered by these contingent, historically formed state 
structures which Cox identifies as the constitutive source of those 
larger, holistic structures regulating behaviour within modern 
international society - namely the successive hegemonic structures of 
world order.
Expanding upon this theme Cox contends that a "proper study of human 
affairs should be able to reveal both the coherence of minds and 
institutions characteristic of different ages and the process whereby 
one such coherent pattern - which we can call an historical structure -
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succeeds another. " 2 3  It is with the explanation of this complex 
historical process of the reproduction of such general structures of 
world order that a critical theory of international relations is 
principally concerned. As historically constituted systems regulating 
human action at the international level,the latter represent the 
practical expression of the conscious creative capacities of human 
agents. Moreover, the historical reproduction of these general 
structures of world order produced by the combined effects of different 
forms of hegemonic domination is identified by Cox as the basic medium 
facilitating the ongoing transformation of those specifically human 
creative powers. Rather than forming static and unchanging substances 
as traditional international theory suggests, the structures of the 
international system undergo a process of evolution giving practical 
expression to the powers of conscious self determination intrinsic to 
those human agents engendering them.
In addressing itself to the historical constitution and transformation 
of these holistic, hegemonic structures of world order then, the 
critical approach to international relations is governed by an interest 
of an explicitly normative nature. For, insofar as this historical 
process is considered to manifest the "continual remaking of human 
nature and the creation of new patterns of social relations which change 
the rules of the game"2"1, critical theory is inevitably concerned with 
the possibilities for the reshaping of international society presented 
by this dynamic process in a manner which facilitates the eradication of 
those constraints traditionally imposed upon human interaction by the 
modern system of international relations. In going beyond the
2ie
ahistorical assumptions and limited preoccupations of traditional 
theory, this critical approach to international order formation focusses 
upon those "conflicts which arise within ... [existing world orders] and 
open the possibility for ... [their historical] transformation."125'. Its 
primary theory-orienting interest lies in ascertaining the potential 
generated by such conflicts for the extension of the human capacity for 
conscious creative interaction and development within the social 
totality which is the modern society of states.
Ill The Integrative Forces of Vorld Order Formation
As it is presented in Cox’s work then, a critical theoretical approach 
to the understanding of international order formation involves the 
analysis of the reproduction of modern structures of world order and the 
complex historical forces engendering them as they reflect the 
articulation of broader processes of human self determination. In most 
general terms, these modern world orders represent "the particular 
configuration of forces which successively define the problematic of war 
or peace for the ensemble of states.H2e Moreover, Cox notes that "a 
principle distinction between structures of world order lies in whether 
or not the order is hegemonic, ... [such a hegemonic order involving] 
dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order 
based ideologically on a broad measure of consent. ” :2'7 It is this latter, 
hegemonic type of world order, as distinct from those world orders based 
around international balances of power, which form the central focus of 
Cox's work. The former represent dynamic structures formed through the 
historical interaction and contingent combination of "basic processes at
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work in the development of social forces and forms of state and in the 
structure of the global economy."20 Moreover, as the central 
constraining forms regulating the possibilities for, and nature of, 
international behaviour, these ordering structures are subject to 
constant historical transformation, manifesting different 
characterisitics at different periods in the history of the modern 
international system.
Despite these significant historical variations, however, Cox discerns 
certain common features characterising the historical formation and 
operation of these modern international ordering structures. Thus, a 
central factor in the rise of such structures of world order from the 
temporal flux of modern history has been the effect of the phenomenon of 
hegemony and the hegemonic state in the construction of integrated 
systems of dominance at the international level. This idea of hegemony 
represents the key feature informing Cox's extended view of the nature 
of the modern state as the central agent in the formation of world 
orders. In terms of this extended conception Cox specifically rejects 
the traditional view of the state associated with problem-solving 
theory, as a unitary, monolithic political actor guided in its external 
actions by a clearly defined conception of its own national interest. In 
contrast with this unproblematic, unitary model> which we have also seen 
to characterise, in varying forms, the perspectives of the Reo-Realist 
and Rationalist theorists, Cox offers a more complex account of the 
state as an historical synthesis of diverse historical forces which is 
motivated in its external actions by complex, relatively-autonomous
forces and interests.
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In elaborating this expanded conception of the state Cox draws on the 
work of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci the 
political state should not be seen as an independent arbiter among the 
plural interest groups of domestic society (the liberal perspective) nor 
as a simple reflection of class interests (the vulgar Marxist view) . 2 9  
Instead, he defines the state as a relatively—autonomous unifying force 
whose broad function is to ensure the effective operation of a domestic, 
capitalist productive system and preserve the long term interests of the 
dominant bourgeois class which ultimately controls this mode of 
production. The principal means whereby the state achieves this end is 
through the integration of potentially conflicting social classes within 
a broader, sovereign, socio-political system. Moreover, it is the 
hegemonic institutions engendered by the political state within civil 
society which Gramsci identifies as the primary mechanisms whereby the 
competing class interests of civil society are unified in this single, 
consensual social structure of co-operative action. Through the 
construction and management of these hegemonic structures, including 
such institutions as the press, churches and schools, the political 
state disseminates those ideological and material forms of class 
domination which serve to pacify and unify subordinate classes. In this 
way the apparatus of hegemony operates as the integrative force which 
"brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of 
subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an 
ideology expressed in universal terms" 3 0  thus securing the unity of a 
socially and economically differentiated capitalist society.
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Cox adapts this Gramscian conception of the state, defined as a complex 
hegemonic structure of state-civil society relations integrated through 
the cohering effects of the political state, as the basic element of his 
own critical theory. But, in doing so he radically extends Gramsci's 
account of this process of hegemonic order formation. Within his own 
theoretical perspective these processes of hegemonic order formation, 
presented by Gramsci as internal to the state, are identified as having 
their parallel in the historical formation of hegemonic world orders 
within the international sphere. By translating the Gramscian conception 
of hegemonic state formation to the analysis of the transformation of 
relations between states in this manner, Cox seeks to transcend the 
limited focus of traditional, statecentric theory upon the political 
interactions between unitary sovereign states and to provide a more 
sophisticated understanding of the development of modern systems of 
international order. Here this traditional perspective is replaced by a 
concern with the reproduction of those multiple structures of 
international hegemonic domination arising from the historical 
universalisation of the internal state/civil society complexes of 
successive, dominant capitalist states.
In accordance with this expanded conception of hegemonic order formation 
then, Cox stresses the need for theory to examine "state-society 
complexes as the constituent entities of world order and for exploring 
the particular historical forms taken by these complexes" 31 as the basic 
determinant of the production of structures of world order in any 
particular historical period. For, according to Cox, it is the historical 
emergence of new, powerful states containing revolutionary new modes of
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production and accompanying domestic systems of hegemonic, political and 
socio-economic relations, which provides the catalyst for the 
construction of new regulative structures of international domination 
within international society. In this respect a world hegemony is "in 
its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national! hegemony 
established by a dominant social class. [With this development] the 
economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology 
associated with this national hegemony became a pattern for emulation 
abroad. " 3 2  With the subsequent internationalisation of its mode of 
production and the hegemonic, political and cultural institutions 
associated with it, a new world order comes into being.
Vhen properly understood, therefore, the hegemonic structure of any 
particular world order is ultimately founded, "not only upon the 
regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived 
civil society i.e. a mode of production of global extent linking the 
social classes of the countries encompassed by it. " 3 3  Moreover, like its 
domestic counterparts, the central feature distinguishing such hegemonic 
world orders from international orders based purely on political 
coercion is its consensual character. To become hegemonic a state has to 
"found and protect a world order which ... Cis] universal in conception 
i.e. not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an 
order which most other states ... find compatible with their 
interests. " 3 4  The political fragment of the sovereign state constitutes 
the central agent facilitating the articulation of the multiple 
economic, political and cultural forces underpinning the reproduction of 
this hegemonic, consensual structure of world order. By facilitating
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the externalisation of those inter-related, relatively-autonomous forces 
of domestic hegemonic dominance, the political state forms the medium for 
the articulation of specific regulative structures, structures 
"functioning in accordance with general principles that ... ensure the 
continuing supremacy of the leading state ... and leading social classes 
but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to 
the less powerful"35 states incorporated within the world order.
Cox identifies a number of hegemonic forces which, by means of their 
internationalisation, enable the hegemon to engender the acquiescence of 
other states and their ruling classes to the former's dominant position, 
thereby facilitating the creation of an integrated, consensual system of 
world order. Within an emergent historical structure of world order Cox 
notes three such farces which interact to produce such an hegemonic 
system, namely material capabilities, ideas and institutions. As an 
essentially contingent structure of international order, the former is 
the result of the integrative and regulative effects produced by these 
three relatively-»autonomous forces. Moroever, the configuration of 
hegemonic forces which they constitute does not represent a rigidly 
deterministic structure shaping behaviour within the international 
system. Instead, this complex historical structure "imposes pressures and 
constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or 
resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them."35 The manner of 
the operation of these forces is not a simple unilinear one but a 
complementary process of complex interaction through which the general, 
regulative structure of world order is established and reinforced.
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Of the material capabilities which contribute to the establishment of a 
hegemonic world order Cox emphasises accumulated resources and 
technological capacities. These represent productive and destructive 
potentials. "In their dynamic form these exist as technological and 
organisational capabilities and in their accumulated forms as natural 
resources which technology can transform, stocks of equipment (e.g. 
industries and armaments) and the wealth which these command."37' 
Complementing these material capabilities are the integrative potentials 
embodied in ideological resources or systems of ideas. Here Cox 
distinguishes between what he defines as intersubjective meanings and 
collective images. Intersubjective meanings are those general, shared 
notions of the nature of international political relations which orient 
states' behaviour. These include, for example, notions of national 
sovereignty and the rules of diplomatic procedure. However, of more 
immediate importance for the construction of world orders is the role of 
collective images. These he identifies as "views as to both the nature 
and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of 
justice and the public good and so forth."3e It is these collective 
images which provide the major resource through which the hegemonic 
state seeks to engender the ideological commitment of other states to 
its dominant position as a crucial factor in the maintenance of a 
coherent, integrated structure of world order operating in its 
interests.
These material and ideological resources available to the hegemonic 
state form the crucial elements which historically converge as the 
constitutive basis of world order formation. Such convergence occurs
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through their incorporation in those hegemonic institutions which 
regulate the multiple political, economic and ideological interactions 
between states at the international level. Thus Cox notes that these 
institutions represent "particular amalgams of ideas and material 
capabilities"33. It is the combination of the latter in these 
institutional structures of hegemonic influence which enables a dominant 
state to instantiate and perpetuate its particular regulative system of 
world order. In practice these hegemonic institutions "reflect the power 
relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend ... to encourage 
collective images consistent with these power relations. " 4 0  To the 
extent that world hegemony is "expressed in [these] universal norms ... 
and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and 
for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries'^ 41 
they have formed the core of successive modern world orders understood 
as consensual, cooperative and, therefore, legitimate structures of 
international dominance.
This aspect of the legitimacy of the hegemonic institutional structures 
is particularly important for Cox. For, by virtue of their legitimate 
status these institutions "provide ways of dealing with internal 
conflicts so as to minimise the use of force ... There is an enforcement 
potential in the material power relations underlying any structure in 
that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary. But 
force will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the 
strong ... [if] the weak accept the prevailing power relations as 
legitimate. " 4 2  The likelihood of lesser states doing so is largely 
dependent upon the dominant state's preparedness to interpret its
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position of international domination as hegemonic and not merely 
dictatorial, in the process expressing its leadership in terms of 
"universal or general interests rather than just as serving ... [its] 
own particular interests. Institutions ... became the anchor for such a 
hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the 
representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of 
policy. " 4-3 By both disemminating and managing the operation of the 
hegemonic rules and regulations of international behaviour in different 
spheres of a particular world order and, in the process, distributing 
the benefits flowing from acquiescence to the system of hegemonic 
domination constructed by the dominant state, these institutions thus 
play a pivotal role in engendering orderly relations at the 
international level.
IV The Dialectics of World Order Formation and the Emancipatory 
Purpose of Critical Theory
For Cox then, modern hegemonic world orders represent the expression of 
contingent historical forces which, when crystallised by a dominant 
capitalist state in a set of hegemonic institutions, engender legitimate 
structures of domination facilitating the emergence of cooperative 
relations between states. Such world orders are distinguished by the 
fact that they rest, not merely on the overt threat of political 
coercion, but on the consent of the other states subject to the 
hegemon's dominance, secured by means of material incentives and the 
inculcation of an ideological commitment on their part to the
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preservation of that order. Moreover, the effective operation of any 
particular hegemonic, world order and, thus, the reproduction of a 
stable condition of orderly relations at the international level is 
ultimately dependent upon the hegemon's capacity to maintain the 
practical legitimacy of this system of domination in its diverse 
material, political and ideological dimensions.
In accordance with his critical, historical perspective however, Cox 
stresses that such structures of world order, are contingent, transitory 
creations. As such they are always subject to challenge and inevitably 
undergo transformation. "One must beware of allowing a focus on 
[hegemonic] institutions to obscure either changes in the relationship 
of material forces or the emergence of ideological challenges to an 
erstwhile prevailing order. Institutions may ... [become] out of phase 
with these other aspects of reality and their efficacy as a means of 
regulating conflict [and their integrative, regulative function] is 
thereby undermined"*4 More particularly, the continuity of such 
structures of hegemonic world order ultimately rests upon the ability of 
the hegemon to preserve the perception of the universal nature of its 
hegemonic institutions as mechanisms serving the general interests of 
its members in the face of inevitable challenges to its dominant 
position. Where it is unable to maintain this perception and to 
preserve the legitimacy of its position, the functional character and 
ideological integrity of the institutional forms and practices of 
hegemonic influence which form the basis of its dominance are likely to 
breakdown and the potential for the continued reproduction of the 
existing world order is thrown into question. In these circumstances the
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possibility for the emergence of a new hegemonic world order arises. It 
is in this dynamic transformative process that critical theory's concern 
for human emancipation comes to the fore.
The essentially dialectical nature of the historical process of world 
order formation is crucial in this context. Cox argues that the analysis 
of historical structures of world order is always directed to the 
consideration of what are always limited totalities. Thus any given 
hegemonic structure under consideration does not represent the whole 
world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its 
historically located totality. Given this inherently limited nature of 
such holistic world orders a critical analysis of international order 
formation necessarily proceeds by "juxtaposing and connecting historical 
structures in related spheres of action. Dialectic is introduced by ... 
[studying] the historical situation to which ... [the world order! 
relates and ... looking for the emergence of rival structures expressing 
alternative possibilities of development.'"15, Vhere such opposing 
historical forces emerge, as Cox argues is inevitable given the partial 
nature of any particular world order, the contingent structure of 
dominance formed by the convergence of the different forces of hegemony 
may fragment and ultimately breakdown under the pressure of opposition, 
thereby opening up the space for the emergence of a new hegemonic world 
order in its place. In this respect, the breakdown of an existing order 
and the potential for the development of a new hegemonic structure are 
determined by the practical historical forces generated by the 
dialectical, historical forces operating within the existing ordering
structure.
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Easily the most important of these transformative forces far Cox is the 
fact of change in the basic structures of social production within the 
existing world order. Thus he notes that "a significant structural 
change in world order is ... likely to be traceable to some fundamental 
change in social relations and in the national political orders which 
correspond to national structures of social r e l a t i o n s . T h e  emergence 
of a new socio-economic system of production, most often originating at 
the periphery of the existing order where the influence of the hegemonic 
state is less pervasive, forms the catalyst for larger processes of 
international transformation. For such "changes in the organisation of 
production generate new social forces which, in turn, generate changes 
in the structure of states; and the generalisation of changes in the 
structure of states alters the problematic of world order. " 4-7 More 
particularly, where such basic changes arise, new ideological images of 
world order are also likely to emerge in opposition to the dominant, 
legitimating ideology providing the existing order with its cohering, 
integrative force. The resulting clash of rival collective images 
provides "evidence of the potential for alternative paths of development 
[within the existing world order] and raises questions as to the 
possible material and the institutional basis for the emergence of an 
alternative structure. " 4-8 The more basic changes in the nature of 
productive relations become especially important then, when they are 
connected with an alternative collective image, or universal ideology of 
world order. From the convergence of these new material and ideological 
forces the resources arise providing the basis upon which can be 
constructed a new legitimate hegemonic world order.
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Thus, for Cox, the possibility for the creation of new, legitimate, 
hegemonic world orders expressing different manifestations of conscious 
human creativity- arises directly from the dialectical tensions 
engendered by the processes of ongoing change within the existing world 
order. Viewed from this dialectical perspective the critical analysis of 
the formation of hegemonic world orders, represented as the conjunction 
of material power, ideology and institutions, appears to "lend itself to 
a cyclical theory of history; the three dimensions fitting together in 
certain times and places and coming apart in others."43 Moreover, when 
viewed from this broader historical perspective, the acquisition of a 
theoretical understanding of the nature of any individual world order 
forms only part of a larger, more fundamental project. For, in 
explaining the origins, growth and demise of such modern world orders in 
terms of the dialectical interrelationships of the three levels of their 
hegemonic structures, critical theory is simultaneously involved in an 
analysis of the practical articulation of conscious human creative 
powers expressed in the concrete forms of modern world orders.
Thus the analysis of the dialectical formation and transformation of 
such orders simultaneously involves an exploration of the degree to 
which this process of conscious human self determination has been 
advanced historically and the potential opened up by these 
transformative historical processes for its further extension through 
the rearticulation of the ordering structures of international society 
in more emancipated forms. The overriding concern of a critical theory 
of world order formation ultimately lies, therefore, in ascertaining the 
possibilities offered by this dialectical, transformative process for
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the practical extensicn of human freedom through the remaking of the 
basic structure of human relations within the international system in a 
radically different image. In chapter six I will proceed to analyse 
Cox's account of the practical historical construction of the major 
forms of world order arising within modern international society and 
their contribution to the emancipatory process noted here. In doing so 
it will be my concern to offer a critical assessment of his theoretical 
perspective and, in particular, to determine the extent to which it 
actually realises Cox's claim to provide a holistic account of the 
historical processes explaining the reproduction of legitimate order 
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The Reproduction of Hegemonic World Orders within Modern Western 
International Society
In the preceding chapter we saw how Cox has sought to redefine the basic 
categories of international relations theory in an attempt to formulate 
a more dynamic, extended theory of international order formation which 
overcomes the perceived weaknesses associated with traditional theory.
In order to clearly grasp the distinctive nature of this theoretical 
approach Cox's conception of world order formation was elaborated there 
in highly generalised terms. However, as he himself observes, the 
specific nature of the particular structures of world order operating 
within modern international society cannot be derived purely from "some 
abstract model but I emerges] from a study of the [particular] historical 
situation to which they relate. " 1 We shall now consider this practical 
historical process of hegemonic world order formation as it has unfolded 
in response to the uneven development of power within modern 
international society. In doing so we shall be principally concerned 
with Cox's account of the way relatively stable orders have been 
historically reproduced within this international society through the 
effects of the legitimate hegemonic structures constituted successively 
by the British and American capitalist states.
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I will begin by outlining Cox's account of the main features of the 
hegemonic world order associated with the Pax Britannica of the 
nineteenth century and the specific domestic and international 
structures upon which the latter was predicated. At the same time we 
shall note the dialectical forces which Cox identifies as engendering 
the breakdown of this hegemonic structure and the consequent emergence 
of a new nan-hegemonic world order in the later~nineteenth century 
characterised by competition between rival imperialist states. As we 
shall see, the subsequent phase of European rivalry forms the historical 
prelude to the emergence of a new, global world order in the post World 
War Two period based upon the hegemonic dominance of the United States. 
In proceeding to examine the basic constitutive structures of this 
second modern hegemonic world order we shall also consider Cox's 
arguments concerning the current decline of this postwar hegemonic 
system and the potential which this present transformative phase opens 
up for the creation of a new legitimate world order in the future 
facilitating the extension of human emancipation at the international 
level. Finally, having articulated this Critical historical conception 
of modern international order formation we shall examine certain 
problems associated with Cox's approach arising from his preoccupation 
with the socio-economic dimensions of world order formation. These 
problems, I shall argue, suggest the need to open up the categories of 
this Critical perspective to take account of other dimensions of the 
historical constitution of order between modern states if the critical 
paradigm is to realise its ambitious theoretical claims.
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I The Rise and Fall of the British Liberal World Order
As we saw in the previous chapter, at the centre of Cox's theoretical 
account of world order formation is his conception of the composite, 
hegemonic state as the central agent in the historical construction of 
international hegemonic structures which integrate the sovereign units 
of international society into a complex system of co-operative, 
consensual order in any given historical period. In this respect the 
emergence of a new world order is the direct outcome of a major change 
in the distribution of international power brought on by a "decisive 
shift in . . . Ethel relative economic-productive powers" 2 of states.
Where a major change of this sort occurs the historical conditions are 
created for the emergence of a newly powerful hegemonic, capitalist 
state capable of engendering a system of hegemonic relations at the 
international level constitutive of world order. Cox identifies two 
major states which have formed the focus of hegemonic systems of world 
order in modern international society.
The first hegemonic world order identified by Cox is that which 
developed as a result of the expansion of the British state in the 
aftermath of the revolutionary wars following the French Revolution. The 
emergence of this British world order was integrally linked with the 
redistribution of international power associated with the failure of the 
French attempt to secure European hegemony. According to Cox the defeat 
of Napoleonic France and the peace settlement which followed resulted in 
the establishment of an international system in which the British state 
was able to exercise predominant influence. More particularly, "British
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victory opened the way for the [internal] consolidation of bourgeois 
hegemony at home and its expansion to found a liberal world order 
abroad. " 3 The material foundations for this development lay in the 
internal growth and consolidation of the new productive system of 
capitalist manufacture engendered by the industrial revolution in 
Britian - a system which gave England the advantage over the other 
states of Europe in terms of productive capacity and economic power. In 
this respect Cox observes that the "Pax Britannica was based both on the 
ascendancy of manufacturing capitalism in the international exchange 
economy, of which Britain was the centre, and on the social and 
ideological power ... of the class which drew its wealth from 
manufacturing."A Specifically, the rise of the British state to 
international economic ascendancy was predicated upon the formation of a 
new internal, hegemonic system of political and economic relations 
articulated around the socio-economic power of the bourgeois class which 
provided the material bases for Britain's global expansion. Let us 
consider the processes by which this new hegemonic bloc was consolidated 
within the British state.
This new hegemonic bloc upon which the liberal world order was built 
took the form of a re-articulation of state-civil society relations 
based around a coalition of the traditional aristocratic ruling class 
and the bourgeois middle class newly empowered by the rise of the 
capitalist system of manufacture. The distinguishing feature of the 
hegemonic state arising from this coalition was the formal separation of 
the political and economic spheres which it entailed. According to Cox 
the new bourgeoisie "did not need to directly control ... [the state.]
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Its social power became the premiss of state politics."5 In this 
respect the aristocratic governing class came to recognise that 
Britain's world power was dependent on its commerce and manufacturing 
and "was therefore prepared to govern in such a way as to allow the 
bourgeois economy to flourish and expand. I At the same time] the middle 
class was . . . politically mobilised to specify and demand policies in 
its interests and to take control of municipal governments in its 
particular areas of implementation. "6
In these circumstances then, the principal role of the political 
fragment of the new hegemonic bloc became that of creating the domestic 
economic and political conditions facilitating the efficient operation 
of the dynamic bourgeois free market economy. To this end successive 
governments introduced a series of socio-economic and political reforms 
which transformed the domestic structure of political and socio-economic 
life. Most notable among these were those reforms affecting the economic 
sphere, including the repeal of discriminatory trade practices 
associated with the Corn Laws, the Navigation Act and the reform of the 
poor law. Through these reforms the protective apparatus of earlier 
mercantilist policy obstructing the operation of the free market was 
removed and the conditions were established for the consolidation of a 
nationwide free market in labour and goods which had begun to emerge 
with the earlier effects of the industrial revolution. Cox also notes 
that government legislation operated to provide the broader social 
conditions for the efficient functioning of the free market, ensuring 
the soundness of money by the imposition of the gold standard and 
creating centralised administrative and policing systems essential for
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the regulation of social life within the liberal state. At the same 
time, the political reforms of the 1830s which enfranchised the 
increasingly powerful bourgeois middle class further consolidated the 
new, domestic hegemonic bloc.7
The general effect of the development of this new hegemonic bloc was to 
produce the internal conditions facilitating the rapid growth of 
manufacturing industry and the financial power upon which the external 
expansion of the British state was predicated. It was the internal 
dynamics of this liberal, free trade system of capitalist production 
unleashed by the new hegemonic bloc of capitalist and political forces 
which formed the central dynamic behind the universalisation of the 
internal system of British hegemonic order. Thus Cox observes that the 
"liberal world order was the creation of an expansionist society ... 
Expansionism took the form of trade, emigration and capital investment. 
The movement was aided and abetted by state actions."3 Moreover, the 
laissez-faire character of this internal capitalist system of social 
production dictated the specific form of the hegemonic world order 
created by the expansionary forces of the British state. Hence British 
forces of commercial expansion had no interest in establishing formal 
structures of direct imperial domination. The liberal imperialism of 
this phase was "largely indifferent as to whether or not peripheral 
countries were formally independent or under the political- 
administrative control of a colonial power, provided that the rules of 
the international economy were observed."3 Given Britain's maritime 
dominance and its considerable advantage over other European states in 
industrial development, it was in the interests of British capitalism to
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maintain free, open international markets, a situation advocated by the 
liberal, free trade ideology of the age.
Cox notes that the role of British sea power was a central factor in the 
building of this liberal world order and in the ongoing reproduction of 
British hegemonic dominance on both the political and economic levels.
At the geo-political level British sea power enabled the English to 
create a favourable political situation on the European continent 
through its maintenance of a stable balance of power which prevented the 
emergence of any potential continental hegemon and, thereby, any 
potential challenger to British world power. That balance could be 
preserved as long as the continental powers remained of roughly equal 
strength. Accordingly, Britain practiced a "policy of presence in Europe 
but one designed to preserve the balance of power, not to dominate 
politically."10 By using its political influence and strategic power 
Britain was able, with remarkable success, to maintain the status quo in 
Europe up until the latter part of the nineteenth century. According to 
Cox this policy of maintaining a strategic balance on the continent 
involved a number of important implications for the pursuit of wider 
British hegemonic interests. Firstly, it enabled Britain to preserve its 
domestic security against any likely European threat and by relatively 
cheap means. By the same token, it left British commercial interests 
free to concentrate on the accumulation of their economic power and to 
extend and consolidate British control over markets within the world
economy.
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This brings us to the second and most important dimension of British 
world order formation, namely the construction of a liberal world 
economy consequent upon the universalisation of the hegemonic structures 
of the domestic system of free trade noted above. British sea power was 
important here again in underwriting the dissemination of English 
capitalist productive relations and the associated free market ideology 
on a global scale. In this context Cox notes that the "liberal world 
order, like the liberal state, posited a separation of politics from 
economics, together with a fundamental compatability between them. . . The 
responsibility of the state ... was to ensure the conditions for this 
open world economy while refraining from interfering with the operations 
of . . . tits] economic agents. " 1 '1 But, while the construction of this 
liberal world order was underwritten by the threat of coercive power,
Cox stresses that the essence of this order was not overt domination but 
the creation of a hegemonic system of co-operative relations between its 
major centres. The logics of the liberal, hegemonic system of social 
production themselves encouraged a non-restrictive, unregulated form of 
world order as the condition for it to flourish. Accordingly, in the 
British capitalists' pursuit of global markets for their manufactured 
goods and raw materials to supply the needs of industry, formal empire 
mattered less than freedom of commercial access to all countries. "In 
commercial matters ... [Britain] sought openess for all countries, not 
special advantages for Britain ... In an open trading world it was clear 
that Britain's industrial and financial lead gave her a decisive 
advantage over all other powers. " 1 2
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Given the logics of the internal, capitalist productive system and its 
manifest naval and economic superiority then, the interest of the 
British hegemonic state lay in breaking down the constraints upon 
international trade and opening up the non-European regions of the world 
to the dynamics of liberal free trade. In penetrating regions of the 
non-European world the hegemonic forces of the British state sought to 
transform local economic and political structures to facilitate their 
incorporation within the liberal world economy. Here Cox notes that the 
colonial state "developed its capacity to protect the growth of the 
liberal economy through a mix of coercion, tax policy and property 
law... CIt] also mobilised finance for investment in transport and 
communications facilities. Thus, the functions of the liberal state were 
exported ... to the penetrated countries."13 Integral to this process 
was the establishment of a global system of linkages between local 
elites in peripheral regions and the bourgeois interests of the British 
hegemonic state. "In ... countries from the Mediteranean through Asia 
and Latin America local bourgeoisies acted as agents and intermediaries 
for capital from the expansive centres. European economic penetration 
was encouraged and protected by local authoritarian regimes as well as 
welcomed by these comprador groups."1A
In pursuing such policies the agents of British economic hegemony were 
able to justify their actions in terms of liberal ideologies which 
presented these international arrangements as serving the general 
interest of those regions incorporated into the liberal world order. 
Hence Cox notes that, once institutionalised, the "norms of liberal 
economics (free trade, the gold standard, free movement of capital and
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persans) gained widespread acceptance with the spread of British 
prestige, providing a universalistic ideology which represented these 
norms as the basis of a [natural] harmony of interests."1s Not least 
important in engendering acquiesence to the introduction of the 
regulative structures of British world order were the benefits which 
such cooperation could bring to local elites. As Cox observes, "British 
naval power enforced mercantile access and financial contracts ... but 
most frequently coercion was not necessary. States were glad to have 
access to British capital and technology... and were ready to adopt the 
rules and practices of the liberal order as their own guidelines."1e
In this manner the interlinking structures of the hegemonic liberal 
world order were put into place. By the mid-ninteenth century the 
political and economic agents of the British state had constructed a 
world order which reproduced the internal hegemonic forms of the 
latter on a global level. According to Cox this liberal system was "a 
hierarchical order. Britain was its centre: the principal trading 
nation, principal source of capital for the rest of the world, principal 
enforcer of market rules, and preserver of the military balance."17 In 
the absence of more substantive hegemonic international institutions 
resulting from the formal separation of the economic and political 
spheres, it was the financial centre of London which constituted the 
focus of this legitimate world order. The expansive capitalism of the 
mid-nineteenth century British state brought most of the world into the 
exchange relations of an international economy centred in London. The 
latter assumed the role of its "administrator and regulator according to
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[universal, liberal, free trade] rules, with British sea power remaining 
in the background as potential enforcer. " 1 '3
Neverthless, Cox identifies the historical forces of uneven development 
emerging within this world order which would lead to the breakdown of 
British hegemony and its informal, constitutive liberal structures, 
giving rise to a new non-hegemonic system which was to dominate 
international relations from the late ninteenth century through the 
first half of the twentieth century. We shall briefly consider these 
disintegrative forces and the non-hegemonic world order engendered by 
them before proceeding to Cox's account of the rise of the American 
neoliberal hegemony.
II The Breakdown of the Liberal World Order and the Transition 
to the Neoliberal American Order
Central to the demise of the liberal world order outlined above were 
the changes engendered within it by the uneven development of the power 
of European states stimulated by the expansion of the forms of 
industrial production originating within British society itself. The 
primary expression of this process of uneven development was the 
emergence of a unified German state as a major rival to Britain within 
the European international system. More particularly, it was the growth 
and expansion of German power which was to be the major catalyst in the 
breakdown of the nineteenth century European balance of power, 
predicated upon British dominance, which had been so important to the
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preservation of the liberal world order. According to Cox the conditions 
for this challenge to the European status quo were engendered, in large 
degree, by the operation of the Liberal world order itself which 
provided the facilitating conditions for the emergence of a radically 
new type of hegemonic state structure within Europe. Two factors were 
important here. The first of these was the creation by this liberal 
hegemonic order of the facilitating conditions for the emergence of new 
national forms of political community in Europe. Hence Cox notes that 
"Britain's manipulation of the European balance of power secured a 
permissive environment for Western European countries to adopt liberal 
reforms without risk from old regime restoration powers."1^  Secondly, 
and most importantly, the spread of the forms of bourgeois capitalist 
production originating in British society formed the catalyst for the 
internal formation of new, dominant hegemonic blocs within the major 
European states which would first challenge, and ultimately supersede 
the British liberal state structure. According to Cox this "spread of 
industrialisation and the mobilisation of social classes it brought 
about not only changed the nature of states but also altered the 
international configuration of state power as new rivals overtook 
Britain's lead. " 2 0  Let us consider this point more closely.
The new hegemonic state structure arising out of the transformative 
effects of industrialisation upon European society was one predicated 
upon a very different relationship between the political state and civil 
society to that underpinning the British hegemonic state. Within this 
newly emergent hegemonic bloc the central liberal principle of the 
formal separation of economic and political spheres exercised little
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influence. Continental European states like Germany mobilised a major 
new social force in the form of the emerging industrial labour force 
which was now incorporated within the hegemonic bloc of the state. 
Moreover, the role of the political state was here extended to include 
active intervention in the socio-economic system in order to implement 
the (minimum) social policies and welfare reforms required to maintain 
the allegiance of the workers to the nation state. This new internal 
hegemonic bloc created a dynamic basis for the development of sovereign 
power in the form of the unified energies of the integrated nation 
state. Moreover, it also gave rise to powerful expansionist tendencies. 
Thus Cox notes that the "incorporation of the industrial workers, the 
new social force called into existence by manufacturing capitalism, into 
the nation ... brought the factor of domestic welfare ... into the realm 
of foreign policy. The claims of welfare competed with the exigencies of 
liberal internationalism within the management of states; while the 
former gained ground as protectionism, the new imperialism and 
ultimately the end of the gold standard marked the long decline of 
liberal internationalism."2'
The impact of the formation of this new hegemonic structure upon 
domestic relations of social production underlies the shift in the 
distribution of power within European international society in the late 
nineteenth century which was to transform European international 
relations and, in the process, to reshape the structure of international 
order. According to Cox, the incorporation of industrial workers within 
the hegemonic bloc of western states from the late-ninteenth century 
"accentuated the movement of these states towards economic nationalism
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and imperialism (a new form of state), which brought about a 
fragmentation of the world economy and a more conflictual phase of 
international relations (a new structure of world order)."'-22 The 
dynamic, expansionary forces unleashed by the new hegemonic bloc within 
the nation state ultimately engendered a new European world order of 
imperialist rivalries characterising later nineteenth and early 
twentieth century European international relations, displacing the old 
free trade system of the liberal world order. This breakdown of the 
liberal world order was aided by the contradictions emerging within the 
structures of the British hegemonic state itself. Here the self- 
regulating market generated forces which "by undermining the traditional 
social fabric and leaving many people vulnerable to unemployment and 
starvation, provoked a reaction of social defence."23 The ultimate 
outcome of these internal class tensions generated by the shortcomings 
of the operation of the free market economy would be the gradual 
breakdown of the liberal hegemonic bloc and the eventual construction of 
a new, national welfare state within Britain itself. At the same time, 
Cox notes that the hierarchy of the world economy generated inequalities 
that became more entrenched, thereby discrediting the ideology of formal 
equality of market relationships argued by liberal free market 
ideologists. Such contradictions would be exploited by the major non- 
European challenger to British economic dominance in the pacific region 
in the form of the rising, rival maritime power of the United States.
As a result of these debilitating contradictions within its internal and 
external hegemonic structures and in the face of the rising power of its 
contintental rivals, British hegemonic power "declined relatively, losing
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its undisputed supremacy at sea, first with the German challenge and 
then with the rise of US power; Economic liberalism foundered with the 
rise of protectionism, the new imperialism and ultimately the end of the 
gold standard.',:2A Thus the latter part of the nineteenth century saw the 
rise of a new, non-consensual world order based upon competitive, 
imperialist relations of territorial domination rather than legitimate 
forms of hegemonic cooperation. "As ... the material predominance of the 
British economy and the appeal of the hegemonic [liberal] ideology 
weakened the hegemonic world order of the mid-Uineteenth century gave 
place to a non-hegemonic configuration of rival power blocs.M:2S During 
this period, therefore, there occured a fundamental transformation in 
the structure of world order at the three crucial levels of the 
distribution of power, the nature of the dominant ideology informing the 
system of world order and in the consequent nature of the conduct of 
European international relations. While the new hegemonic, national bloc 
underpinning this competititive, non-hegemonic world order would undergo 
a number of major reformulations leading to relatively more aggressive 
regimes (including the moderate corporate state and the extreme Fascist 
variations of this corporatist model), the basic competitive tendencies 
of this new hegemonic formation would perpetuate the rivalries in 
European international relations, ultimately resulting in the historical 
decline of Europe as the historical focus of world order formation.
Thus the historical phase beginning with these changes of the later 
nineteenth century saw the "decomposition of one fully farmed structure 
that coherently linked world political economy, forms of state and 
production relations, and the emergence of the elements of a new
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structure in process of formation in which all these elements were to 
become transformed."2e Out of the contradictions associated with the 
system of rival European imperialisms and the two world wars engendered 
by this non-hegemonic European world order would emerge a new postwar 
system of legitimate world order. It is to Cox's account of the nature 
of this new legitimate ordering structure that we must now turn.
Ill The Emergence of the American Neo-Liberal World Order
The political struggles arising within the European international system 
consequent upon the breakdown of British hegemonic dominance and the 
associated decline of the European balance of power represented a long, 
drawn out process of European decline reaching its nadir in the material 
and spiritual exhaustion of the major European states at the end of the 
Second World War. In turning now to examine the Cox's account of the 
second modern hegemonic structure of world order arising from that 
process of decline we shall discover some significant similarities 
between it and the British system which preceded it. But we shall also 
see how the American world order differs significantly from the latter 
in important respects, not least because of the distinctive nature of 
the hegemonic structure of the American state engendering this order - a 
structure which was itself influenced by the political changes in the 
general form of the state associated with the preceding period of rival 
imperialisms in Europe.
249
In explaining the origins and development of the contemporary American 
world order Cox gives special attention to the internal changes within 
American society in the inter-war period which, he argues, generated the 
dynamism underlying the expansion of the postwar American state. Of 
central importance here was the formation of a new internal hegemonic 
bloc engendered by the domestic changes associated with the reforms of 
the New Deal Administration. Like the British political state of the 
nineteenth century, the New Deal administration is identified by Cox as 
the agent responsible for establishing the preconditions for the 
transformation of the internal system of social production which was to 
drive the process of American expansion in the postwar period. The 
legislative program of Roosevelt's presidential administration was 
instrumental in creating a new neoliberal, corporatist hegemonic bloc 
which removed major pre-existing constraints upon the effective 
operation of the domestic economic system and opened the way to the 
rapid development of the domestic capitalist system of production. 
Especially important here was the action of government in 
institutionalising the social relations of bipartism which transformed 
the previous system of production relations.
In this respect the "1930s New Deal administration of Franklin Roosevelt 
was the turning point for bipartism in the United States ... The 
government placed the weight of legality behind the union movement and 
... collective bargaining as the manner of settling disputes and it 
protected union organisers against harassment by employers. A new, 
[powerful] union movement ... became part of the political coalition put 
together by the Roosevelt Democrats."27' Under this new system of
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bipartism the state's role, "though fundamental, ... [was] limited. ...
[It sought] to bring about a balance of forces in industry between 
workers and employers and to ensure that peaceful means were used for 
the settlement of industrial disputes." At the same time the 
Roosevelt administration introduced a wide range of measures to aid 
business and to provide relief to workers suffering from the effects of 
the depression. In accordance with the ideas of social justice 
associated with the New Deal program, welfare provisions were also 
introduced to provide for those individuals excluded from the benefits 
of the free market.
The overall effect of these various reforms within the American socio­
economic system, Cox notes, was the establishment of a new neoliberal 
hegemonic structure which represented a significant variation on the 
corporatist state structures of the period of rival imperialisms in 
Europe. In terms of the operation of this domestic hegemonic structure 
the American political state, like its British liberal predecessor, 
observed the formal distinction between the spheres of the political and 
economic. Avoiding the extremes of state intervention characterising 
Fascist state corporatism, the American political state acted to 
facilitate the emergence of a national free enterprise system of 
capitalist production based on an institutionalised system of labour- 
management relations. This hegemonic corporatist structure had the 
effect of engendering a more efficient system of domestic production by 
directing the management of production relations into formal channels.
At the same time, the material and ideological bases for the development 
of a popular commitment to national development were established through
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the culturally integrative effects of those social welfare initiatives 
noted above and the dise mini nation of notions of social justice 
consequent upon the extension of Federal authority over national life 
under the New Deal.
It was this new domestic hegemonic bloc emerging from the New Deal era 
which would form the substantive basis upon which the postwar American 
world order was articulated. The impetus to increased production 
provided by the formalisation of capitalist productive relations and the 
injection of government aid to the economy associated with the 
construction of this new hegemonic bloc enabled America's recovery from 
the depression and provided the stimulus for the dynamic economic growth 
underlying the American war effort, as well as its postwar global 
expansion. Indeed, Cox argues that this new hegemonic state was 
inherently expansive in nature. By virtue of its reconstituted internal 
structure the neo-liberal American, capitalist state was one which 
sought to "facilitate adaptation rather than to protect existing 
positions."2* The creation of an institutionalised system of capitalist 
productive relations within this neoliberal hegemonic bloc facilitated 
the grovrth of American industries which would later become the agents of 
multi-national expansion in the postwar era. While thus creating the 
socio-economic bases for American hegemonic expansionism, the New Deal 
era also provided the ideological rationale for the former. Here Cox 
observes that the "growth indicators of material power during the inter­
war period were insufficient predictors of a new hegemony. It was 
necessary that US leaders should come to see themselves in ideological 
terms as the necessary garauntors of the new world order. The Roosevelt
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era made this transition including both the conscious rejection of the 
old hegemony ... and the gradual incorporation of New Deal principles 
into the ideological basis of the new world order. There followed US 
initiatives to create the institutions to administer that order" 3 0  and 
to universalise the principles underlying the New Deal through the 
creation of those hegemonic structures considered further below.
According to Cox then, the new, postwar world order was "founded by a 
country in which social hegemony had been established ... and in which 
that hegemony was sufficiently expansive to project itself on a world 
scale. " 31 The formation of this new world order presupposed a shift in 
the relative distribution of international power which involved, not 
only the development of a reconstructed American capitalist state, but 
also the corresponding decline in the power of the major states of the 
European international system. Moreover, it was the effects of that 
process of European decline upon American perspectives and policies 
which provided the immediate catalyst for the establishment of the 
postwar American world order. The expansionist impetus implicit in the 
restructured neoliberal capitalist state was formally unleashed as a 
result of America's entry into the struggle against the axis powers and 
through its subsequent role in the rebuilding of Western European states 
and the construction of an anti-Soviet, western strategic alliance.
Thus, the "power configuration of the [new! Pax Americana ... [took] the 
form of alliances (all hanging on US power) created in order to contain 
the Soviet Union. The institutionalisation of this power configuration 
created the conditions for the unfolding of a global economic system
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within which the United States played a very similar rale to that of 
Britain in the nineteenth century system. " 3 3
Vhat, then, were the main agencies through which American hegemonic 
dominance was institutionalised in postwar western international society 
and a new neoliberal system of legitimate world order constituted? Cox 
identifies two major agents in the construction of this world order 
corresponding to the dual processes of the universalisation of American 
hegemonic structures. The first of these, and the most important in 
engendering the cooperative, consensual nature of the new world order, 
was the internationalisation of the forms of the political state. The 
internal changes in the American political state initiated under the New 
Deal administration,in the form of the concentration of strategic 
political and administrative affairs in the political executive, were to 
decisively influence the formation of the American world order.
According to Cox, the internationalisation of the American hegemonic 
state entailed the universalisation of these centralised administrative 
organisations and the consequent transformation of the political 
structures of those states incorporated within this hegemonic order. The 
expansion of these constitutive political forces of American hegemony 
compelled "the emergence in the countries of more advanced capitalist 
development of a neo-liberal form of state attuned to the 
[international] hegemonic order and in the peripheral economies of forms 
of states geared to the linking of these peripheral zones to the world 
economy. " 3 3  It was this reorientation of the internal structures of 
those states incorporated in the new world order which produced an
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international political environment conducive to the effective 
functioning of the global, neo-liberal system of capitalist production
The primary expression of this process is identified by Cox in the 
formation of the transnational institutional structures which have 
served to co-ordinate the economic relations of western states in the 
postwar world. On a formal level these include the international 
institutions of the world economy, most notably the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. In their role as the distributors of 
capital and finance to needy states, these institutions have provided 
the main "mechanisms to supervise the application of the system's norms 
... [by making] financial assistance and other benefits of the system 
conditional upon reasonable evidence of intent to live up to the 
norms.1,34 Such assistance has been made available to those observing 
and implementing the norms of the neoliberal world economy while being 
withheld from those non-compliant states. Through such practices, Cox 
argues, these institutions have provided a combination of rewards and 
penalties aimed at inducing conformity to the free-trade norms of the 
neoliberal system. Connected with, and complementing the operation of 
these formal institutions of hegemonic dominance, is the informal system 
of policy harmonisation developed between fragments of the American 
political state and their counterparts in the political, administrative 
structures of other states.
The main function of this informal network of relations has been to 
facilitate the coordination of an internationalised policy process for 
the regulation of economic relations within the neoliberal world order.
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In this process "the central agencies of these states -prime ministerial 
and presidential offices, foreign offices, treasuries, central banks- 
interact with each other ... through more ad hoc multi-lateral forums 
including economic summit conferences; sometimes in complex bilateral 
relationships. U.S. agencies have a dominant but not necessarily 
determining role; they are determining only when they can rally a broad 
measure of support on specific issues."3S Through this transnational 
network of international connections involving the coordination of 
segments of states in an international process of policy formation, the 
national policies and actions of the states incorporated within the 
world order are adjusted to the logics and requirements of the 
neoliberal free trade system. In this way the "new hegemonic order [is] 
held in place by a configuration of different forms of state whose 
common feature ... [is] the role each ... [plays] in adjusting national 
economic policies to the dynamics of the world economy ... [Moreover the 
ideology informing this order] represents the highest interest of all 
countries as being to facilitate the expansion of the world economy and 
to avoid restrictive national measures of economic policy that would be 
in contradiction in the long run with world-level expansion. " 3 0
By facilitating such consultative processes these formal and informal 
institutions of hegemonic dominance have operated as the central agency 
engendering and reinforcing the general consent of western states to the 
operation of the American hegemonic system. Through these institutional 
channels an integrated structure has been able to develop in which the 
"notion of [international] obligation moved beyond a few basic 
commitments ... to a general recognition that measures of national
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economic policy affect other countries and that such consequences should 
be taken into account before national policies are adopted ... 
Adjustments were thus perceived as responding to the needs of the system 
as a whole and not to the will of the dominant countries. " 3 7  This 
political dimension has been crucial in establishing and reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the neoliberal world order at the international level. The 
multi-lateral framework has formed "a power structure in which the 
components sought to maintain consensus through bargaining and one in 
which the bargaining units were bureaucratic fragments of states. The 
power behind the negotiation [i.e the dominant American state] was 
tacitly taken into account by the parties. " 3 '3 Moreover, Cox notes the 
development around these international institutions of a new 
transnational managerial class sharing its own common culture and 
distinctive interests reinforcing the institutions of American hegemony. 
"The culture specific to this class is generically American and has been 
spread transnationally, ... homogenizing the outlook and behaviour of 
members of the globally dominant group in a way that distinguishes them 
from the differentiated cultures of national elite groups, " 3 3
This brings us to the second agency of American world order formation, 
namely the internationalisation of American economic structures in the 
postwar period through the expansion of the major corporations of the 
American neoliberal economy and their rearticulation as multi-national 
economic actors. Although initially seeking only sources of raw 
materials, Cox notes that these corporations proceeded to develop into 
complex transnational productive organisations producing primarily for 
the world market and using their transnational organisational structure
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to exploit international market variations in order to maximise their 
profits. "Transnational production organisations take advantage of the 
differences between the factor endowments of different countries, 
especially differences in labour costs. They internalise these 
differences, making use of of them to minimise overall production costs.
. . . Accumulation takes place through a hierarchy of modes of social 
relations of production linked with transnational production 
organisations. ',4-°
Despite the decentralised, transnational nature of their operations, 
then, these multi-national corporations have been able to maintain their 
control over the production process and the crucial technologies on 
which its success is based through the practice of direct investment. In 
this respect the "essential feature of [multi-national practices of] 
direct investment is possession, not of money, but of knowledge - in the 
form of technology ... The financial arrangements for direct investment 
may vary greatly, but all are subordinated to this crucial factor of 
technical control ... [Local enterprises] become suppliers of elements 
to a globally organised production process planned and controlled by the 
source of the technology. '"11 At the same time, Cox notes that the 
transnational nature of the operations of these corporations is directly 
dependent upon, and facilitated by, the hegemonic political structures 
noted above which encourage policies conducive to this form of economic 
activity. Aided by the dominance of the neoliberal free trade ideology 
disseminated by these institutions, such multi-national enterprises have 
been able to develop highly flexible productive organisations enabling 
them to minimise their vulnerability to state imposed economic
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restrictions and to maximise their economic returns. The outcome of this 
process, Cox notes, has been the progressive rearticulation of 
international producive relations into a transnational system of 
capitalist production in which a few giant American corporations have 
attained dominant control over the operation of the global economic 
system.
As a result of these different internationalising processes outlined 
above and the consequent universalisation of the forms of the neoliberal 
hegemonic state, a regulated, legitimate system of world order has been 
established within the western international system in the postwar 
period subject to American dominance. According to Cox the influence of 
these American hegemonic forces in the postwar period has "led the 
Western European countries and Japan towards a world economy with free 
access to raw materials, free movement of goods, capital and technology; 
and the elimination of discrimination in economic relations."412 In much 
the same fashion as the expanding English state of the nineteenth 
century, the operation of this open, free trade system has ultimately 
served the interests of the hegemonic elements of the dominant American 
state. But, at the same time, Cox stresses the point that this 
neoliberal world order was essentially a hegemonic one insofar as it 
secured, in varying degrees, the general interest of its constituent 
members. "Pax Americana was hegemonic. It commanded a wide measure of 
consent among states outside the Soviet sphere and was able to provide 
sufficient benefits to associated and subordinate elements to maintain 
their acquiesence."43 In so doing it has also created a condition of 
relatively stable order within the western international system which
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has facilitated an unprecedented level of economic growth and 
prosperity.
However, despite its evident success, Cox observes that the forces 
engendering the breakdown of this hegemonic system of legitimate world 
order have already begun to emerge and are active within the 
contemporary world economy. Before proceeding to my critique of Cox's 
theory I want to consider his account of the factors engendering this 
disintegrative process and his views concerning the possibilities for 
the historical construction of a new, legitimate, emancipated world 
order arising out of that process.
IV Contradictions in the Neoliberal World Order and the Prospects 
for a Non-hegemonic, Emancipated World order
According to Cox the postwar structure of world order outlined above, 
which has regulated the western international system in the postwar 
decades, has, since the early nineteen seventies, been undergoing 
progressive decline as a result of the ongoing uneven development of 
power at the international level. In line with this process the postwar 
system "has become more decentralised and power more diffused, a 
diffusion that is more pronounced in the economic . . . realm. To this 
diffusion of power corresponds a loss of hegemony in the sense of a 
consensual norms based s y s t e m . T h e  first signal of the current 
system's decline was the world economic crisis beginning in the early 
1970s and given its clearest expression in the progressive breakdown of
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the general consensus upon which the operation of the neoliberal 
hegemonic institutional structures were predicated. Viewed in broader 
terms, however, Cox argues that the main source of this crisis of the 
neoliberal world order lies in the inherent contradictions associated 
with the development of the structures of the neoliberal order. For, 
this order, "based ... on a corporate social contract, on state 
administered welfare and on an internationalising of production and ... 
the state, regulated by international finance, created through these 
very practices the conditions of its undoing."AS In briefly analysing 
these major contradictions of the neoliberal order I shall focus on 
Cox's views concerning the possible alternative world orders which may 
emerge from the apparent decline of the present one.
A major factor in the decline of this postwar world order has been the 
fragmentation of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc upon which the former was 
founded, a development arising largely as a response to a growing 
fiscal crisis within the neoliberal state. According to Cox the social 
contract underlying the corporatist structure of the neoliberal state 
contained an inherent inflationary bias. "Vage increases agreed between 
big corporate employers and trade unions were passed on to the public in 
price increases... [At the same time] the state's expenses tended to 
rise both because of welfare state transfer payments and because of the 
higher wages secured by increasing numbers of state employees . . . Cost 
push inflation was supplemented by state deficit financing." The 
subsequent decline in investment and the fiscal crises brought on by 
these inflationary tendencies have seen the progressive disintegration 
of the social contract on which the neoliberal hegemonic bloc was based
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and the development of a legitimation crisis within the state. "As 
growth stagnates, the costs of social policies rise and the tax base on 
which to finance them diminishes. . . There is strong pressure from 
capital to cut back on legitimacy by reducing expenditures and rolling 
back real wages, thereby denouncing the social-democratic compromise 
worked out among capital, labor and governments during the postwar 
economic boom. In this situation, Cox observes, government has been
forced increasingly into an alliance with capital in opposition to 
labour in an attempt to reduce production costs and increase 
productivity in a condition of declining production.
This internal fragmentation of the Ueo-liberal hegemonic bloc has been 
exaccerbated by the destabilising effects of the internationalisation of 
the state and production which have formed the major vehicle of the 
construction of the postwar world order. The major problem arising here 
is the division introduced by this process between the interests of 
national and international segments of capital. According to Cox "the 
economic crisis following 1974 brought out the conflict of interests 
between the nationally and internationally oriented capitalist 
interests."4'3 This conflict has manifested itself at the level of class 
formation and in debates over economic policy and the distribution of 
capital. Thus the internationalisation of production has produced a 
transnational managerial class which is principally oriented to 
producing for the world market. Insofar as it possesses its own 
strategy and institutions of collective action, this class is a class in 
itself and for itself whose internationalising interests are in marked 
contrast with that of the domestic, national element of capitalism. In
262
this respect "national capitalists are to be distinguished from the 
transnational class. The natural reflex of national capital faced with 
the challenge of international production is protectionism. It is torn 
between the desire to use the state as a bulwark of an independent 
national economy and the opportunity of filling niches left by 
international production. * *  Apart from this basic division between 
sectors of the national economy, further division is identified by Cox 
in the ranks of industrial workers within the neoliberal hegemonic blGC. 
Here also the influence of the multinational corporation has introduced 
tensions amongst industrial workers within the state employed by 
national and international capital respectively.
This postwar internationalisation of American forms of production has 
therefore produced contradictory tendencies within the hegemonic bloc of 
the American state and its counterpart states which represent the 
practical expression of a declining neoliberal world order in the last 
two decades. Moreover, the problems to which the contradictions outlined 
here have given rise within the neoliberal world order are epitomised in 
the general decline in the centralised management of the world economy 
as the unified hegemonic bloc on which it is based gradually 
disintegrates. Here Cox points to the progressive reduction of the 
efficacy of the legitimating institutions coordinating the American 
world order which we examined above. Particularly important in this 
change has been the decline in the regulative role of the International 
Monetary Fund and the increasingly dominant role of private banks in 
lending money to, among others, third world debtor states, (a practice 
creating the conditions for the emergence of the debt crisis of the
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1980s). "The relative enlargement of the private, nonstate character of 
international financial management during the 1970s may be seen as an 
effect of weakening hegemony. Private international credit expanded for 
lack of any agreement on how the official intergovernmental structures 
in the system could be reformed"50 in light of the erosion of the 
regulative power of the American hegemonic institutions noted above.
Corresponding to this process has been the breakdown of the neoliberal 
free trade consensus which supported the operation of hegemonic 
institutions like the GATT system and the corresponding growth of 
neomercantilist tendencies among the states incorporated within the 
neoliberal world order. For Cox these mercantilist tendencies, reflected 
in the increasing prevalence of restrictive, partial trade practices and 
the negotiation of special bi-lateral economic agreements between 
states, are themselves a reflection of a more general growth in economic 
competition between the major western national economies consequent upon 
the recovery of those national economies from the effects of the war.
The consequent diffusion of economic power and the increasingly 
competitive nature of the world political economy "puts pressure on 
states to adopt an offensive strategy in world markets. Through such 
offensive strategies states would lead and assist national industries to 
conquer market positions. At the same time internal pressures come from 
interests disfavored by competition to adopt a defensive strategy of 
protection and withdrawal from world competition."51
These various contradictions emerging within the world economy represent 
the unravelling of the legitimate, consensual system of world order
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constructed by the American state in the initial postwar period. 
According to Cox the current historical phase is one characterised by a 
"weakening of global hegemony tending towards a permissive world order 
in which it would be difficult for a dominant power or group of dominant 
powers to enforce conformity to its norms, 1,52 But, while posing major 
problems for the operation of the existing neoliberal world order, Cox 
discerns in this most recent phase of uneven international development 
the possibility for the historical construction of a more emancipated, 
solidary type of world order - one ultimately based upon the transformed 
capitalist productive relations engendered by the transnational 
character of the current economic world order. Specifically, the 
potential implicit in this internationalised system of production raises 
the possibility for the movement beyond the present necessitous system 
of relations of social production where human productive activity is 
limited to the production of material or physical needs, to a world 
order incorporating emancipatory relations of social production. Hence 
Cox's observation that "through all history the task of physical 
reproduction - the making of what is necessary for biological survival 
and for the nourishment of political power - has absorbed the greater 
part of human effort. Now an era dawns when most of this effort can be 
done by machines with relatively little human effort. A vast reserve of 
potential human effort thereby becomes available that could be devoted 
to social reproduction and development - the building and running of 
institutions and patterning of social relations" 3 3  in accordance with an 
extended principle of legitimacy which would free the species from the 
dictates of 'physical reproduction' and allow the realisation of higher, 
solidary forms of social community.
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Elaborating upon this emancipatry interest, Cox seeks to ascertain the 
prospects for the future emergence of a counter-hegemonic force capable 
of realising the emancipatory potentials implicit in the productive 
structures of the contemporary, destabilised world order. His basic 
assumption here is that the "social forces generated by [these! changing 
production processes are the starting point for thinking about passible 
futures. These forces may combine in different configurations. "s‘i 
Working on this assumption Cox advances certain hypothetical 
propositions as to the likely character of a future world order 
predicated upon different interpretations of the outcome of the 
contradictory forces affecting the current world order. Three potential 
configurations are identified suggesting three different types of future 
world order. These include a "reconstruction of hegemony [based on the 
continuing internationalisation of production! with a broadening of 
political management [of the world economy], ... increased fragmentation 
of the world economy around big-power centred economic spheres [i.e. the 
triumph of the mercantilist response to the internationalisation of 
production!; and [thirdly! the possible assertion of a Third World 
counterhegemony [based on the unification of potential revolutionary 
forces generated by the internationalisation of production] with the 
concerted demand for the New International Economic Order as a 
forerunner."GS
Of these possibilities it is in the latter development that Cox discerns 
the best prospects for the development of a new, emancipated, legitimate
world order. Thus he argues that "the prolonged crisis m  the world 
economy ... is propitious for some developments which could lead to
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counter-hegemonic challenge. In the core countries those policies which 
cut into transfer payments ... and generate high unemployment open the 
prospects of a broad alliance of the disadvantaged against the sectors 
of capital and labour which find common ground in the monopoly-liberal 
world order ... In peripheral countries, some states are vulnerable to 
revolutionary action, as events from Iran to Central America suggest. " 3 3  
However, in noting these different sources of potential counter hegemony 
Cox also acknowledges that "an effective political organisation ... 
would be required in order to rally the new working classes generated by 
international production and [to! build a bridge to peasants and urban 
marginals. " 3 7  The formation of such an organisation would require a 
long historical process involving the building of new national hegemonic 
blocs, based around these disadvantaged groups, as the foundation for 
the historical formation of international structures of legitimate world 
order incorporating productive relations of emancipatory practice. 
Moreover, the obstacles to the emergence of such a counter-hegemonic 
structure are, he acknowledges, extremely formidable, thus suggesting 
only very limited prospects for the emergence of a more emancipated 
world order in the foreseeable future.
V A Critique of Cox's Paradigm of World Order Formation
Cox's Critical theory of world order formation raises considerations of 
foremost importance for the larger concerns of this thesis. As I shall 
argue in the concluding section, this critical, historical paradigm 
provides some of the basic categories upon which a more sophisticated,
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synthetic theory of the formation of international order may be 
elaborated - a theory which overcomes some of the major substantive and 
methodological shortcomings of the Ueo-Realist and Rationalist 
perspectives outlined earlier. Particularly significant in this respect 
is its acknowledgement of the need for an adequate theory of 
international order formation to provide a holistic, historical account 
of legitimate order formation within modern international society which 
encompasses the major, dynamic forces accounting for the historical 
reproduction of these orders. At the same time, Cox's critical 
perspective is important for the way it takes us beyond the limited 
preoccupation of traditional theory with the question of order formation 
defined as the minimal concern with how to prevent war and maintain 
peace between nations existing in a recurring state of anarchy.
Eschewing the restricted, problem-solving perspective informing this 
traditional approach, the essential concern of theory is here 
rearticulated in broader, expanded terms as the analysis of the 
possibilities presented by the transformative processes of uneven 
international development for the practical advancement of human 
emancipation conceived as the historical articulation of the human 
potential for conscious self determination.
Thus we have noted the preoccupation of this holistic, critical 
perspective with those basic contradictions engendered within specific 
structures of world order by the uneven development of power within 
modern international society and the dynamic logics of world order 
transformation associated with the former. It is these developmental 
logics which Cox identifies as opening up the possibility for the
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historical transition of modern international society from those more 
limited historical world orders based on material productive relations 
of social necessity to a potential, future world order predicated upon 
principles of legitimacy facilitating emancipatory relations of social 
production. In this way Cox's Critical theory can be seen to take up the 
basic theme of legitimate international order formation raised by the 
Rationalist perspective examined in Part Two. But, in doing so, Cox's 
work provides an understanding of the deeper sources and wider, 
normative implications of this process insofar as it locates the 
formation of modern, legitimate international orders within the context 
of the historically evolving domestic power structures which underpin 
them.
In terms of this more sophisticated theoretical understanding then, it 
is the particular virtue of this critical paradigm that it avoids the 
ahistorical tendencies associated with' the reified conceptions of modern 
international relations which characterise, in different forms, both the 
Reo-Realist and Rationalist perspectives. In opposition to these latter 
approaches which tend to present the international system as a sphere of 
political relations conducted between discrete, unitary sovereign 
states, Cox's approach seeks to provide an understanding of the 
historically constituted nature of such states and of those order 
constitutive structures engendered by the former within modern 
international society conceived as the historical expression of more 
basic processes of human self determination. In doing so he highlights 
the complex nature of the state, as the primary unit of modern 
international society, as an historically evolving, composite construct
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whose domestic stability and international power is largely predicated 
upon the formation of coherent hegemonic blocs between its mere powerful 
political and economic groups.
In this context we have seen how Cox's theory illuminates the central 
link between the historical formation of such internally coherent 
hegemonic state structures within the most powerful states of any given 
period and the role of the composite elements of these hegemonic blocs 
in the constitution of historical structures underpinning particular 
hegemonic systems of world order. In doing so Cox's approach indicates 
some of the complex historical logics (economic, political cultural) 
involved in the historical reproduction of legitimate systems of order 
at the international level and, in particular, the importance of 
normative structures in the formation and successful reproduction of 
such legitimate orders. It is his critical, reflective account of this 
complex historical process of the constitution and transformation of 
legitimate systems of international order in response to the rise and 
expansion of hegemonic state structures which potentially forms the most 
valuable contribution of Cox's theoretical paradigm to the synthetic 
conception of international order formation elaborated in Part Four. As 
I seek to show there, the categories of this critical model offer the 
potential bases for the development of a more sophisticated, 
comprehensive Critical theory of the historical logics of order 
formation within modern international society.
However, while arguing the more sophisticated character of this critical 
theoretical paradigm^it is important to note some major shortcomings of
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the account of international order formation resulting from Cox's 
practical application of the theoretical categories of this critical 
model. These limitations are all the more important in that they impinge 
directly upon the credibility of this perspective's claims to provide a 
superior explanation of the process of modern international order 
formation insofar as it offers a holistic analysis of the major order 
constitutive forces shaping that process. For, despite his ambitious 
attempts to account for the major, relatively_autonomous forces 
influencing the development of order between modern states, we shall see 
that Cox's theory either neglects, or underplays some crucial aspects of 
this process which need to be addressed by a Critical theory concerned 
to establish the prospects for, and constraints upon, the extension of 
human emancipation within modern international society. Let us consider 
this problem more closely.
As we have seen above, in elaborating his historical account of world 
order formation Cox gives particular emphasis to the uneven development 
of power between states as it is manifested in the rise and fall of 
hegemonic, capitalist systems. Vhile acknowledging the role of the 
political dimension of state power in the formation and expansion of 
such hegemonic systems, the focus of Cox's analysis rests upon social 
production and the dynamic tendencies of internal, hegemonic structures 
of capitalist productive systems as the pivotal factor providing the 
universalising impetus underlying specific historical phases of world 
order formation. Moreover, the central function of the hegemonic 
political and economic institutions produced by this universalising 
impetus is to facilitate a legitimate system of consensual cooperation
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amongst the hegemonic fragments of states allowing the unrestricted 
operation of such universalised capitalist productive structures. This 
is not to suggest that Cox ignores the role of other historical forces 
at the level of the political state and international relations and 
their influence on the historical formation of world orders. However, in 
Cox's own analysis of this historical process these latter dimensions 
are ultimately subordinated to his central concern with the formation of 
hegemonic capitalist states and the logics of order formation associated 
with their location within an international capitalist economy. 
Consequently, there is little attempt made to explain the independent 
logics of international order formation engendered within these other 
spheres and their relationship with the order-.constitutive processes 
outlined by Cox.
The central problem which arises far Cox's holistic perspective here 
then, is that this preoccupation with the uneven development of the 
socio-economic power of states and the capitalist dynamics of hegemonic 
order formation leads him to underplay the significance of the 
developmental processes arising from the geo-political location of 
modern states - their historical existence within an evolving 
international society distinguished by relations of political 'anarchy' 
or government less, as well as economic forms of activity. As one 
commentator addressing himself to this problem has observed, "thus far 
the debate about hegemony ... from more critical theorists in the neo- 
Gramscian mould has focussed upon the production and distribution of 
power in the international political economy. Of major concern has been 
the role of transnational capital and international regimes. To the
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extent that questions of military strategy and war have been treated ... 
it has been the nea-Gramscians who appear to have abdicated the issue to 
the traditionalists. " 513 Here we confront again a central theme raised 
in my earlier critical account of Valtz's Neo-Realist conception of 
international order formation. This concerns the uneven historical 
development and distribution of the forms of strategic-military power 
among modern states and the problems involved in the historical 
reproduction of political order between such states given their ever 
present concern with ensuring their strategic security within an 
'anarchical' international, political society. Of particular note here 
are the processes by which modern states have attempted to overcome the 
strategic dilemmas presented by their common existence within an 
anarchical political system characterised by the unequal distribution of 
strategic capabilities between states through the historical formation 
of balances of power and hegemonic orders of strategic cooperation.
Ve can illustrate the problems to which this underestimation of the 
importance of the strategic-political dimension gives rise for Cox's 
holistic theory of international order formation by examining some of 
the deficiencies associated with his account of the different modern 
phases of hegemonic world order formation. One major problem which 
arises in this context is Cox's failure to account for the significant 
differences in the nature and extent of these different historical 
examples of hegemonic world order, most notably between the Pax 
Britannica and the Pax Americana. In particular, he fails to adequately 
explain the fact that the British state of the nineteenth century 
clearly lacked the unquestioned strategic and political superiority and
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consequent influence over western international society which the 
American state has been able to exercise in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Thus, as Kennedy notes, Britain's gross national 
product, unlike that of the United States in the period immediately 
after the Second World War, was never the largest in the world in the 
decades after eighteen fifteen. Moreover, the industrial power of 
Britain during this period was "not organised ... to give the state 
swift access to military hardware and manpower .. . The size of the 
British economy in the world was not reflected in the country's fighting 
Dower. " 6 3  This appears to have been a consequence of both limited 
material capabilities and the ideological proclivities of the liberal, 
British hegemonic bloc. "Not only did the mid-Victorians show ever less 
enthusiasm for military interventions in Europe ... but they reasoned 
that the equilibrium between the continental great powers . . . made any 
full-scale commitment on Britain's part unecessary."eo
According to this argument then, Britain possessed neither the material 
capabilities or the ideological commitment required to dominate European 
international society in the period after eighteen fifteen. The British 
phase of hegemonic dominance was severly limited, true hegemony being 
restricted to the extra-European territories of the imperial economic 
system. Considered at the geo-political level of European international 
politics Britain represented only one of a number of significant powers 
of relatively commensurable strategic capabilities whose relative 
equality gave rise to a system of strategic balancing as the source of 
order within European international society. 6'1 Moreover, its limited 
influence, as merely one among many great powers within the European
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international system, meant that the continental European states were 
left largely free to develop along their own independent paths during 
the nineteenth century rather than being limited to the adoption of the 
neoliberal economic and political model provided by the British state.52
British extra-European hegemony in the nineteenth century would appear 
to have operated then, in tandem with, rather than as the regulator of, 
the European political power balance. This contrasts markedly with the 
situation in the hegemonic system of the post World War two era. Thus, 
as Gilpin points out, "in terms of absolute power the United States in 
1945 greatly surpassed the rest of the world. In addition to her vast 
industrial capacity, the US virtually monopolised or controlled the ... 
sources of power in the modern world. . . She alone had the atomic bomb 
. .. American factories produced over 50 percent of the world's output 
and America held approximately 50 percent of the world's monetary 
reserves."53 It was this enormous superiority in all the major forms of 
state power which has enabled the United States to impose its will upon 
the western political system and to exercise an undisputed leadership 
over western international society for most of the second half of the 
twentieth century.
The important point to emphasise here is that, when the geo-political 
dimension of international behaviour and uneven international 
development is taken into account, the ability of any major state to 
attain undisputed hegemonic dominance over international society appears 
to be essentially limited and the historical exception. It was only the 
enormous preponderance of the United States resulting from its greatly
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superior strategic and economic capabilities at the end of World War Two 
which enabled it to attain undisputed dominance over both the economic 
and political dimensions of western international society. By contrast, 
the case of Britain and its relationship with the continental powers in 
the nineteenth century is arguably more indicative of the general 
historical pattern of western international relations - namely, a 
political condition in which a number of great powers possess relatively 
commensurable power and between whom legitimate order has been 
engendered through the ongoing historical construction of strategic 
balances of power. It is only in infrequent phases of modern 
international history that the uneven development of power between 
states has given rise to a sovereign state whose extreme preponderance 
in both economic and strategic-political capabilities has enabled it to 
attain, for limited periods of time, a preponderant position over the 
other states of the system. Host commonly, such historical attempts by 
states to attain hegemonic dominance have been countered by the 
concerted strategic-military power of those other great powers within 
the international system whose interests were threatened by the rise of 
a single preponderant power. Within the broader context of the evolution 
of the international political system then, the process of legitimate 
order formation is more accurately seen in terms of an historical 
oscillation between conditions of relative commensurability in the 
capacities of the great powers reflected in the operation of balances of 
power between preponderant states, and alternative phases where 
individual states, through the attainment of superior power, have 
initiated more or less successful attempts to secure hegemonic dominance
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over the society of states in response to the uneven historical 
development of power therein.
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PART THREE CONCLUSION
The preceding critique of Cox's account of the modern process of world 
order formation is important for the way it highlights certain major 
deficiencies of the latter as an explanation of modern international 
order formation, especially as expressed in his neglect of the 
historical logics associated with the uneven development of the 
strategic-political power of states as a major influence upon this 
process. If its claim to provide a holistic account of the modern 
process of international order formation and of the major possibilities 
for the extension of human emancipation implicit in that process is to 
be realised, Cox's Critical theory clearly needs to be broadened and his 
account of the historical reproduction of hegemonic world orders 
relocated as part of these wider practices associated with the uneven 
development of power between modern states. In particular, in terms of 
this reformulated critical perspective much greater attention needs to 
be given to the manner in which the expansionist tendencies of powerful 
states and their capacity to establish and reproduce structures of 
dominant influence at the international level have been historically 
constrained by the effects of the combination of the strategic-military 
forces of other major states of this international society.
Can the issues raised by our preceding critique be encompassed within 
the Critical paradigm of international order formation elaborated by 
Cox, or do they raise considerations which are ultimately too difficult
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for a theory oriented by a cognitive interest in human emancipation? It 
is my contention that they can be so incorporated within this Critical 
perspective and, in concluding this section of the thesis, I want to 
indicate the way in which the former can be extended to facilitate this. 
Here we need to focus on the potentials implicit in Cox's neo-Gramscian 
conception of the relationship between the construction of those 
hegemonic blocs operating within sovereign states, and the reproduction 
of legitimate order between those states. It was argued in chapter three 
that a major virtue of Cox's Gramscian model of hegemonic order 
formation is that it admits an account of the relatively autonomous role 
of the political state in the historical construction and dialectical 
transformation of structures of order at the international level.
Despite this fact, however, we have seen that Cox's application of the 
theoretical categories of this hegemonic model offers little explanation 
of the historical development of those major forms of strategic-military 
and political power exercised by the state as crucial forces shaping 
order formation within international society. Neverthless, it is 
arguable that Cox's conception of the relatively autonomous role of the 
political state within the broader process of hegemonic state formation 
contains the resources to accommodate such an explanation. In indicating 
how this is possible I wil draw upon certain ideas presented in the work 
of the neo-Marxist historian, Theda Skocpol.
In her major work, States and Social Revolutions.1 Skocpol's primary 
concern is to provide an extended account of the complex forces 
engendering the major political revolutions of modern European history. 
What is of particular interest for us is the way Skocpol's account of
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the causes of these revolutions and the associated breakdown of 
legitimate state structures and the formation of new political orders in 
their place leads her to emphasise the importance of the geo-political 
location of the state and its impact upon the historical process of 
hegemonic bloc formation. Thus, according to Skocpol, the nature of the 
internal process of hegemonic bloc formation is a highly complex one 
which is greatly influenced by the relatively autonomous organisational 
structures and practices of the political state. Within the context of 
the larger, historically evolving hegemonic bloc shaping the state's 
overall power, the political institutions of executive authority are 
conditioned, but not rigidly limited by, their dependence upon the 
logics and interests of socio-economic forces. This relatively- 
autonomous determining role of the political fragment of the sovereign 
state derives primarily from its strategic location at the intersection 
of a number of power processes which together explain the overall power 
of the state. More particularly, in critiscising the limitations of 
Marxist economistic accounts of the nature of the state, Skocpol 
emphasises that "we should not forget that states also exist in 
determinant geopolitical environments, in interaction with other ... 
states. An existing economy and class structure condition and influence 
a ... [given state's character and its capacity to act internally and 
externally.] But so too do geopolitical environments create tasks and 
opportunities for states and place limits on their capacities to cope 
with either external or internal tasks or crises."12
According to Skocpol then, the political state's "involvement in an 
international network of states is a basis for potential autonomy of
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action over and against groups and economic arrangements within its 
jurisdiction. " 3 In terms of this dimension of its practice the political 
executive of the state must develop and reproduce "a set of 
administrative, policing and military organisations"4- which contribute 
to the preservation of its territorial integrity through the practical 
accumulation and organisation of forms of coercive power enabling the 
defence of its borders and the development of diplomatic practices 
facilitating political relations with its sovereign counterparts. In 
accordance with this extended understanding then, Skocpol concludes that 
the political state is "fundamentally Janus-faced with an intrinsically 
dual anchorage in class divided socio-economic structures and an 
international system of states. If our aim is to understand the 
breakdown and building up of state organisations ... we must focus on 
the points of intersection between international conditions and 
pressures ... and class structured economies and organised political 
interests."s
This more complex conception of the nature of hegemonic state formation 
provides some crucial insights for our concern with reconstructing Cox's 
critical model of international order formation to provide a holistic 
understanding of international order formation of the sort envisaged by 
him. Arguably Skocpol's account of the relatively-autonomous role of the 
political state as the mediator between domestic hegemonic bloc 
formation and the pressures associated with its location within the 
international system offers the means whereby the deficiencies in Cox's 
own elaboration of this Critical paradigm may be remedied. By allowing 
the extension of the categories of the latter to encompass the
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strategic-political relations between states, this extended Critical 
perspective suggests the way to the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the historical processes involved in the ongoing 
construction of structures of legitimate order within modern 
international society. By invoking this more complex conception of 
hegemonic state formation the possibility arises of accounting for the 
different historical forces and inter-connecting logics of uneven 
development engendering the reproduction of legitimate order between 
states in modern history understood, in broadest terms, as the practical 
expression of processes of conscious human development.
In proceeding, in the concluding section of this thesis, to present the 
broad outlines of a synthetic theoretical account of the historical 
process of order formation within modern western international society, I 
shall draw directly upon this extended Critical perspective sketched 
above. In doing so it will be my concern to indicate how this synthetic 
perspective might effectively incorporate the major points of value 
arising from the various theoretical paradigms examined in the body of 
this thesis. Insofar as it is able to do this the general theory 
proposed here may be expected to provide a more effective understanding 
of this historical process of legitimate order formation and its 
implications for the Critical, reflective interest in the practical 
possibilities for the extension of human emancipation within this 
modern, anarchical international society.
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PART FOUR
Uneven Development and The Logics of Legitimate Order Formation 
within Modern Western International Society: Towards a Critical, 
Emancipatory Perspective
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages we have seen how the different Neo-Realist, 
Rationalist and Critical theoretical perspectives incorporate very 
different paradigmatic understandings of the nature of modern 
international relations. Moreover, we have seen how these understandings 
are shaped by very different types of theory-orienting interests, 
interests which give rise to qualitatively different interpretations of 
the basic character of the process of international order formation 
emerging in response to the uneven development of power within this 
modern international sphere. At the same time, I have sought to show how 
the particular approaches adopted by the different theories considered 
above manifest inherent tensions and contradictions whose resolution 
presumes the introduction of alternative theoretical categories 
presupposing a qualitatively different understanding of this modern 
process of international order formation. Proceeding in this manner we 
have undertaken a complex theoretical progression from the more limited 
explanatory categories of Neo-Realist theory to the increasingly more 
sophisticated conceptions of the nature of international order formation 
elaborated in the Rationalist and Critical approaches examined in 
sections two and three.
In terms of this theoretical progression presented in the preceding 
chapters, we have identified two broad theoretical paradigms which 
involve very different conceptualisations of the nature of the 
international sphere and the process of order formation occurring within
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it, namely the naturalistic and the societal paradigms. Thus in section 
one we saw how the theories of Valtz and Gilpin were guided by a 
technical interest in international order formation occurring within a 
quasi-natural condition of anarchical power relations. Furthermore, in 
delineating this model of international relations the central role of 
the theorist was seen as that of ascertaining the nature of those 
regulative, technical mechanisms and practices whereby order is most 
effectively reproduced within this quasi-natural anarchical sphere. A.t 
the same time, we noted how these theories incorporate assumptions which 
are ultimately incapable of being adequately accomodated within their 
own naturalistic paradigm. Rather, the full elaboration of the 
assumptions implicit in the respective theories of Valtz and Gilpin was 
seen to require the adoption of the superior categories of a different 
theoretical paradigm involving a distinctive, societal understanding of 
the condition of international anarchy and of the nature of the 
historical processes producing order within that anarchical condition.
In terms of this societal paradigm, the central focus of theoretical 
analysis is radically redefined, being understood, not in terms of the 
problems involved in producing the most efficient form of technical 
control over quasi-natural power relations among states, but, rather, as 
the interest in the historical dimensions of the historical construction 
of systems of legitimate order within an historically evolving society 
of sovereign communities.
Examining this societal conception as it is presented first in the work 
of Rationalist theorists, we noted the way the latter illuminate the 
socio-cultural dimensions of the process of legitimate order formation
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between states within modern international society. However, we also 
encountered some important shortcomings of the methodological and 
substantive dimensions of the Rationalist conception of this societal 
process of legitimate order formation which, it was argued, were 
ultimately attributable to the limited, practical interest orienting 
this theoretical perspective. As we saw in Part Two, at the 
methodological level this practical interest entails a view of the 
possibility of the theorist assuming a neutral position in relation to 
the historical reality he seeks to explain. In this context, it was 
indicated how the practical interest informing Rationalist theory 
engenders a one-sided, critically detached explanation of the 
substantive nature of the order constitutive process within 
international society in which the cultural structures engendering 
legitimate societal order between sovereign states are abstracted from 
other important dimensions of international order formation.
Consequently, it was argued that the Rationalist approach is unable to 
provide a systematic account of the relationship between the development 
of these broad normative structures of international society at 
different stages of modern history and the more specific forms of 
international domination engendered by major powers as the basis of the 
reproduction of legitimate, stable systems of order within this 
historically evolving international society.
Developing on this theme in Part Three I identified a higher expression 
of the societal paradigm of international order formation in Cox's 
critical theory of world order formation. In contrast with both the Neo- 
Realist and Rationalist approaches, Cox's Critical perspective
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emphasises the historically located nature of the theorist's activity 
in interpreting the nature of the modern process of international order 
formation as the reflective articulation of complex historical practices 
of conscious human creative action. Moreover, in accordance with this 
more sophisticated notion of the critical engagement of the theorist 
with the historical subject under consideration, the concern of this 
Critical theory was identified as the development of a reflective 
understanding of the nature of international order formation as an 
historically contingent, constantly evolving expression of the 
historical process of human self determination. Moreover, in contrast 
with the one dimensional approach evident in Rationalist thought, Cox's 
Critical theory is concerned to explain the reproduction of order 
between modern states from a holistic historical perspective. As we 
have seen, for Cox the adoption of this integral, holistic, historical 
perspective is essential to the development of a proper understanding of 
the dynamic historical nature of legitimate order formation between 
modern states and the possibilities raised by the latter for the 
transcendence of those historical relations of social necessity 
operating between states and the further extension of human self 
determination within modern international society.
In articulating this reflective, critical societal paradigm, I have 
argued, Cox's theoretical perspective provides a more sophisticated 
understanding of the nature and implications of the modern process of 
international order formation as one entailing, not merely the extension 
of technical control over natural power processes, nor solely the 
establishment of systems of consensus and social cooperation between the
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sovereign members of international society, but as a complex process 
involving the qualitative historical transformation of the nature of 
modern international society. At the same time, we noted some basic 
deficiencies with Cox's substantive application of this critical model 
of international order formation prejudicing its claim to provide a 
holistic account of the major forces contributing to the process of 
legitimate order formation and their implications for the historical 
extension of human emancipation. In doing so I indicated a way in which 
Cox's critical paradigm might be further elaborated in order to 
incorporate an account of these forces unsatisfactorily treated of in 
his own work. Thus it was suggested in the conclusion to Section Three 
that, by incorporating an account of those geo-politcal and strategic 
dimensions of international relations highlighted by the Rationalist and 
Neo-Realist theories considered in Parts One and Two, this extended 
critical perspective potentially provides the most sophisticated 
interpretative framework from which to grasp the complex nature and 
significance of the process of order formation within modern western 
international society.
It is to the elaboration of this tentative, synthetic critical account 
of modern international order formation that I now turn. Drawing on the 
insights offered by the different perspectives examined above, the 
synthetic theory outlined here aims to indicate the broad dimensions of 
a more comprehensive understanding of the reproduction of legitimate 
order within modern western international society opened up by the 
reflective, emancipatory theoretical perspective underlying Cox's work - 
a theory informed by a basic interest in the way the historical
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transformation of modern structures of legitimate international order 
has facilitated the progressive extension of human self determination 
within that society.
II
In elaborating this reformulated critical perspective I shall begin by 
reintroducing a basic distinction between different types of 
international civilisation and the nature of order formation 
characterising them noted in our analysis of the work of Hedley Bull in 
chapter three. As we saw in Section Two, it is Bull's contention that 
international civilisations can be distinguished historically in terms 
of the degree of cultural integratedness, or what I shall call here the 
level of sociability, characterising the relations between their 
constituent political entities. In elaborating this point Bull 
differentiates directly between the type of interstate relations 
existing within international SYSTEMS and international SOCIETIES 
respectively. In the case of international systems, characterised by a 
low level of sociability and a high degree of 'systemic' behaviour, the 
interaction between constituent members is sufficient to make the 
actions of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other 
"without them being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving 
themselves bound by a common set of rules or cooperating in the working 
of common institutions. " 1 The qualitative nature of states' 
interrelations is here very low even though contact may be frequent.
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By comparison, the political communities incorporated within an 
international society, in which the element of sociability is more 
predominant, exhibit a considerable degree of cultural commonality. Here 
states' relations are predicated upon shared traditions and cultural 
preconceptions deriving from a common cultural heritage. This culturally 
grounded nature of the relations between its constitutive members 
ensures that the process of order formation within an international 
society assumes a very different character to the alternative, systemic 
type mentioned above. More specifically, in pursuing their particular 
interests within the international sphere the actions and claims of 
states composing an international society are always articulated in 
terms of shared, historically preconstituted cultural categories and 
preconceptions which translate, in practical, historical terms into 
formal institutional structures of social interaction. By virtue of the 
more socially intensive character of their relations based on this high 
degree of cultural commonality then, the interactions of these political 
communities are inevitably mediated through common institutional forms 
which represent the practical articulation of their shared cultural 
heritage and which confer a degree of legitimacy upon the relations 
between them.
Hence, in referring to the particular historical example of the Greek 
city-states, Bull notes the important role of the common Hellenic 
cultural heritage of antique Greek civilisation associated with the 
dominant political organisation of the Polis as a major factor shaping 
the conduct of relations between the Greek city-states. This common 
cultural heritage, expressed in a number of central cultural
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institutions based around the common political form of the polis, 
operated to mediate the relations between Greek city-states, in the 
process differentiating this international society from other 
civilisations with which it came into contact. In this respect, as Bull 
notes, "Persia was perceived by the Greeks as a barbarian power ... 
[because! it did not share the common values of the Greeks, expressed in 
the Greek language, the Pan-Hellenic games or consultation of the 
Delphic oracle; it was not subject to the rules which required Greek 
city-states to limit their conflicts with one another; and it was not a 
participant in the amphictyonae in which institutional cooperation among 
the Greek states took place, or in the diplomatic institutions of the 
proxenoi.',;2 Stable relations among the Greek city-states depended, to a 
significant degree then, upon the common recognition and observance of 
these social rules and regulations and participation in the common 
social institutions which provided a degree of unity and legitimacy in 
their mutual relations which was absent from their interactions with 
other, non-Hellenic communities. The reproduction of these socio­
cultural institutions was a central factor in the ongoing reproduction 
of the Greek society of states itself.
It is this notion of relative degrees of international sociability which 
forms the central thematic of the extended critical theory of modern 
international order formation broadly outlined here. More particularly, 
it is contended here that modern western international society can be 
distinguished from other international civilisations as one manifesting 
a relatively high degree of sociability between its constitutive 
political entities. Furthermore, it will be my concern to argue that it
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is passible to discern a historical evolution in the general form of 
international sociability characterising the relations of this 
international society - an historical evolution which represents the 
central expression of that emancipatory process of human self 
determination within modern western international society which 
constitutes the primary orienting interest of our extended critical 
theory. 3 Moreover, as I shall argue in more detail below, the central 
medium through which this evolutionary process has occured has been via 
the ongoing construction and transformation of structures of legitimate 
international order in response to the effects of the uneven development 
of power between sovereign states. In accordance with this general theme 
the central concern of our reformulated critical account of 
international order formation may be defined as that of articulating the 
broad dimensions of this historical evolution in the form of sociability 
characterising interstate relations within modern western international 
society to qualitatively higher levels.
The relatively highly developed character of its societal relations 
noted here derives, at the most basic level, from the historical fact of 
the origins of modern western international society within the cultural 
matrix of the preceding civilisational formation of medieval Europe. As 
Bull notes, the central political outcome of the historical breakdown of 
this feudal, Christian civilisation was the gradual emergence of a new 
society of formally autonomous political communities within western 
Europe in place of the indeterminate, interconnecting political 
communities of the preceding feudal order. The historical establishment 
of this new society of states was not a sudden development but the
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outcome of a long and. complex historical process engendered by a 
diversity of historical forces."1 However, the most important point for 
our concerns is that, as a result of these historical processes, there 
emerged in Western Europe after the fifteenth century a society of 
states which, by virtue of the influence of a common cultural heritage, 
incorporated a distinctive type of political authority farming the basis 
of social interaction between its constituent members. The central 
characteristic distinguishing this newly emergent international society 
was the new exclusive form of sovereign authority upon which it was 
predicated, a form of sovereignty very different from the feudal type 
preceding it. Thus, as Ruggie notes, the preceding medieval civilisation 
was based around a heteronomous, diffuse form of political authority 
involving crosscutting, transcommunal linkages between municipal 
political units which were formally integrated through the tenuous 
institutional forms and practices of the Roman Catholic church and the 
political structures of the Holy Roman Empire.
By contrast with this porous, loosely differentiated form of sovereign 
identity circumscribing the relations of feudal political communities5• 
the newly emergent European international society was predicated upon 
the establishment of political communities advancing exclusive claims to 
territorial authority, claims expressed in the assertion of sovereign 
legal and political autonomy against the universal authority of the 
Roman Catholic church as well as the fragmentary claims of internal 
social groups. Moreover, the emergence of this new, exclusive form of 
political sovereignty was, from the outset, associated with the 
development of domestic hegemonic blocs which sought to establish
295
integrated, unified, communities within specific territorial spheres.e 
It is these historically formed, legally and territorially distinct 
sovereign communities asserting political claims to sovereign autonomy 
which represented the constitutive entities of the new societal system 
of relations forming the basis of an emerging modern western 
international society. As a result of their common acceptance and 
cultivation of the legal-political forms of the new type of sovereign 
political authority there arose among these communities a formal, mutual 
acknowledgment of each other’s legally autonomous sovereign status. It 
was this historically evolved practice of their common constitutive 
recognition as formally sovereign, independent states which facilitated 
the establishment of a set of social institutions of international co­
operation between them.
In effect then, the new form of sovereign authority established by these 
embryonic states provided the historical conditions for the development 
of a new type of international sociability between them. For, what this 
mutual form of sovereign authority engendered was a highly distinctive 
type of normative community involving a sophisticated system of formal 
political obligations attaching to states as sovereign members of this 
broader international community. As a consequence of the emergence of 
this new form of sovereign authority and the societal practice of common 
constitutive recognition associated with it the relations between the 
sovereign political communities co-existing within this modern 
international society have, from the beginning, assumed a distinctive 
character. For they have been mediated through distinctive socio­
cultural structures, including, most notably, an evolving body of
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international law and the associated tradition of diplomatic relations 
and the regulative practices involved in the reproduction of the balance 
of power. Thus, as one commentator on this historical process has noted, 
the "contraction of the Feudal pyramid Cof political authority] into the 
new centralised monarchies of Renaissance Europe produced for the first 
time a formalised system of inter-state pressure and exchange with the 
establishment of the novel institutions of reciprocal fixed embassies 
abroad, permanent chancelleries for foreign relations and secret 
diplomatic communications ... shielded by the new concept of extra­
territoriality. " 7 Such institutional practices gave practical expression 
to the new mode of international sociability predicated upon the 
distinctive, morally extensive principle of sovereign authority defining 
these emergent states. At the same time, however, this new form of 
sovereign authority also produced a highly decentralised structure of 
political power within this new international society - an anarchical 
political structure which has posed the problem of the historical 
reproduction of orderly societal relations between modern states in a 
highly distinctive form.
For the latter has meant that the relations between these states has had 
to be pursued within an historical condition of social necessity. This 
necessitous character of their societal relations has followed from the 
common need of these states to provide for their own security and well 
being within international society in the absence of any single, 
overriding sovereign body or universally integrative authority capable 
of imposing a single system of regulative behaviour upon them all. In 
these historical circumstances modern states have retained a primary
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interest in pursuing actions within international society directed to 
ensuring their own historical reproduction. But, while the development 
of their external societal relations has been constrained by this 
general condition of social necessity, the point to be emphasised here 
is that this condition of necessitous action is not, in any sense, a 
natural or invariable condition. Far from remaining the same throughout 
modern history, the character of these necessitous interstate relations 
within western international society and the structures of interstate 
order emerging therein represent historically and culturally evolving 
phenomena. More particularly, as I have suggested above, the nature of 
these societal relations has undergone a process of historical 
evolution, an evolution integrally connected with the historical 
transformation of the sovereign character of the states constituting 
this international society. Through the practical historical formation 
and subsequent reconstitution of the structures of legitimate order 
operating between these states, the dominant form of state sovereignty, 
and with it, the normative principle of constitutive recognition shaping 
the formal relations of those states have been progressively 
transformed. It is this transformative process which, I want to suggest 
here, provides the clearest expression of the general historical 
extension of human self determination within modern western 
international society which forms the central interest of our critical 
theory.
In addressing itself to this historically evolving, anarchical western 
society of states then, the reformulated critical theory proposed here 
may be seen to incorporate two main, interrelated concerns which
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together define its general, emancipatory theory-orienting interest. The 
first of these concerns is to delineate the major historical forces 
explaining the creation and historical transformation of the structures 
of legitimate order arising between states within this evolving 
anarchical society and to explicate the nature of those different 
structures of legitimate order thus constituted. The second, more 
encompassing concern of this theory would be to highlight the manner in 
which this historical process of international order formation has 
provided the stimulus for the transformation of the qualitative nature 
of those societal relations of necessity characterising the interaction 
of states at different phases in the history of modern western 
international society. In terms of its overriding emancipatory interest, 
this theory would aim to indicate the way in which this ongoing process 
of international order formation has led to the reconstitution of the 
principle af sovereign constitutive recognition forming the normative 
basis of societal relations between modern states, resulting in its 
progressive rearticulation in more developed forms. In doing so it would 
seek to demonstrate how this process has opened up the possibility for 
the further transformation of the general form of international 
sociability characterising relations among these states. It is in this 
way that the historical process of legitimate order formation at the 
international level may be seen to have facilitated the introduction of 
more self determining modes of societal interaction transcending the 
basic relations of social necessity characterising earlier phases in the 
history of western international society. In this development, I would 
argue, we can discern the practical expression of the evolution of the 
nature of human moral community within modern international society
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which represents the central expression of the process of human self 
determination forming the focus of our critical, emancipatory 
perspective.s
Vhat, then, are the major historical forces which this extended critical 
theory needs to focus upon in explaining the development and ongoing 
transformation of the historical structures of order between western 
states giving rise to the progressive rearticulation of international 
societal relations suggested here? At the broadest level it is the 
condition of inter-state competition engendered by the decentralised, 
anarchical structure of this society which has been responsible for the 
practical formation and subsequent transformation of the different 
historical systems of international order. However, as our foregoing 
analysis has illustrated, this condition of international competition 
does not constitute an invariable power struggle between states 
conceived as undifferentiated units of power capabilities of the type 
suggested by Heo-Realist theory. Rather, drawing on the more complex 
understanding implicit in the work of Wight and more explicitly 
developed in the critical approaches of Cox and Skocpol, our theory 
would acknowledge the nature of this competitive process as a struggle 
between composite, historically constituted and constantly evolving 
sovereign communities - a process arising in response to the uneven 
development of power within modern international society which has 
engendered the historical reproduction of structures of legitimate order 
between these sovereign communities.
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More specifically, our critical perspective would draw upon the extended 
conception of hegemonic state formation elaborated in the work of Theda 
Skocpol and broadly outlined in chapter six. Especially important here 
are the insights which Skocpol's work provides into the complex 
character of hegemonic bloc formation within the sovereign state as a 
process affected by both internal and external socio-economic and 
strategic-political forces and, in this connection, her account of the 
central role of the institutional structures of the political fragment 
of the state in mediating these domestic and international dimensions of 
its historical existence. As we have seen, it is this relatively 
autonomous political fragment which is identified by Skocpol as the 
central agent mediating those domestic and international dimensions of 
the life of the state affecting its ongoing historical reproduction. 
Rather than representing a mere reflection of more basic socio-economic 
forces, as Cox's work sometimes suggests, the political structure of the 
state is here acknowledged as an agent operating in a relatively 
autonomous manner within the larger hegemonic bloc constituting the 
totality of the sovereign state, following interests and logics specific 
to its own political function as the central coordinating agency in the 
reproduction of the sovereign community as a whole. In particular, it is 
the political executive and the institutional structures of legitimate 
political authority associated with it which have played the central 
historical role in the coordination of those different spheres of 
domestic social practice (socio-economic, cultural, coercive etc.) 
within an integrated hegemonic structure providing the bases of the 
power of the state as a distinctive, historically constituted sovereign 
community. Furthermore, as the practical mediator of these internal
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processes of hegemonic bloc formation, the political fragment of the 
state has traditionally borne the responsibility for ensuring the 
reproduction of this sovereign community in the face of the pressures 
arising from its location within the larger geo-political sphere of an 
anarchical international society.
Vhat Skocpol's work offers for our extended critical theory then, is an 
account of the way the political executive of the state has operated in 
a relatively autonomous manner in the sphere of international relations 
in pursuing those distinctive political ends relating to its pivotal 
role in the reproduction of the historically constituted totality of the 
sovereign community. Through its appropriation and deployment of the 
resources (bath material and cultural) deriving from the broader 
domestic hegemonic bloc whose legitimate sovereign interests it claims 
to represent within the international sphere, the political executive of 
the state has operated to establish the strategic-military power 
structures essential to the advancement of those legitimate sovereign 
interests at the international level and to counter the threats to the 
ongoing historical reproduction of the sovereign state arising within 
the larger society of states.3 At the same time, through its engagement 
in diplomatic relations with the other political states of this society 
in accordance with the historically evolved practice of sovereign 
constitutive recognition noted above, the relatively autonomous 
political institutions of the hegemonic state have formed the central 
agency in the creation of those structures of legitimate international 
order emerging at different stages in the history of modern 
international society. Historically, it is only the most powerful of
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these states in any given period which have possessed the capabilities 
to significantly influence this general process of international order 
formation. Moreover, the ability to exercise such significant influence 
has been conditional upon the successful creation and maintenance of an 
internally coherent, sovereign hegemonic bloc providing the material and 
cultural resources for the continued growth and external projection of 
sovereign state power.
Invoking this extended conception of the nature of the sovereign state 
and hegemonic state formation within the broader geo-political context 
of an historically evolving, anarchical international society, it 
becomes possible to reconstruct Cox's Critical historical perspective to 
provide a more adequate theoretical account of the modern process of 
international order formation and the potential for the extension of 
human self determination engendered by that process. Within this 
reconstructed perspective our Critical theory would be concerned to 
indicate the way in which the competition between western states, 
understood as historically evolving, composite hegemonic blocs, has 
resulted in the historical formation and transformation of structures of 
legitimate order between them. More specifically, it would consider how 
the changes in the relative power of these dominant sovereign states, 
produced by the effects of competitive pressures at the domestic and 
international levels, have given rise to transformative processes within 
western international society engendering a movement from historical 
phases characterised by multi-actor structures of legitimate 
international order predicated upon the regulative mechanism of the 
balance of power, to historical periods in which particular states have
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sought, more or less successfully, to transcend the constraints imposed 
by this multi-actor, anarchical society of states through the imposition 
of their hegemonic dominance over that international society as a whole. 
In doing so it would seek to show how the uneven development of 
international power has given rise to the progressive transformation and 
reconstitution of the normative principle of sovereign constitutive 
recognition informing societal relations within western international 
society.
In terms of the extended Critical perspective sketched here it is 
possible to identify two major, interrelated aspects of the uneven 
development of international power responsible for the transformation of 
such legitimate systems of international order and, along with them, the 
nature of the societal relations characterising this international 
society. The first of these is the historical transformation of those 
domestic hegemonic blocs which have provided the dynamic basis of the 
internal accumulation and external projection of sovereign power by the 
major states of western international society. More particularly, the 
extended Critical theory proposed here would need to consider the way 
pressures at both the domestic and international level have produced 
changes in the hegemonic structures of existing states (or stimulated 
the development of new, unified sovereign states) with the effect of 
increasing their relative power within the international sphere, thus 
giving rise to more or less successful attempts to impose their 
political dominance over international society. By seeking, in this way, 
to extend their control aver the operation of the political and economic 
power processes at the international level through the imposition of
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their own domestic, hegemonic structures as the model for international 
society as a whole, such states have sought to transcend the constraints 
of the existing multi-actor structure and to enhance the prospects for 
their own historical reproduction.
Considered from the perspective of our critical interest in the 
historical transformation of international society, attention would be 
given to the long term implications of such attempts to establish 
hegemonic dominance for the general restructuring of interstate 
relations. In this respect the practical attempts of particular states 
to impose forms of hegemonic domination upon western international 
society can be seen to have contributed to the long term rearticulation 
of these societal relations through the diffusion of the cultural forms 
of the preponderant, expansionist power. Thus it has been the effects of 
the dissemination of such hegemonic cultural farms which can be seen to 
have provided the historical stimulus to the long term transformation of 
the domestic structures of other sovereign states and the subsequent 
creation of new sovereign hegemonic blocs within international society 
based upon adaptations of that hegemonic model. Moreover, it is the 
historical instantiation and external expression of these reconstituted 
sovereign hegemonic blocs which has provided the dynamic agency behind 
the transcendence of existing historical structures of international 
order and the formation of new, extended forms of societal relations 
between modern states expressed in the emergence of new systems of 
legitimate international order. As I shall indicate further below, the 
transformative impact of such expansionist practices upon the nature of 
modern international societal relations is exemplified in the effects of
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the dissemination of the hegemonic forms of the revolutionary French 
state and the industrialised capitalist mode of production underpinning 
the nineteenth century British imperialist state.
At the same time, viewed from the short term historical perspective, our 
Critical theory would need to indicate the reasons for the transient 
nature of such international structures of hegemonic dominance 
established by these expansionist powers. Especially important here is 
Cox's point, noted in chapter five, concerning the essentially limited 
nature of such hegemonic systems as inevitably partial totalities within 
a larger, international society of plural sovereign states and the 
potential for the development of countervailing forces facilitated by 
their limited, partial nature. This leads us to the second important 
historical expression of the uneven development of power within 
international society explaining the transformation of the structures of 
legitimate international order, namely the changes in the relative 
distribution of power between states produced by the historically 
shifting strategic alliances between the great powers of this modern 
anarchical society. Consideration would need to be given here to the way 
the attempts at the imposition of hegemonic domination over 
international society by any single state have ultimately provoked 
counter structures of strategic alliances. It is through the formation 
of such counter structures that those states threatened by an 
expansionist power have combined their strategic-political capabilities 
to readjust the imbalance in the distribution of international power 
engendered by the processes of hegemonic bloc transformation noted 
above. Through such relatively autonomous strategic practices the
309
political fragments of threatened states have sought to overcome the 
preponderance of any one sovereign power and to ultimately re-establish 
a new multi-actor structure of international order based upon the 
reassertion of the strategic balance of power.
It is the effects of the uneven development of power between major 
states engendered, most notably, by the dual processes indicated here, 
which our Critical theory would focus upon in seeking to explain the 
historical construction and subsequent transformation of the different 
systems of legitimate international order at different stages in the 
history of western international society. Examining this ongoing process 
of legitimate order formation engendered by the uneven development of 
power between the major states of this society, this Critical theory 
would be concerned to indicate the way in which the former has resulted 
in the historical transformation of the condition of social necessity 
characterising modern western international society. More specifically, 
it would seek to show how the general process of international order 
formation has provided the dynamic impetus for the expansion of this 
society beyond its original, geographically and socially limited context 
within western Europe and its consequent historical transformation into 
a contemporary global society of sovereign states incorporating a new 
nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition as the 
normative basis of societal relations. At the same time, this critical 
theory would seek to highlight the way this new principle of sovereign 
constitutive recognition has introduced the potential for the 
establishment of a still higher, solidary form of international 
sociability among contemporary nation states transcending the
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pluralistic forms developed thus far. In doing so it would attempt to 
assess the practical possibilities for the further, practical 
articulation and institutionalisation of this extended form of 
sociability as the basis of a new, more emancipated system of legitimate 
international order within contemporary international society.
Ill
A detailed account of this transformative historical process is clearly 
beyond the limits of the present thesis whose primary aim has been to 
indicate the broad features of the more comprehensive, Critical theory 
of international order formation sketched above. Here I can only present 
the most general of outlines of this reconstructed historical 
perspective which attempts to indicate the most important phases in the 
historical transformation of western international society and the 
evolution of the forms of international sociability characterising the 
different stages of its historical development.10 Thus, beginning with 
the society of Absolutist states whose emergence from the breakdown of 
feudal society I have briefly sketched above, attention would be 
initially directed to the limited form of international sociability 
informing the latter which was integrally associated with the operation 
of the dynastic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition. Here 
the sovereign state was one in which hegemonic bloc formation was 
focussed around the political authority of the dynastic, monarchical 
family as the articulator of the sovereign power of the state and as the 
legitimate representative of its sovereign interests within
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international society. The relatively autonomous executive structure 
centred around the institution of the monarchy played a central role in 
the reproduction of the Absolutist state through its mediation of the 
development of the structures of the domestic hegemonic bloc and the 
external pressures arising from the state's location within a system of 
necessitous inter-societal relations articulated around the formation 
and reconstitution of international balances of power.
Vithin this Absolutist society of states, where sovereign authority was 
centred in the institutional personality and prescriptive rights of the 
monarchy, the political and economic dimensions of hegemonic bloc 
formation constituted inseparable aspects of the augmentation of the 
political authority of the dynasty as the legitimating focus of the 
sovereign community. Moreover, this dynastic form of legitimate, 
sovereign authority was expressed at the level of interstate relations 
in the limited doctrine of the Reason of State as the guiding normative 
principle informing the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition 
between Absolutist states. In this context, as Mckay and Scott note,
"the doctrine of raison d'etat ... was simply the argument of necessity 
as the basis for the political [and economic] conduct of states. Self- 
interest was ... the dominant motive behind foreign policy ... Force was 
the essential, if unspoken element in international relations ... Rulers 
and statesmen strove ceaselessly to increase the power, and therefore 
the wealth of their state.“11
This normatively limited character of the dynastic principle informing 
inter-societal relations was reflected then, in a system of interaction
312
between Absolutist states characterised by a ruthless competition for 
economic and political power. Indeed, as Morse notes, the dynastic 
principle involved a "built in bellicosity in interstate relations" 1 2 in 
terms of which the overriding aim of foreign policy was understood as 
that of maximising one's share of the limited resources of international 
society. Accordingly, within this Absolutist society of states political 
and economic relations emerged characterised by extreme necessity based 
on the egoistic pursuit of power by dynastic regimes. Within the sphere 
of economic relations it was mercantilist policies which predominated.
As Morse points out, the "inseparability of economic and political 
factors built into the domestic economy under mercantilism also 
characterised foreign policy. In both spheres the principal aim was to 
augment the power of the sovereign. " 1 3 At the same time, as Wight's 
work indicates, these aggrandising tendencies of states in the more 
specifically political sphere of international relations received 
articulation in the political machinations over the legitimate rights of 
rulers to hereditary succession. Accordingly, it was the diplomatic 
intrigues and military struggles between Absolutist states arising over 
this issue of the legitimacy of dynastic succession which represented a 
central determining factor in the reproduction of legitimate order 
within this multi-actor, international society through the continual 
transformation and readjustment of the relative balance of power between 
sovereign states which it engendered.
Taking this Absolutist society of states as its point of departure the 
Critical theory sketched here would seek to indicate how the ongoing 
process of international order formation engendered by the uneven
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development of power between states has resulted in the progressive 
movement beyond the normatively limited, dynastic form of international 
sociability and the highly necessitous process of legitimate order 
formation engendered by it. More particularly, it would be concerned to 
show how the ongoing reproduction of systems of legitimate order between 
western states has led to the reconstruction of the prescriptive, 
dynastic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition informing this 
early system of international sociability, in the process giving rise to 
a more universalistic, nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive 
recognition as the normative basis of societal relations within 
contemporary global international society. The historical factors 
explaining this evolutionary process are highly complex. However, 
arguably the single most important historical event initiating this 
transformative process was the radical challenge to the dynastic 
structure of Absolutist international society arising from the French 
Revolution.
The primary interest of this historical event for our Critical theory 
lies in the way it initiated a major restructuring of the dynastic 
hegemonic bloc forming the basis of French state power. Particularly 
important here was the impact of the new, popular, nationalistic ideal 
of sovereign authority advanced in association with the more general 
challenge to the structures of the ancien regime represented by the 
revolutionary movement. In fact, as I shall argue below, it was this 
popular conception of sovereign legitimacy which would provide the basic 
model for future exercises in hegemonic state formation shaping the 
ongoing historical transformation of the societal structure of western
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international society. In this respect, the principal effect of the 
revolution in France was to displace the locus of sovereign state 
authority from its traditional centre in the institution of the monarchy 
to the state defined as the representative of the nation and the 
expression of the popular, national will. As Skocpol notes, "a single 
legitimating theme ran through all the phases Cof the revolution]; an 
identification of executive functions with the implementation of the 
people's will."1 *
It was this epochal change in the sovereign structure of the French 
state introduced by the revolution which was to underpin French 
imperialist expansion under Napoleon. In the words of Brunn, "the 
energies of the French people, released, intensified and coordinated Cby 
the influence of the revolutionary ideals of popular sovereignty and the 
later effects of the Napoleonic reforms! gave them an immense advantage 
over their disorganised and backward neighbours."1 The change in the 
relative distribution of international power created by this development 
was to be a central factor in the successful extension of French 
dominance over the continent and in generating the radical changes in 
the structure of Absolutist international society following from this. 
The emergence of the nation at arms and the organisational effects of 
the new bureaucratic structures of the French state meant that its 
relative power within international society was greatly increased. In 
particular, the mobilisation of the French people through national 
conscription provided the basis for the successful assertion of French 
hegemonic ambitions in continental Europe under the leadership of
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Napoleon with the consequent expansion of France's political influence 
and the diffusion of its revolutionary political ideas.ie
Outlining the nature of the continental system of hegemonic dominance 
briefly established by Napoleon on the power basis provided by the 
revolutionary transformation of the hegemonic structure of the French 
state, our Critical theory would then need to consider how this 
challenge to the multi-actor structure of Absolutist international 
society was ultimately checked by the formation of the grand alliance 
and the combination of the concerted power of the opposing European 
states against Napoleon. In doing so it would indicate how this 
alliance, in countering French preponderance, provided the foundations 
for the subsequent establishment of a new multi-actor structure of 
legitimate international order within nineteenth century European 
international society organised around the principles of the Vienna 
settlement - an order which reflected the common interest of the great 
powers in the suppression of the revolutionary forces unleashed by the 
French revoution. In doing so it would indicate how their mutual 
interest in securing this end created the preconditions for the 
rearticulation of the institution of the balance of power responsible 
for regulating the relations between dynastic states in the pre- 
revolutionary period. Thus, within this new system of international 
order we see the common acknowledgement by the great powers of certain 
collective norms of responsibility constraining their actions within 
international society, norms which received expression in the practice 
of diplomatic consultation on matters of common concern as the accepted 
condition for the preservation of international order.17-
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However, while providing the basis of a new system of legitimate order 
between the great European powers in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, this attempt to reconstruct the old dynastic international 
society around the new multi-actor system of legitimate order would 
encounter major new forces contributing to its ultimate demise in the 
long term. In this respect, the diffusion of the revolutionary 
nationalist ideals throughout western Europe consequent upon the period 
of French hegemonic domination arguably marks a decisive moment in the 
historical transformation of the general form of international 
sociability characterising relations between the states of modern 
western international society. For, as Wight observes, the dissemination 
of such nationalist ideals operated to produce a major schism within 
this society in the nineteenth century expressed most clearly in the 
conflict between the competing dynastic and popular conceptions of 
sovereign legitimacy. This conflict between traditional political 
regimes predicated upon the dynastic principle of sovereign authority 
and those emerging social movements advancing demands for the new 
popular, nationalistic form of sovereign government may be seen as the 
expression of a major crisis of legitimacy within modern European 
international society, a crisis whose effects would ultimately extend 
well beyond the geographical limits of Europe to engender transformative 
processes in the non-European world. However, the instabilities created 
by this legitimation crisis within European international society itself 
operated to aggravate already existing differences between the major 
powers participating in the management of the nineteenth century system 
of legitimate international order. 161 In effect then, the seeds of the 
decay of the restored multi-actor structure of legitimate order based
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around the ninteenth century balance of power were already planted by 
the transformative effects of the earlier period of French hegemony. It 
was the impact of these fragmentary forces, combined with the 
destabilising effects upon European society of the dissemination of the 
new forms of industrial capitalism, which would ultimately lead to the 
progressive breakdown of that order in the later ninteenth century.
The increasing influence of this popular model of national sovereignty 
during the nineteenth century, combined with the diffusion of the forms 
of industrial power first introduced in Britain are identified here 
then, as the major factors explaining the progressive erosion of the 
traditional dynastic principle of legitimacy informing the Absolutist 
system of societal relations. 1 -4 In circumstances where Britain, as the 
dominant industrial power in European international society, directed 
its energies principally to the establishment of an overseas empire in 
the non-European world and did not seek to impose direct hegemonic 
leadership over the other European states, continental European 
countries were not constrained to follow the British liberal model and 
could draw upon these influences in following their own independent 
paths of development. In these circumstances the diffusion and 
adaptation of the ideas of national sovereignty and the forms of British 
industrial capitalism stimulated the development of new forms of 
hegemonic bloc formation on the continent which would culminate in the 
further historical transformation of European international society in 
the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The most notable 
expression of this process of change was the emergence of the new, 
unified nation-states of Italy and Germany in the second half of the
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nineteenth century.2 0  In the case of the formation of the new German 
state, for example, the concern for the development of an internal, 
protected economic market through the formation of a single customs 
union provided a major early impetus to later national unification. 
Moreover this policy of economic protectionism formed a major component 
in the later efforts to consolidate and expand the economic and military 
power of the new unified German state as a major rival to Britain within 
later nineteenth century international society.
Acknowledging this major rearticulation of the configuration of states 
within European international society, our Critical theory would 
emphasise the crucial new phase in the uneven development of 
international power to which it gave rise. In doing so it would stress 
the renewed drive to international competition between these states 
engendered by the former which would finally result in the destruction 
of the nineteenth century system of legitimate order structured around 
the balance of power. In this context, as Cox notes, "the spread of 
industrialisation [and nationalist ideas] and the mobilisation of social 
classes it brought about not only changed the nature of states but also 
altered the international configuration of state power as new rivals 
overtook Britain's lead. Protectionism ... [was adopted by these newly 
industrialising nations] as the means of building economic power 
comparable to Britain's. " 21 This renewed inter-state rivalry created by 
the new phase of hegemonic bloc formation and the uneven development of 
international power associated with it received practical expression in 
a new climate of aggressive competition between the major European 
states reflected in two interrelated developments of the later
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nineteenth century. The first of these was the race far empire engaged 
in by European states. Here we see the incorporation of non-western 
regions into an imperial system of European domination which would 
provide the basis for practices of nation-building and the stimulus for 
the development of nationalist movements in these regions culminating in 
the emergence of a multiplicity of new nation-states into international 
society with the advent of decolonisation in the twentieth century.2 2
In the more immediate historical context however, this political and 
economic competition between European states in the peripheral regions 
was arguably only a reflection of that more basic change in the 
character of relations within European international society reflected 
in the development of what Van Evera has called the new 'cult of the 
offensive' and the escalation in the development of the capabilities and 
tactical strategies for fighting war which that offensive outlook 
entailed. 2 3  More particularly, our Critical theory would need to 
consider how the shift in the relative distribution of international 
power engendered by the new phase of national hegemonic bloc formation 
confirmed the ultimate historical breakdown of the nineteenth century 
structure of legitimate international order and, with it, the 
Absolutist, dynastic form of international society which it supported, 
by creating the social and political bases for the assertion of German 
hegemonic ambitions. 2 "1 Viewed from the longer term historical 
perspective it was the debilitating effects of the two world wars 
directed to checking the successive attempts by this newly unified 
German nation to establish hegemonic dominance over European 
international society in the first half of the twentieth century, which
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would ultimately lead to the loss of the position of ascendancy 
traditionally held by European states within western international 
society and see the emergence of a new, post-European, global society of 
nation-states dominated by the United States.
Within this broad historical context, attention would need to be given 
to the temporary success of the alliance of those powers (including the 
United States) opposed to German expansionism in World War One, in 
countering this preponderant power within Europe produced by the effects 
of German national unification. But, at the same time, our theory would 
also consider the subsequent inability of those states to rectify the 
existing fundamental imbalance in the distribution of international 
power within European international society as a result of their failure 
to re-establish an effective new structure of legitimate international 
order after the war on the basis of the institutions of the League of 
Nations. More particularly, it would be concerned to highlight the way 
this failure advanced the broader process of the historical decline of 
European international society by ensuring the breakdown of the tenuous 
interwar structure of political and economic order, in the process 
facilitating the re-emergence of a new, expansionist German state 
predicated upon a sovereign hegemonic bloc incorporating the 
protectionist economic policies and militaristic ideological and 
institutional forms of National Socialism.25 In terms of our critical 
interest in the historical transformation of western international 
society, the central point of interest arising here concerns the manner 
in which the subsequent struggle to counter the expansionist power of 
Germany resulted in the ultimate decline of the old European states as
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the central agents of order construction in western international 
society while, at the same time, creating the historical impetus for the 
movement to a new global western society of nation states in the postwar 
era dominated by the major non-European member of the allied alliance; 
the United States.
This practical decline, and final supersession of the traditional, 
European-centred society of states as the focus of international 
societal formation was manifested in two crucial developments expressing 
the uneven development of international power generated by the events of 
the first half of the twentieth century. The first of these was the rise 
to ascendancy of the United States as the constitutive agent of a new 
system of legitimate order within western international society. In this 
respect the historical decline of the European powers in this period was 
counterposed by the enormous growth of American power in the first half 
of the twentieth century. It is this preponderant power of the newly 
ascendent American hegemonic state which would form the basis for the 
projection of United States influence within postwar western 
international society, thereby enabling America to take over the role 
traditionally assumed by European states as the dominant order 
constitutive agent. More specifically, as Cox notes, the postwar 
emergence of America as the preeminent actor within western 
international society was manifested in the formation of a new structure 
of legitimate, hegemonic international order in which the "power 
configuration of the pax americana ... [took! the form of alliances (all 
hinging on US power) created in order to contain the Soviet Union. The 
stabilisation of this [strategic-political] power configuration created
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the conditions for the unfolding of a global economy"2® both of which 
have been built around American hegemonic leadership.
Thus the postwar period saw the emergence of a new structure of 
legitimate hegemonic order in western international society forming one 
part of a larger bipolar world dominated by two superpowers whose 
spheres of influence were based upon the dissemination of two very 
different forms of economic and political organisation as the basis of 
their legitimacy. Co-extensive with the development of this new 
legitimate, hegemonic system of international order progressively 
embedded by the polarising effects of the global bi-polar struggle 
between America and the Soviet Union, there also occurred the entry of 
those new nation states of the non-European regions of the world into 
this nascent global society. The breakup of European colonial 
territories, accelerated by the postwar decline of the European colonial 
powers, was the signal for the emergence of a multiplicity of new nation 
states claiming sovereign membership of western international society.
As a consequence of this process of decolonisation the postwar period 
has seen the progressive diffusion of the nationalist form of political 
sovereignty and, with it, the effective universalisation of a new 
nationalist principle as the basis of the societal practice of 
constitutive recognition between western states.
In accordance with these interrelated, transformative processes emerging 
from the redistribution of international power engendered by the period 
of European conflict and decline?the character of western international 
society has radically changed. Within the increasingly globalised,
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postwar international society the formal nature of the condition of 
international sociability has been profoundly transformed. Where 
previously societal relations were based upon the normatively limited, 
prescriptive principle of Reason of State associated with the 
interaction of political dynasties as the legitimate focus of sovereign 
community, the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition has now 
been redefined in much broader ethico-political terms. Within this 
contemporary global international society the normative relations 
between states have been reconstituted around a common acknowledgement 
of the formal, universal rights and obligations existing between 
political states as formally equal representatives of sovereign national 
communities forming the larger society of nation-states. Moreover, this 
nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition has 
received practical expression through the establishment of the United 
Nations, the institution to which all nation-states are formally 
admitted on the basis of the practice of sovereign constitutive 
recognition between these states as formally equal national 
communities. z'7
In focussing its attention upon this emergent global western society of 
nation states the extended Critical theory outlined here would be 
concerned to identify the major problems confronting the continued 
historical reproduction of the hegemonic system of legitimate order 
which underpins it. In particular, taking up the main theme of Bull's 
later writings, it would examine the apparent tension which has emerged 
within this legitimate order as a result of the sense, on the part of 
its less advantaged members, of the increasing disparity between its
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formal principle of international sociability and the effects of the 
practical operation of its legitimate structures of hegemonic order.
For, as the later work of Hedley Bull indicates, despite the attainment 
of formal political autonomy in the period of decolonisation, these new 
nations have remained subject to major substantive forms of inequality 
consequent upon the perpetuation of relations of dependence on their 
former European masters in the post-colonial period. Most important in 
this context has been the perception by these states of a growing 
disparity between the formal equality of the sovereign communities 
constituting this society implied by the nationalistic principle 
underpinning the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition, and the 
manifest inequality of states within this global society produced by the 
uneven distribution of its material benefits resulting from the 
operation of those post-colonial ordering structures principally 
tailored to the interests of the American hegemonic state and other 
advanced, industrialised nations.
In accordance with this perception of the inequitable nature of the 
hegemonic structures of this postwar international order> there has 
arisen amongst those less advantaged nations a counter-hegemonic 
movement aimed at securing the restructuring of the former. More 
particularly, this reformist movement has given practical expression to 
its grievances by advancing a challenge to the legitimacy of the present 
international order through the radical reinterpretation of the 
nationalist principle informing the international practice of sovereign 
constitutive recognition. By introducing a more extensive principle of 
justice as the proposed basis of international societal relations they
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have sought to advance their formal demands for the restructuring of the 
existing international order, a process culminating in the demands for a 
New International Economic Order in the ninteen seventies. Here, the 
traditional, pluralistic liberal principle of justice underlying the 
practice of sovereign constitutive recognition and defining the formal 
rights and obligations of states as sovereign members of international 
society has been radically reinterpreted. Rejecting this traditionally 
accepted understanding of international justice, these states have 
sought to extend the concept beyond the notion of the equal right of 
nations to political self determination to encompass a qualitatively 
higher notion of distributive justice which asserts the right of all the 
states of this society to substantive equality in political, economic 
and cultural terms.2®
As our analysis of the later thought of Hedley Bull has indicated, the 
principal motive underlying this challenge to the orthodox 
interpretation of the nationalist principle of sovereign constitutive 
recognition have been the concerns of third world nations to advance 
their particular interests within the larger western society of states. 
Moreover, developments within the western international political 
economy in more recent times have resulted in the effective 
marginalisation of such claims by third world states for the major 
restructuring of the existing international order. However, as Bull 
suggests, this challenge to the existing legitimate order may be seen to 
involve a deeper significance for our general theoretical interest in 
the ongoing historical transformation of the form of sociability 
grounding states' relations within contemporary western international
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society. For, what this redefinition of the nationalist principle of 
sovereign constitutive recognition offers is an indication of the manner 
in which the form of international sociability characterising 
contemporary international social relations might be further elaborated 
in a more emancipatory form in the future.
Of central importance here is the extended solidary conception of 
international sociability which underpins this radicalised nationalist 
principle of sovereign constitutive recognition implicit in the third 
world's challenge to western dominance. As Bull's later work indicates, 
this principle is one which entails a conception of normative social 
community transcending the traditional pluralistic understanding of the 
society of states. In opposition to this traditional conception of 
international society as an association of autonomous, right-possessing, 
sovereign entities representing the highest expression of human 
community and owing obligations solely to one another, this radicalised 
principle entails a conception of international society in which the 
form of international sociability encompasses obligations to a 
qualitatively higher normative community defined in solidary terms. The 
higher community referred to here, extending beyond the limits of 
separate sovereign nation states, is that wider moral community of the 
species and the common world good associated with the latter.
In accordance with its basic emancipatory interest, the reformulated 
Critical theory outlined here would be concerned to assess the 
possibilities for the advancement of this qualitatively higher form of 
international sociability as the practical basis of legitimate order
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formation within contemporary international society. Examining the 
ongoing process of the uneven development of power at the international 
level, our Critical theory would consider the potential which this 
process opens up for the historical transformation of the structures of 
the existing hegemonic system of legitimate order in accordance with the 
extended principle of constitutive recognition mentioned above. At the 
same time, in accordance with Cox's own dictum, this critical 
perspective would need to take account of the formidable constraints 
upon the actualisation of this extended form of international 
sociability arising from the necessituous nature of existing 
international relations and the operation of those structures of 
international domination already engendered by the uneven distribution 
of power between contemporary nation states. 2 3
Particularly important in this context would be the transformative 
effects upon the postwar structure of international relations produced 
by the relative decline of the two superpowers in more recent times as 
the central expression of the contemporary phase of uneven international 
development. Thus, in the case of western international society which 
has been our primary concern in this work, consideration would be given 
to the erosion of the postwar structures of international legitimacy 
consequent upon the decline of American dominance in recent decades and 
the rise of other states to challenge its economic preeminence. -1°
Insofar as this latter development has introduced a greater degree of 
instability and uncertainty into the western international political 
economy and produced a general reduction in the high levels of economic 
growth characterising the earlier phase of undisputed American
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leadership we can discern an increasing preoccupation amongst 
industrialised western states with the maintenance of their own economic 
well being, thus limiting the scope for the emergence of more solidary 
forms of societal relations within the international sphere. Compounding 
this problem is the recent weakening of the position of third world 
states, formerly the main protaganists seeking the restructuring of the 
international order, resulting from the development of massive third 
world debt and the deleterious effects upon the social structures of 
those countries engendered by the latter.
In addition to these recent developments within western international 
society, our Critical theory would also need to consider the 
consequences of the current changes in postwar relations between the 
superpowers for this broader process of societal evolution. Most 
significant here is the current transformation affecting the bipolar 
structure of postwar international relations produced by the decline in 
the power of the Soviet Union. In this context, the collapse of the 
rigid postwar divisions accompanying the application of the spirit of 
Soviet 'New Thinking' to its external relations and the subsequent 
breakup of its extended empire, would appear to have brought with it a 
significant shift away from traditional, entrenched confrontational 
attitudes, thus facilitating a new climate of compromise and cooperation 
between the superpowers.31 At the same time, the breakdown of the 
Soviet empire and the current movement of, not only Eastern European 
countries but also the Soviet Union itself, towards more liberalised 
economic and political structures suggests a new tendency towards the 
convergence of states, the emphasis now being upon the introduction of
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pluralistic systems of government and free market economies. As a result 
of these tendencies we now appear to be witnessing the incorporation of 
the different regions of the world, as never before, within a single 
international community transcending the earlier postwar territorial and 
ideological divisions.32
Clearly these recent changes involve major implications for the 
continuing viability of the traditional order-constitutive structures of 
postwar western international relations. Vhile their ultimate 
ramifications for the future shape and stability of international 
society remain uncertain, what these changes do indicate in unambiguous 
terms is that the nature of postwar international relations is already 
in the throes of major transformation and that the legitimate structures 
underpinning the postwar western system of legitimate order are 
undergoing a profound, though uncertain rearticulation. To this extent 
they pose the issue of the prospects for the reproduction of a future, 
stable and durable system of international order in stark, practical 
terms. From the standpoint of the Critical theoretical perspective 
sketched here,this highly fluid contemporary situation arising from the 
current redrawing of the landscape of postwar international relations 
and, in particular, the incipient movement towards a more integrated 
global international community engendered by the rapprochement of the 
superpowers, may be seen to offer significant opportunities for the 
further advancement of the emancipatory interest in the extension of the 
qualitative form of sociability at the international level.
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Hence, in examining these developments flowing from the latest phase in 
the uneven development of international power our Critical theory would 
be concerned to establish the possibilities raised by this freeing-up of 
the rigid postwar structures of international relations for the further 
extension of the process of conscious human self determination within 
international society in accordance with the extended, solidary 
conception of social community implicit in the nationalist principle of 
constitutive recognition.33 More particularly, it would aim to identify 
and advance those historical forces engendered by the present processes 
of international change which might facilitate the practical extension 
of conscious human control over the forms of power underpinning the 
operation of those order-constitutive structures within the contemporary 
global society of states as the precondition for their rearticulation in 
a new structure of legitimate order - one capable of addressing the 
complex, interrelated problems which now endanger the reproduction of 
this international society understood, not Just as a pluralistic 
community of discrete sovereign states, but as a single solidary 
community of humanity sharing a common interest in the maintenance of 
the basic conditions required for its continued existence.
Perhaps the most important development giving rise to these pressing 
problems now threatening the reproduction of this larger community 
including, but ultimately transcending the historically contingent 
boundaries of separate sovereign states, is the increasingly universal 
diiffusion, along with the other forms of western international 
civilisation, of industrialised modes of production as the material 
basis of the reproduction of the hegemonic structures of contemporary
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nation states. Among the major dilemmas posed by this development is the 
problem of how we are to ensure the continued reproduction of a 
sustainable international society in ecological terms while states 
continue to maintain and increase their levels of economic growth to 
satisfy their material and security needs as members of a larger, 
competitive, anarchical society. This issue is itself closely linked 
with the current problems confronting the reproduction of a stable 
international economic system posed by the increasing competition for 
markets between industrialised western states reflected in recently 
emerging mercantilist practices. Also important here are the potentially 
destabilising effects arising from the necessity for third world 
countries to repay massive foreign debts and the complexities which this 
situation involves for the reproduction of a fair and equitable, but, at 
the same time, sustainable system of economic relations between 
states.3 "4 Finally, there are the formidable problems involved in the 
reproduction of strategic-military order in the post-cold war period in 
the face of the breakdown of the old strategic blocs and practices and 
the ongoing proliferation of advanced weapons systems created by modern 
military-industrial complexes. Arguably the most pressing concern here 
is the need for the development of new, more solidary forms of strategic 
cooperation capable of addressing the threats posed to the reproduction 
of international order by the growing number of states possessing 
potentially catastrophic nuclear capabilities.3S
In acknowledging the highly complex, interconnected nature of these 
problems associated with the reproduction of contemporary international 
society, our Critical theory would be concerned to highlight the need
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for the development of extended, solidary forms of international 
cooperation as the condition for their effective management - modes of 
cooperation which go beyond the qualitative limits of the contemporary, 
pluralistic form of international sociability associated with the 
normative social practices characterising contemporary international 
society. Viewed in these terms, the emancipatory interest informing our 
Critical theory would be one which advocates the advancement of modes of 
political practice aimed at creating a future type of legitimate 
international order radically different from those of the past which 
offers the possibility for the progressive actualisation of the solidary 
form of international community noted above.3e In moving beyond the 
limitations of those dynastic and nationalist systems in which the 
practice of sovereign constitutive recognition has given primacy to the 
obligations owed to partial, separate sovereign communities, the 
international order engendered by these forms of practice would be one 
incorporating a more emancipated form of international sociability 
involving the acknowledgement by its constituent units of extended 
obligations to the overriding community of humankind understood as a 
single species. Moreover, the acknowledgement of this extended form of 
obligation would receive practical expression through the development of 
forms of cooperation directed to securing and further advancing what 
Bull has defined as the world common good associated with this higher 
community.
Clearly the progress towards this more emancipated form of legitimate 
international order faces formidable constraints engendered by the 
continuing, necessituous nature of the relations between states within
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contemporary international society. Accordingly, the establishment of a 
solidary system of legitimate international order of this sort through 
the institutionalisation of the extended principle of constitutive 
recognition outlined above is not to be understood as, in any sense, an 
imminent or inevitable outcome of current historical processes. Rather, 
this Critical theory would acknowledge the contemporary phase of 
societal transformation as only part, although arguably a most crucial 
phase, of the broader historical process of the reproduction of 
international order sketched in this chapter. In doing so it would 
emphasise the dependence of the realisation of this emancipatory 
interest upon the further practical articulation of those conscious 
powers of human self determination underpinning the broader historical 
evolution of modern international society which we have noted in the 
preceding pages.
Viewed from this broad, evolutionary perspectivey the interest dictated 
by our Critical theory in the realisation of this qualitatively 
superior, emancipatory system of international order would need to be 
tempered by the awareness of the complex, historically conditioned 
nature of current movements towards the further reconstruction of the 
existing international order. But, at the same time, our theory would 
also reflect the extent to which that evolutionary process has advanced 
thus far. Vhen understood in these pragmatic, historical terms, the 
commitment to the realisation of this emancipatory end cannot be 
rejected as the misdirected pursuit of a purely abstract, idealistic 
postulate. Rather, as I have sought to indicate in this work, it is an 
inescapable consequence of the acceptance of the more sophisticated
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critical conception of international order formation presented above - a 
perspective which draws upon the insights of the more limited 
explanations of this process examined in the body of this thesis while, 
at the same time, transcending their methodological and substantive 
limitations which preclude the acknowledgement of the nature of modern 
international order formation as the complex, ongoing expression of the 
historical practice of conscious human self determination.
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here suggests, the distinction between system and society is a 
formal, rather than a strictly historical one. Thus Bull 
acknowledges that every international civilisation presupposes some 
degree of sociability. However, this is not always sufficient to 
enable the establishment of those more intensive practices binding 
states in a substantial social system. I have introduced the notion 
of relative degrees of international sociability in the following 
argument as a clearer way of expressing Bull's point.
2. Ibid., pp 14-15. For an extended account of these social 
institutions operating among the Greek city states see M. Wight, 
Systems of States. Ch.2.
3. The scope of the present thesis does not allow an analysis of 
earlier historical phases in this historical process associated 
with the evolution of forms of sociability in earlier western 
civilisations. For some historical works which offer general 
overviews of the historical periods which come within the 
dimensions of the broader historical process alluded to here see 
A. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History,
Princeton, 1960, M. Kann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.l, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1986, and F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty.
(2nd edn.), Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1986.
4. Apart from the explanations of this general process examined in the 
preceding theoretical perspectives there is a wide literature 
dealing with the different influences explaining the early formation 
of western international society. On the transition from the feudal 
to the European capitalist mode of production see F. Braudel, 
Civilization And Capitalism 15th-18th Century: Vol III The 
Perspective of the World. (Transl. S. Reynolds), London, 1984. On 
the more specific aspect of the formation of the Absolutist society 
of states see P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. London, 
1974; C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe. Princeton, 1975; 0. Hintze, The Historical Essays of
Otto Hintze. (ed. F. Gilbert), New York, 1975, and F.H. Hinsley, 
Sovereignty. Ch.5.
5. On the question of whether or not these medieval political 
communities can actually be described as sovereign in any real sense 
see G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity", 
Neo-Realism And Its Critics. pl43. For some different
views on the specific date of the emergence of modern western 
international society see Wight, Systems of States. Ch.l, 
and Morse, Modernisation And The Transformation Qf International 
Relations. Ch.2
6. On the importance of the revival of Roman law in this early process 
of hegemonic bloc formation see P. Anderson, Lineages of the 
Absolutist State. Ch.l. For some specific case studies see 0. Ranum
336
(ed.), National Consciousness. History nnd Political Culture in 
Early-Ködern Europe. Baltimore, 1975. Cox identifies the central 
impetus to such early hegemonic block formation in the attempts to 
control the peasant unrest of the fourteenth century. Mann, in 
contrast, identifies the catalyst for this process in the 
internecine wars between feudal lords which engendered processes of 
early taxation and the formation of bureaucratic state structures. 
See Cox, Production. Power and World Order Ch.5. and Mann,
The Sources of Social Power Vol.1, Ch.13.
7. Anderson, Op. Cit., p.38. In this connection see the
account of the historical origins of these institutional forms of 
European international society in the earlier practices of the 
Italian city-states presented in G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy 
Middlesex, 1955
8. For some accounts of the specific effects of this historical 
evolution of the form of international sociability between states in 
engendering new international norms for the regulation of military 
practice see Bull, The Anarchical Society, Part 2, and
Janice Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms and the 
Decline of Mercenarism", International Studies Quarterly.
Vol. 34, no. 1, March, 1990
9. On this central dimension of the mediatory role of the political 
fragment in the reproduction of the sovereign state see Tilly (ed), 
The Formation of National States In Western Europe.
and M. Mann, The Sources Of Social Power. Vol.l, Ch.13.
10. The tentative nature of this historical outline must be stressed 
here. A more substantial and comprehensive treatment of this 
historical development would require a separate work. For some 
alternative texts which present general historical overviews of the 
broad historical period sketched here from an uneven development 
perspective see Mckay and Scott, The Rise Of The Great Powers.
George Modelski, "Dependency Reversal in the Modern States-System: A 
Long Cycle Perspective”, in C.F. Doran (et al.) (eds.), North/South
Perspectives: Studies of Dependency Reversal. New York, 1983, Ch.2, 
and P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers.
11. McKay & Scott, Op. Cit. pp 210-11.
12. E. Morse, Modernisation and the Transformation of International 
Relations. New York, 1976, p.211.
13. Ibid., p.29.
14. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p.200.
15. G. Brunn, Eurcne and the French Imperium. 1799-1814, New York, 1975, 
p. 351
16. Noting the effects of the Levee en masse on French military power 
Mckay and Scott observe that the "immense numerical superiority and
337
... patriotism Cof the French Revolutionary armies] carried almost 
ail before them. The new found ardour was reflected in the more 
aggressive mobile tactics which could be employed. Total victory was 
the object, ferocity part of the means to achieve it." The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers. p287.
17. On the nature and development of the mechanisms of the Concert of 
Europe forming the basis of this new legitimate international order 
see Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, and R. Albrecht-Carrie, 
The Concert Of Europe. 1815-1914. New York, 1968.
18. For an analysis of the tensions existing between the aims of those 
conservative and more liberal members of the Concert see Hinsley, 
Power and The Pursuit of Peace. Ch. 10 and C. Holdbraad,
The Concert of Europe: An Essay in German and British 
Philosophy. New York, 1971.
19 For an account of the diffusion of these dual influences and their 
destabilising effects upon the structure of legitimate order 
operating within Europe after 1815 see E.J. Hobsbawn, The Age Qf 
Revolution. 1789-1848. London, 1962.
20. Of course such national unification assumed the form of unification 
from the top down, rather than, as popular nationalist ideology 
envisaged, from the bottom up. For the deleterious effects of this 
elitist form of national unification on the political development of 
Germany in particular, see G. Lichtheim, Europe In The Twentieth 
Century. London, 1974.
21. R. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", pl42
22. Apart from the account of this process by Bull and Watson presented 
in Ch.4, see the analysis in R. Emerson, From Empire To Nation.
23. See S. Van Evera, "The Cult of the offensive and the Origins of 
World War One", International Security. Vol. 9, No 1, 1984,
pp.58-107. For a detailed account of the uneven development of power 
between European states in this period engendering the new phase of 
offensive activity see Kennedy, The Rise And Fall Qf Ths—
Great Powers. Ch. 5.
24. Barraclough traces the origins of such hegemonic aspirations to the 
concerns of later nineteenth century German military strategists to 
establish Germany as one of an emerging concert of world powers. See 
G. Barraclough, An Introduction To Contemporary History, ch.4.
25. The relationship between the different historical factors leading to 
the breakdown of the interwar structure of peace is highly complex 
and cannot be treated in detail here. For a valuable account of this 
period as the struggle between those satisfied states and
those alternative, revisionist states disatisfied with the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles see E. H. Carr, Ths Twenty Years!— Crisis. 
1919-1939, London, 1934. On the historical origins and nature of the 
new German, National Socialist hegemonic bloc and the expansionist
338
ideology informing it see G. Craig, Germany. 1866-1945. and 
J. Weiss, The Fascist Tradition: Radical Right-Wing Extremism In 
Modern Europe. New York, 1967.
26. R. Cox, "Social forces, States and World Orders", p.140.
27. For some works which stress the negative implications for the 
reproduction of international order arising from the entry of the 
new, non-western nations into international society due to their 
unstable internal political systems and revisionist attitudes to the 
exiting international order, see P. Lyons, "New States and 
International Order", A. James (ed.), The Bases of International 
Order, London, 1973, pp.24-59, and W.V. Obrien, (ed.), The New 
Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. London: Stevens & Sons, 
1965. As noted further below, the Critical theory outlined here 
would be concerned to identify the prospects for the historical 
reconstruction of the legitimate hegemonic blocs within such states 
as an important precondition for the future realisation of the 
extended, solidary form of international sociability implicit in 
this new nationalist principle of international legitimacy.
28. Of course the reactions of post-colonial, non-European states to 
such western dominance have been complex and cannot be totally 
encompassed by the movement for a New International Economic Order. 
For an assessment of these different responses and, in particular, 
of the more extreme rejections of western cultural dominance see 
D.C. Gordon, Images of the West: Third World Perspectives. Savage, 
USA, 1989.
29. As the later work of Hedley Bull suggests, the successful 
historical transformation of the form of international sociability 
underpinning the contemporary international order would also require 
the practical transformation of the major inequities existing within 
third world states engendered by repressive indigenous political 
regimes in accordance with the acknowledgement of the higher
form of sociability implicit in the extended nationalist 
principle of sovereign recognition.
30. Such changes are most clearly reflected in the revival of the 
economies of Japan and western European states and the recent 
emergence of new mercantilist tendencies amongst the more equal 
economic powers of the United States, Japan and West Germany. As 
well as Cox's account of this process outlined in chapter six see 
A. Buchan, The End of The Postwar Era. London, 1974, R. Gilpin,
The Political Economy Of International Relations and M. Davis, "From 
Fordism to Reaganism: The Crisis of American hegemony in the 1980s,
R. Bush et. al. (eds.), The World Order: Socialist Perspectives, 
Cambridge, Eng., 1987
31. For some differing interpretations of the implications of this 
recent change in superpower relations for future world order 
see the essays in M. Kaldor, (et al.) (eds.), The New Detente: 
Rethinking East-West Relations. London, 1989, and Francis Fukuyama, 
"The End of History", The National Interest, no.16 Summer, 1989,
339
pp.3-18. On the principles underlying the 'Hew Thinking' associated 
with Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev and its emphasis upon the 
need to address the common interests of humankind transcending 
states' ideological differences see M. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New 
Thinking For Our Country and the World. New York, 1987, Ch. 3.
32. It is important to stress here the complex nature of the current 
changes in superpower relations and the uncertain implications they 
involve for the future reproduction of international order. It may 
well be the case that the integrative potentials opened up by the 
latter will be overwhelmed by the tensions and conflicts associated 
with the contemporary processes of international transformation.
Such tensions are reflected in the revival of nationalist 
sentiment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and in the 
instabilities associated with the reduced influence of the 
superpowers over antagonistic states in the Middle East.
33. The implications of the recent transformation of postwar 
international relations noted here arguably raise the need to 
extend the scope of this Critical theory to examine the 
possibilities for the extension of this higher, solidary form of 
international sociability on a truly global dimension rather than 
merely within the contemporary western society of states which has 
been our primary concern.
34. For some recent accounts of the complex relationship between these 
problems, the potential instabilities to which they may give rise 
within contemporary international society and the need for extended 
forms of societal cooperation to manage them see J. Mcneill,
"The Greening of International Relations", International Journal.
Vol. No.1, 1989-90, pp.1-35, S. George, A Fate Worse Than Debt,
New York, 1988, and R.A. Falk, This Endangered Planet, Prospects and 
Proposals for Human Survival, New York, 1972.
35. On the problems posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons within 
the postwar society of states see H. Bull, The Control of the Arms
Race. London, 1961.
36. For some accounts of the potential social forces engendered by these 
current processes of international change and the possibilities they 
offer for the advancement of this emancipatory interest see, for 
example R.B.J. Valker, One World/Many Worlds and Anthony Giddens,
The Nation State and Violence. Ch.ll.
BOOKS
Albrecht-Carie, R. The Concert Of Europe.. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1968.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise To Globalism : American Foreign Policy Since 
1938. 3rd rev. ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1983.
Amin, S. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of 
Peripheral Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
Amin, S. (et al.) (eds.), Dynamics Of Global Crisis. London: MacMillan, 
1982
Anderson, P. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: Verso, 1974.
----------  Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books,
1974.
Barnes, K. (ed.) After Philosophy: End or Transformation. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, cl987.
Barker, Ernest (ed. & intro.) Social Contract: Essays by Locke. Hume and 
Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971.
Barraclough, G. An Introduction To Contemporary History. Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1967.
-------------  The Medieval Papacy. London: Thames & Hudson, 1968.
Beloff, M. The Age of Absolutism 1660-1815. London: Hutchinson 
Univ. Library, 1958.
Bernstein, Richard J. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, 
Oxford: Methuen, 1985.
Bhagwati, J.N. The New International Economic Order : the North-
South Debate. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977.
Black, Max (ed.) The Importance of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1962.
Block, F. The Origin of International Economic Disorder. Berkley,
Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1977.
Bowle, J. The Imperial Achievement: The Rise and Transformation of_tbs.
British Empire. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1977.
Bozeman, Adda B. The Future nf Law in a Multicultural World. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971.
342
----------  Politics and Culture in International History.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960.
Braudel, F. Civilization And Capitalism. 15th-18th Century: Vol.III. The 
Perspective of the World. (Transl. S. Reynolds, London: Collins, 
1984.
Brewer, Anthony Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980
Briggs, Asa The Age Qf Improvement: The Making of Modern England. 1783- 
1867. New York: Harper, 1965.
Brunn, G. Europe and the French Imperium 1799-1814. New York: Harper 
& Row, 1975.
Buchan, A. The End of the Postwar Era: a New Balance of World Power, 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1974.
Bull, H. The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics. 
London: Macmillan, 1977.
------  The Control of the Arms Race. London: Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1961.
------  Justice in International Relations. Waterloo, Ont.: Univ.
of Ontario, 1983.
Bull, H. (ed.), Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984.
Bull, H. & A. Watson. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985.
Bush, R. (et al.), The World Order: Socialist Perspectives. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987.
Butterfield, H. & M. Wight.(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations : Essays in 
the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.
Calleo, D.P. The Imperious Economy. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1982.
Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics since 1945. 4th ed., London:
Longman, 1982.
Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 : an Introduction to the 
study of International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1981.
Clark, I. Reform and Resistance in the International Order. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980.
343
-------  Limited Nuclear Var: Political Theory and War Conventions.
Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1982.
Conclly, William E. The Terms of Political Discourse. 2nd ed., Oxford: 
Martin Robinson, 1983.
Cox, R.V. Production. Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 
of History. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1987.
Craig, G.A. Germany 1866-1945. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978.
-------  Europe Since 1815. Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1974.
Craig, G.A. & A.L. George Force And Statecraft : Diplomatic Problems of 
Our Time. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983.
Dehio, Ludwig The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe 
1494-1945. London: Chatto & Windus, 1963.
d'Entreves, A.P. Natural Law : an Introduction To Legal Philosophy. 
London: Hutchinson Univ. Library, 1970.
Der Derian, J. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Estrangement. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1987
Der Derian, J. & M. Schapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual
Relations: Boundaries of Knowledge and Practice in World Politics. 
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988.
Doran, C.F. (et. al.) (ed.), Nnrth/Snuth Relations : Studies of 
Dependency Reversal. New York: Praeger, 1983.
Dürkheim, E.The Division of Labour in Society. (Transl. G. Simpson), 
London: Macmillan, 1933.
Elias, Norbert The Court Society. (Transl. E. Jephcott), Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983.
Emerson, R. From Empire to Nation : the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian
and African Peoples. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
Emmanuel, A. Unequal Exchange: A Study of The Imperialism of Trade,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
Erickson, Carolly The Medieval Vision: Essays in History and Perception, 
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976.
Falk, R.A. This Endangered Planet : Prospects and Proposals for Human 
Survival. New York: Random House, 1972.
Femia, J.V. Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony. Consciousness and tns. 
Revolutionary Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
344
Fieldhouse, D.K. Economics and Empire 1830-1914. London: Macmillan,
1984.
Forsyth, M.G. (st al.) (eds.), The Theory of International Relations: 
Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitshcke. London: Allen & Unwin, 
1970.
Frank, A.G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical 
Studies of Chile and Brazil, Mew York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
George, S. A Fate Worse Than Debt. London: Penguin, 1988.
Giddens, A., The Nation-State and Violence : a Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism, Vol.2, Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press,
1985.
Gilbert, F. To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign 
Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970.
Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1981.
--------  U.S. Power and The Multi-National Corporation : the Political
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Basic Books, cl975.
--------- The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987.
Gong, G.V. The Standard of Civilisation in International Society.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
Gorbachev, M. Perestroika : New Thinking For Qur Country and the World. 
New York: Harper & Row, cl987.
Gordon, D.C. Images of the Vest: Third World Perspectives. Totawa,
N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1989.
Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.
(ed. Si transl. Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith), New York: International 
Publishers, 1980.
---------- The Modern Prince and Other Writings. New York:
International Publishers, 1970.
Grotius, H. The Law of Var and Peace. Oxford, 1925.
Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interests. (Transl. J. Schapiro), 
London: Heinemann, 1972.
----------- Legitimation Crisis, (Transl. T. McCarthy), Boston:
Beacon Press, cl975.
Hay, D. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
345
Heckscher, Eli F. Mercantilism. (Transl. M. Schapiro), London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1955.
Higgot, R. (ed.), New Directions in International Relations?: Australian 
Perspectives. Canberra: Australian National University, Dept, of 
International Relations, 1988.
Hinsley, F.H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace : Theory and Practice in 
the History of Relations between States. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1967.
------------ Sovereignty. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1986.
Hintze, 0. The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. (ed. F. Gilbert),
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975.
Hobbes, T. Leviathan, (ed. C.B. Macpherson), Middlesex: Penguin, 1976.
Hobsbawm, E.J. The Age of Revolution 1789-1848. New York: Mentor, 1962
Hoffman, S. The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics. New York: Praeger, 1965.
---------- Duties Beyond Borders : on the Limits and Possibilities of
Ethical International Politics. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. 
Press, 1989.
Holbraad, C. The Concert of Europe: An Essay in German and British 
Philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971.
------------(ed.), Superpowers and World Order. Canberra: Australian
National Univ. Press, 1971.
Holsti, K.J. The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in 
International Theory. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985.
Horowitz, David. From Yalta to Vietnam : American Foreign Policy in the 
Cold War. Harmondsworth, Middlesex. : Penguin, cl971.
Howard, Michael War in European History. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1977.
James, A. (ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of 
C.A.V. Manning. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973.
Jay, M. The Dialectical Imagination : a History of the Frankfurt SchoaL 
and the Institute of Social Research. London: Heinemann, 1974.
Joll, J. Europe Since 1870. 2nd ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1976.
346
Jones, S.J. & W.S. Rosen (eds.), The Logic of International Relations. 
4th ed., Boston: Little, Brown & Co. , 1974.
Kaldor, M. et. al. (eds.), The New Detente: Rethinking East-West 
Relations. London; New York: Verso, 1989.
Kant, I. On History, (ed. L. Beck), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merri11, 1985.
Kaplan, Morton A. System and Process in International Politics.
New York: Wiley, 1979.
---------------- Towards Professionalism in International Theory :
Macrosystem Analysis. New York: Free Press, cl979.
Kegley, Charles W. & E.R. Wittkopf, The Global Agenda : Issues and
Perspectives. New York: Random House, cl984.
Keller, M. (ed.) The New Deal. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967.
Kennedy, P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
Keohane, R.O. After Hegemony : Co-operation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, cl984.
Keohane, R.O. (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1986.
Knorr, K. St J.N. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International 
Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.
Kolko, G. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American 
History. 1900-1916. New York: Col1ier-Macmillan, 1963.
Kolakowski, L. Positivist Philosophy: From Hume to the Vienna Circle. 
(Transl. N. Guterman), Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972.
Krasner, S.D. Defending The National Interest: Raw Materials
Investments and United States Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton Univ. Press, cl978.
Krasner, S.D. (ed.), International Regimes. Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1984.
Lauterpacht, H, Recognition in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1948.
Laver, M. The Politics of Private Desires : the Guide to the Politics of 
Rational Choice. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1981.
Lichtheim, G. Europe in the Twentieth Century. London: Cardinal, 1974.
347
Linklater, A. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. 
London: Macmillan, 1982.
------------ Beyond Realism and Marxism : Critical Theory and
International Relations. Houndmills, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990.
Machiavelli, N. The Prince and the Discourses. New York: Modern Library, 
cl950.
Mandelbaum, M. The Nuclear Revolution : International Politics before
and after Hiroshima. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981.
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power. Vol.l, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1986.
Mattingly, G. Renaissance Diplomacy. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1973.
McCarthy, T. The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1978.
McKay, D. & H. M. Scott The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815. London: 
Longman, 1983.
McKinlay, R.D. & R. Little Global Problems and World Order. London:
F. Pinter, 1986.
McManners, J. M. Lectures On European History 1789-1914 : Men. Machines 
and Freedom. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
Mcneill, H. The Pursuit of Power : Technology. A.rmed Force and Society 
since A. D. 1QQQ. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
Meinecke, F. Machiavel1 ism: the Doctrine of Raison d'etat and its Place 
in Modern History. London: Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
Miller, L.H. & R.V. Pruessen (eds.), Reflections on the Cold Var:
A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: Temple 
Univ. Press, 1974.
Morgenthau, H. Politics among Nations : the Struggle for Power and Peace 
5th ed. , New York: A. Knopf, 1978.
Morse, Edward L. Modernisation and the Transformation of International.
Relations. New York: Free Press, cl976.
Nicolson, H. Diplomacy. 2nd ed. , London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958.
Nolte, E. Three Faces of Fascism (Transl. L. Vennewitz), New York:
Mentor Books, 1965.
Nye, R. B. & Morpurgo, J.B. A History of the United States._Vol.— 2j_
The Growth of The United States. Middlesex: Penguin, 1965.
348
O'Brien, V.V. (ed.) The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy. 
London: Stevens & Sons, 1965.
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. New York: Schocken Books, 1968.
Parkinson, F. The Philosophy of International Relations: a Study in the 
History of Thought. London: Sage Publications, cl977.
Pettman, R. State and Class : a Sociology of International Affairs. 
London: Croom Helm, 1979.
Pettman, R. (ed.) Moral Claims in World Affairs. Canberra: Australian 
National Univ. Press, 1979.
Ranum 0. (ed.), National Consciousness. History and Culture in Early-
Western Europe. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Univ. Press,
1975.
Roll, E. A History Of Economic Thought. London: Faber & Faber, 1954.
Rosecrance, R. The Rise of The Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in 
the Modern World. New York: Basic Books, 1986
Rousseau, J.J. The Social Contract and Discourses. (Transl. G.D.H. Cole) 
London: Dent, 1966.
Rude, George Revolutionary Europe. 1783-1815. Glasgow: Fontana, 1975.
Rumble, G. The Politics of Nuclear Defence: A Comprehensive 
Introduction. Oxford: Polity Press, 1985.
Schumpeter, J. Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. New York: Unwin 
Univ. Books, 1962.
Schurmann, F. The Logic of World Power : an Inquiry into the Origins. 
Currents and Contradictions of World Politics. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1974.
Skinner, Quentin The Foundations Of Modern Thought. Vol.I, Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions ; a Comparative Analysis of 
France. Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979.
Southern, R.V. The Making of the Middle Ages. London: Hutchinson & Co., 
1973.
Stoessinger, Vhv Nations Go To War. 3rd ed., New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982.
Strayer, Joseph R. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970.
349
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Kasterv In Europe 1848-1Q18 , Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1971.
--------------The Course of German History: A Survey nf the Development
of German History since 1815. London: Methuen, 1968.
-------------- How Wars End. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985.
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. (Transl. R. Varner & 
intro. M.I. Finely), Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972.
Tilly, C. (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe. 
Princeton, M.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975.
Tucker, R.V. The Inequality of Nations. Mew York: Basic Books, 1977.
Valker, R.J.B. One World. Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace. 
Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
Valker, R.J.B. & S.H. Mendlowitz, Contending Sovereignties : Redefining 
Political Community. London: Lynne Reinner, 1990.
Vallace-Hadrill, J.M. The Barbarian West 400-1000. London: Hutchinson 
& Co, 1966.
Vallerstein, I. The Modern World System Vol.l: Capitalist agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth 
Century. Mew York: Academic Press, 1974.
Valtz, K. Man. The State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. Mew York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1959.
-------  Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, cl979.
-------  Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: the American and
British Experience. Boston: Little Brown & Co. , 1967.
Watson, A. Diplomacy: the Dialogue Between States. London: Methuen, 1982
Weiss, J. The Fascist Tradition: Radical Right-Wing Extremism in Modern 
Europe. Mew York: Harper & Row, cl967.
Wight, M. Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester Univ. Press, 1977.
--------  Power Politics. 2nd ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin,
1986.
Volf, John B. The Emergence of the Great Powers 1685-1715. Mew York: 
Harper & Row, 1962.
Wright, M. (ed. ), The "Mew Imperialism11: Analysis of Late-Minteenth 
Century Expansion. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, cl961.
350
Yarnell, A. (ed.), The Postwar Epoch: Perspectives on American History 
since 1945. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Zeigler, D.V. War. Peace and International Politics. 4th ed., Glenview, 
111.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1987.
ARTICLES
Ashley, R.K. "Political Realism and Human Interests", International 
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 25, 1982, pp.204-236.
----------- "The poverty of neorealism", International Organisation.
Vol.38, No.2, 1984, pp.225-286.
Bull, H. "International Relations as an Academic Pursuit",
Australian Outlook. Vol.26, no. 3, 1972, pp.251-265.
-------  "Martin Wight and the Theory of of International Relations",
British Journal of International Studies. Vol.2, No.2, 1976,
pp.101-116.
-------  "The Grotian Conception of International Society",
H. Butterfield & M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations:
Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1966, pp.51-73.
Campbell, D. "The Problem of Rationality in Foreign Policy Analysis", 
Melbourne Journal of Politics. Vol.18, 1986/87, pp.1-17.
Cox, R.W. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory", Mi1lenium. Vol.10, no.2, 1982, pp.126-155.
-------  "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in
Method", Mi1lenium. Vol.12, no.2, pp.162-175.
-------  "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order:
reflections on some recent literature, International 
Organization. Vol.33, No.2, 1979, pp.257-301.
-------  "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order",
International Journal. Vol.44, 1989, pp.823-862.
Davies, Roy E. "The English school of international relations: a case 
for closure" Review of International Studies. Vol.7, No.4, 1981,
pp.1-13.
351
Der Derian, James "Mediating estrangement: a theory for diplomacy", 
Review of International Studies. Vol.13, 1987, pp.91-110.
Eldrod, Richard E. "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an
International System", VorId Politics. January, 1976, pp.159-173.
Fitzpatrick, J. "The Anglo-American School of International Relations:
The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism" , Australian Outlook,
Vol.41, No.1, 1987, pp.45-52.
Fukuyama, F. "The End of History", The National Interest. No.16, Summer, 
1989, pp.1-18.
Gallie, V.B. "Essentially Contested Concepts", Max Black (ed.),
The Importance of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1962, pp.121-46.
Garst, D. "Thucydides and Neorealism", International Studies Quarterly. 
Vol.33, No.1, 1989, pp.3-27.
George, J. "International Relations and the Positivist Empiricist Theory 
of Knowledge: Implications for the Australian Discipline",
R. Higgott (ed.), New Directions in International Relations?: 
Australian Perspectives. Canberra: Australian National Univ., Dept, 
of International Relations, 1988, pp.65-142.
Gilpin, Robert, G. "The richness of the tradition of political realism", 
International Qrganisation. Vol.38, No.2, 1984, pp.287-304.
Gourevitch, P. "The Second image reversed : the international sources of 
domestic politics", International Organisation. Vol.32,
1978, pp.881-911.
Halliday, F. "The Ends of Cold Var", New Left Review, No.180, 1990, 
pp.5-24.
Hoffman, M. "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Milleniuia, 
Vol.16, No.2, 1987, pp.231-250.
Hoffman, S. "Revisionism Revisited", L. H. Miller & R.V. Preussen (eds.), 
Reflections on the Cold Var. Philapelphia: Temple Univ. Press,
1974, pp.5-27.
---------  "Review of 'Theory of International Relations' by Kenneth N.
Waltz", American Political Science Review. Vol.71, 1977, pp.1635-36
Huntington, Samuel P. "No Exit: The Errors of Endism", Th,g...Na.t jgna.L 
Interest. No.17, Fall, 1989, pp.3-11.
Klein, Bradley S. "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American power
projection and alliance defence politics", Review of_International.
Studies. 1988, Vol.14, pp.133-148.
352
Lyons, P. "New States and International Order", A. James (ed.), The
Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W, Nanning. 
London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973, pp.24-59.
Mcneill, J. "The Greening of International Relations", International 
Journalf Vol 44, no.l, 1989-90, pp.1-35.
Modelski, G. "Dependency Reversal in the Modern States-System: A Long 
Cycle Perspective", C.F. Doran et al. (eds.), North/South 
Relations: Studies of Dependency Reversal. New York: Praeger, 1983. 
pp.49-72.
Rosecrance, R. "International theory revisited", International 
Organization. Vol.35, 1981, pp.691-713.
Ruggie, John G. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", Robert 0. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism 
and its CriticsNew York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986, pp.131-157.
Skocpol, T. "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and 
Historical Critique", American Journal of Sociology. Vol.82, 1977, 
pp.1075-90.
Thomson, J. "State Practices, International Norms and the Decline of
Mercenarism, Journal of International Studies. Vol.34, No.l, 1989, 
pp.23-47.
Van Evera, S. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War 
One", International Security. Vol.9, No.l, 1984, pp.58-107.
Vincent, J. "Hedley Bull and Order in International Relations", 
Millenium. Vol.17, no.2, 1988, pp.195-213.
---------- "Change and International Relations", Review of
International Studies. Vol.31, No.l, 1987, pp.65-87.
Walker, R.B.J. "Realism, Change and International Political Theory", 
International Studies Quarterly. Vol.31, No.l 1987, pp.65-87.
K. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of 
International Affairs. Vol.44, No.l, 1990, pp.21-38
-------- "International Structure, national force and the balance of
world power", Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 21, No.2,
1967, pp.215-231.
Watson, A. "Systems of States", Review of International Studies. Vol.16, 
pp.99-109.
Wight, M. "Western Values in International Relations", H. Butterfield & 
M. Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin, 1966, pp.89-131.
353
--  "An anatomy of international thought", Review of International
Studies. Vol. 13, 1987, pp.221-227.
